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Preface
We live in the age of disclosure: personal data circulates relatively freely across borders, and citizens 
are able to create and control multiple identities. Personal data underpins most digital services: search, 
social networking, eCommerce, eHealth. Personal data also enable businesses to provide new, intelligent 
and automated services to their customers. But not all is rose-tinted in the digital world. 
The present survey provides new evidence that European citizens favour strong and secure privacy, 
identity and data protection rights. Europeans care a lot about their personal information, about their 
privacy and about their digital identity. Although the perception of our identity as well as that of others has 
always been important, the advent of the Internet has increased the importance of personal information, 
since online identity is what allows us to share information and access data, services and applications. 
Personal data is today indispensable to live our digital lives. 
The survey suggests that our use of, and dependence on, the Internet, mobiles and other devices has 
highlighted the need to regulate and better control the identification process in a global digital world. 
There is big demand for secure and interoperable e-authentication tools that can reduce our vulnerability 
towards misuse and abuse of personal data such as identity theft, personal data loss and profiling. 
2011 was a year of review, both in Europe and more broadly. I hope that many will find therefore 
fresh evidence in what follows for improved behaviour, stronger policy and better business models.
Robert Madelin
Director General
Directorate General Information Society and Media
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Executive Summary
This Report presents the results of the largest survey ever conducted in Europe and elsewhere 
about people’s behaviours, attitudes and regulatory preferences concerning data protection, privacy 
and electronic identity, both on the Internet and otherwise in their daily lives. It finds that personal data 
disclosure is increasingly prevalent in the European society, largely due to the expansion of the Information 
Society. In turn, most services provided in the digital economy rest on the assumption that this data and 
associated electronic identities are collected, used and disposed of according to existing legislation. 
The survey shows very clearly how Digital Europe is shaping up. About two thirds of EU27 citizens 
use the Internet frequently, more than one third uses Social Networking Sites (SNS) to keep in touch 
with friends and business partners and almost 4 out of 10 shop online. In both of these contexts, people 
disclose vast amounts of personal information, and also manage a large and growing number of electronic 
identities. However, there are equally significant differences among Member States and considerable 
digital exclusion, mainly due to socio-demographic differences in affluence, education and age.
Europeans know that if they want to benefit from using the Internet to its full potential they 
have to disclose their data (biographical, social, financial or medical) and manage online identities. 
Almost three in four Europeans accept that revealing personal data, so as to benefit from online 
services, is part of everyday life. While nearly all disclose biographical data (i.e. name, nationality, 
online account identity) to access a service, users shopping online also disclose address information 
and financial information and users of social networking sites disclose more social information but 
not financial. 
But online users are also very much aware of risks in transacting online and are naturally concerned. 
The perception of risk is greater for more ‘mature/active’ users but it does not seem to curb abuse 
and misuse – such as data loss and identity theft. Providentially, these are still uncommon in Europe. 
Furthermore, Europeans understand they are not in control – an impressive 30% of all eCommerce users 
that disclose information believe they have no control on their data. They employ a variety of methods, 
both in the offline and the online world, to protect their identity; however, they tend to understand better 
how to protect their identity in the offline world (62% use data minimisation techniques) than when in the 
online world (about 40% use anti-spam and anti-spy software). Finally, almost all Europeans (90%) favour 
equal protection of their data protection rights across the EU, even though a majority feel responsible 
themselves for the safe handling of their personal data.
Finally, people trust institutions more than companies, especially medical institutions, to protect the 
data they are entrusted with; they are slightly less sanguine about whether Governments and Banks are 
to be trusted and concur as to the perception that private companies such as Internet service providers, 
e-shops and telephone companies are not to be trusted with their data. 
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These are some of the insights of the Eurobarometer survey2 on Data Protection and Electronic Identity 
which was conducted in December 2010 and the results of which were released3 and published4 in June 
2011.
The present report5 builds on the top line results presented in the EB-359 report and analyses in 
depth the information collected so as to draw conclusions in direct relation to four Digital Agenda key 
areas: e-Commerce, Social Networking sites, Authentication and Identification and Medical information 
as personal data.
More in detail, this report finds: 
1 As eCommerce is becoming mainstream in Europe (about 40% of EU27 citizens engage in this 
activity), the fact that virtually nobody shops cross-border in-EU or out-EU without shopping first in 
their own country points at the need to promote cross-border eCommerce by enforcing legislation 
to enhance ‘trust’ within national borders first. Reinforcing trust of young people is particularly 
important, as the younger generation harnesses the Internet in more depth.
2 With socio-demographics (i.e. affluence, education, age) underpinning Internet uptake and an almost 
perfect correlation between Internet use and eCommerce, both factors strongly influence online 
shopping; they are at least as important, if not more, than national factors such as regulation, supply 
of services or structure of the digital market.
3 There is significant use of business-issued rather than public-issued credentials for all Internet 
transactions, especially for eCommerce; in part, this depends on the fact that although many countries 
issue credentials these are seldom directly usable online for commercial purposes. This implies that:
 a) A transaction system based on the use of third-party credentials, rather than on direct disclosure 
of bank or credit related information, and in general other ways of pegging ‘virtual identity’ to 
real identity may enhance accountability and be useful to stimulate cross-border shopping.
 b) The offer of interoperable, easy to use national and cross-border systems with similar look and 
feel and more uniform protection of the rights of consumer and their personal data across the EU 
contribute to making it easier to transact cross-border.
4 With small differences in socio-economic traits and country of residence, people consider themselves 
and companies as being responsible for the protection of their data, rather than policymakers [of 
course, each in their own capacity]. Explicitly better enforcement of existing Data Protection rules 
accompanied by an increase of awareness of rights is seen as required. Implicitly, this suggests that 
fostering [genuine] trust in data controllers and their practices may remove part of the burden from 
regulators’ shoulders.
2 The eID team at the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and DG Justice 
managed the design, analysis and interpretation of Special Eurobarometer 359 on Data Protection and Electronic Identity. 
TNS Opinion conducted the survey in EU27 and contributed to data analysis. The survey was coordinated by the DG COMM 
“Research and Speechwriting” Unit.
3 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/742&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
4 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf
5 Deliverable D3 of the AA 31508-2009-10 between DG INFSO/C1 and JRC-IPTS on analysis of results.
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5 The perception of risk associated with eCommerce and Social Networking is not acknowledged as a 
dominant factor. The more people carry out Internet activities the more likely they are to shop across 
borders, even though the perception of risk increases. An explanation may come from the finding that 
people who fear risks are also more likely to take active steps to protect their personal identity, both 
offline and online.
6 More needs to be done to raise awareness regarding the identity-related personal data users regularly 
provide online; differences in the use of identification data are unrelated to macro-economic 
indicators but they mirror the structure in place in single countries. If cross-border eGovernment or 
eCommerce are to be fostered, then a more homogeneous use of government-related identification 
data would be needed.
7 People who use government-issued credentials are both more likely to report reduced perception of 
risk of identity-theft and to trust companies less as data controllers. In turn, people who trust companies 
less are less likely to engage in a range of Internet activities, including eCommerce. Therefore, some 
degree of ‘portability of trust’ from public to commercial institutions could be fostered via the greater 
use of government-supported, if not outright issued, credentials.
8 The media play a vital role in generating support for more articulated awareness of the challenge 
of identity or data loss. Since Internet users are largely sensitive to the media, these may be used to 
‘nudge’ Europeans in the direction of improved protection of their identity-related data with online 
protection tools or by minimising personal data disclosure. The latter is particularly important in the 
case of the ‘significant’ minority of Europeans who are very open to disclose personal data, trust 
companies and are comfortable with online profiling and practically do not use measures to protect 
their data. From another point of view ‘nudging’ could be facilitated if accompanied by stricter rules 
to prevent abuse.
9 Independent of whether people use private- or public- issued identification data they are strongly in 
favour of the key principles of the existing European Data Protection legislation: (i) homogeneous 
data protection rights across the EU; (ii) to be informed when their personal data is lost or stolen; 
(iii) to be able to delete/edit their data whenever they wish to do so. This is a loud and clear call for 
stronger enactment, in everyday life, of these principles. This may also indicate a trend towards more 
institution-centred remedies (i.e. on regulating directly the controllers, processors of information) 
rather than more personal initiative (i.e. burdening the data subjects with necessary proactive online 
strategies for the protection of their identity online).
10 Overall, results suggest that public institutions have large room for manoeuvre in addressing problems 
of trust and safe use of credentials in online transactions – today the role of public credentials is 
largely marginal to the structure of eServices in most EU countries. It emerges clearly that Member 
States need to coordinate their respective eID actions, if the potential of credentials is to enable an 
increase in the fruition of eServices both public and commercial; especially, this is the case in MS 
with a less established culture of credentials, lower levels of eCommerce and lesser Internet skills.
11 More than a third of EU27 (34%) access Social Networking Sites (SNS), and more than half of those 
also use websites to share pictures, videos, movies, etc… The main use of SNS is to enable online 
socialising which necessarily means disclosing of social (personal) information online; indeed SNS 
users are less cautious about sharing social information although they consider it personal. There are 
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notable differences in the geographical use of SNS amongst Member States. There is also a generation 
split as younger people use the Internet very little outside SNS in all MS while older people who use 
SNS are practically the same as a percentage of Internet users. 
12 The last point is important, as the younger generation (Digital natives) tends to behave in a significantly 
different fashion from their parents; results suggest that this may go beyond lifecycle effects, as not-
so-young adults also disclose more, control less and are equally worried about their privacy. Thus 
the policies and regulatory framework of today may need overhauling in the next 10-20 years. In 
the interim, policy initiatives need to provide support for the commercial ‘nudging’ of the relatively 
younger generation (40-55 years of age) to behave responsibly with their data.
13 Significant work will be needed to enforce fully informed consent and to foster better awareness of 
what may happen with people’s personal data once it is disclosed in an SNS. Such initiatives would 
need to address both: (i) what SNS ought to do to inform their users on how data collected will be 
used and what the consequences of such use may be; and (ii) what SNS users may demand as just 
return to their consent towards their personal information being used to extract monetary value from 
(i.e. behavioural advertising).
14 This is especially so in the case of those Europeans (3-5%), who albeit consider their medical data to 
be personal, do disclose it. Since they are aware of the risks that this may involve, one may deduce 
that the benefit from disclosure is high enough. In this case significant protection may be needed; 
especially since currently the controllers of such information are private companies who are less 
trusted online. The latter may indicate an opportunity for ‘trusted’ public services to become available.
15 Finally, the survey indicates strong support for a number of technical solutions to challenges, such 
as the need for systems that: (i) allow portability of trust from public to commercial institutions via 
the greater use of government-supported, if not outright issued, credentials; (ii) a disclosure system 
based on third-party credentials, and other ways of pegging ‘virtual identity’ to real identity; and (iii) 
interoperable, easy to use national and cross-border systems with similar looks and feel.
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1 Study Design and Survey Methodology
1.1 Survey methodology
The survey was conducted by TNS in the 
27 Member States of the EU between the 25 
November and 17 December 2010. 26,574 
Europeans aged 15 and over, resident in each 
EU Member States (MS), were interviewed. The 
full breakdown of interviews by Member States 
and relevant data collection dates are reported 
in Table 1. The methodology used is that of the 
Standard Eurobarometer. In short, the survey 
design applied in all MS is a multi-stage, random 
probability sample. 
More in detail, in each country, a number 
of sampling points was drawn with probability 
proportional to population size (for a total 
coverage of the country) and to population density. 
In order to do so, the sampling points were drawn 
systematically from each “administrative regional 
units”, after stratification by individual unit and 
type of area. They thus represent the whole 
territory of the countries surveyed according 
to the EUROSTAT NUTS II (or equivalent) and 
according to the distribution of the resident 
population of the respective nationalities in terms 
of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each 
Table 1. Survey schedule by country
Abbreviations Country # interviews
Fieldwork
started
Fieldwork
ended
Population
15+
BE Belgium 1020 25/11/2010 14/12/2010 8,866,411
BG Bulgaria 1000 26/11/2010 08/12/2010 6,584,957
CZ Czech Rep. 1015 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 8,987,535
DK Denmark 1007 26/11/2010 15/12/2010 4,533,420
DE Germany 1519 25/11/2010 12/12/2010 64,545,601
EE Estonia 1000 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 916,000
IE Ireland 975 26/11/2010 17/12/2010 3,375,399
EL Greece 1000 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 8,693,566
ES Spain 1006 26/11/2010 14/12/2010 39,035,867
FR France 1000 26/11/2010 14/12/2010 47,620,942
IT Italy 1039 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 51,252,247
CY Rep. of Cyprus 501 26/11/2010 12/12/2010 651,400
LV Latvia 1000 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 1,448,719
LT Lithuania 1026 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 2,849,359
LU Luxembourg 501 26/11/2010 15/12/2010 404,907
HU Hungary 1014 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 8,320,614
MT Malta 500 26/11/2010 12/12/2010 335,476
NL The Netherlands 1024 26/11/2010 14/12/2010 13,288,200
AT Austria 1010 26/11/2010 12/12/2010 6,973,277
PL Poland 1000 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 32,306,436
PT Portugal 1046 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 8,080,915
RO Romania 1013 26/11/2010 10/12/2010 18,246,731
SI Slovenia 1020 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 1,748,308
SK Slovakia 1034 26/11/2010 13/12/2010 4,549,954
FI Finland 1003 26/11/2010 16/12/2010 4,412,321
SE Sweden 1010 26/11/2010 15/12/2010 7,723,931
UK United Kingdom 1291 26/11/2010 14/12/2010 51,081,866
Total EU27 26,574 25/11/2010 17/12/2010 406,834,359
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gy of the selected sampling points, a starting address 
was drawn, at random. Further addresses (every 
Nth address) were selected by standard “random 
route” procedures, from the initial address. In 
each household, the respondent was drawn, at 
random (following the “closest birthday rule”). 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face in 
people’s homes and in the appropriate national 
language. As far as the data capture is concerned, 
Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) was 
used in those countries where this technique was 
available.
1.2 Study design
Overall, survey design is based on the 
concept and practice of personal data disclosure 
in context; it takes the move for the assumption 
that personal data disclosure is prevalent, to some 
extent unavoidable, in modern European and 
non European societies. It looks at Online Social 
Networking and eCommerce as two principle 
contexts where disclosure ifs particularly policy 
sensitive. In the process, it examines issues of 
privacy, data protection and identity. Specifically, 
authentication and electronic identities are 
examined as a possible mitigation to the 
prevalence of disclosure across contexts. The 
survey includes 47 questions on these topics, 
alongside usual questions on respondents’ socio-
demographic profile. The full questionnaire is 
provided in Annex: Survey Questionnaire.
Due to its complex nature, the survey was 
a long time in the making, a journey starting in 
2008 and now completed upon publication. 
Quality checks and scientific validations along 
this time ensure that the survey actually measures 
what it aims to. Several preparatory activities, 
described below, lead up to survey execution.
•	 Desk	research	[2007-2010]
- Exhaustive review of literature and 
current research on themes of data 
protection, identity management 
technologies and practices, digital 
identity, privacy, user online 
behaviour, online social networking 
and eCommerce, regulation and 
self-regulation. Review of policy 
developments in data protection, 
eCommerce, privacy, e-signature and 
authentication, electronic identity.
•	 2	 sets	 of	 focus	 groups	 with	 young	 people	
[January-February 2008]
- Two discussion groups of eight to 12 
people aged 15-25 years were held 
during January and February 2008 in 
Spain, France, Germany and Britain.
•	 Validation	workshop	[April	2008]
- Involved 16 external experts from 
various disciplines cognate with survey 
topics. Here, the aims of the pilot survey 
were discussed, to improve both the 
theoretical framework and the data 
collection methodology.
•	 Survey	 pilot	 in	 4	 countries	 [UK,	 Spain,	
France and Germany], conducted using 
scenarios with people aged up to 25 years of 
age, online [July-August 2008].
•	 Focus	 groups	 with	 people	 of	 all	 ages	 and	
young people, in 7 countries, on themes 
concerning the definition and disclosure of 
personal data, and notions of privacy and 
control [February 2010]
- Seven European countries representative 
of regional areas. Two discussion 
groups in each country, with eight to 
12 participants each and with 139 
participants in total.
•	 Validation	workshop	[April	2010]
- Involved 10 external experts from 
various disciplines cognate with survey 
methodology and design. Here, the 
scientific framework of the survey 
was discussed, to arrive at the final 
questionnaire.
•	Survey	finalization	[May-November	2010]
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1.3 Analysis and reporting
Unless otherwise specified, percentages 
reported in the Report are based on weighted 
data, nationally and at EU27 level. This means that 
responses are weighted within countries to make 
them representatives of actual social distribution, 
and of the actual size of different countries in 
terms of population, so as to represent faithfully 
Europe’s views. For each country a comparison 
between the sample and the reality was carried 
out. This ‘reality check’ was based on data on 
the actual composition of the population from 
Eurostat and/or from national statistics offices. 
For all countries, a national weighting procedure 
for gender, age, region and size of locality, using 
marginal and intercellular weighting, was carried 
out based on this fuller picture. For international 
weighting (i.e. EU averages), official population 
figures as provided by EUROSTAT or national 
statistic offices were used. When national results 
are reported, results are based on national 
weighted data only (the first described above). 
When results are reported for Europe, both sets of 
weights are used.
Figures and percentages are rounded at 
the lowest significant value, to the nearest 
integer (e.g., 1% rather than 1.2%, and 2% 
rather than 1.6%). For some questions, ones 
that allowed multiple responses, percentages 
necessarily add up to more than 100%. This are 
clearly marked in table footnotes. Statistical 
measures of significance are also reported 
in some tables and across the text, using the 
standard ‘p value’. Statistical significance 
indicates the extent to which results may be 
due to chance, as only a sample of EU citizens 
were interviewed and not all. Traditionally for 
large samples, only results where this chance 
is below 5% are considered valid.
Across the various sections of the Report, 
two data analysis techniques, namely factor 
analysis and multi-dimensional scaling, were 
used jointly to help determine the structure of 
data and to reduce their complexity. Factor 
analysis is a technique that aims at reducing the 
complexity of data. It does so by creating clusters 
(so-called dimension) of similar variables based 
on what people actually respond to each of 
them. If people responds consistently ‘yes’ or 
‘very much’ to different (but related) questions, 
we assume that an underlying behaviour can 
be identified. If this is the case, factor analysis 
helps extract ‘dimensions’ and build scales 
(e.g. 1 to 10) on the basis of these dimensions. 
Dimensional scales are then used in further 
analysis, in relation to other variables and other 
dimensions (if any exist, of course). There is 
debate in the scientific literature on whether one 
can create reliable scales out of factor analysis 
of dichotomous items (e.g. yes/no questions), 
as these items lack the depth of information 
required by the technique. Therefore we checked 
the results with a technique known as multi-
dimensional scaling. This technique measures 
the distance between responses in a way that 
better respects the yes/no nature of the data. 
However, as a note of caution, this technique 
does not allow the use of national and EU27 
weights.
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2 FACT SHEET: eCommerce
2.1 Question context
The questionnaire included several questions 
regarding disclosure and protection of personal 
Table 2. eID survey questions relevant to eCommerce
Question 
code
Shorthand Formulation Rationale
QB4b
Personal data 
disclosure
Thinking of the occasions when you have 
purchased goods or services via the Internet, 
which of the following types of information have 
you already disclosed?
To gauge the extent of disclosure of different 
types of personal data; this question 
follows on a previous questions asked of 
all respondents regarding what information 
they though was personal.
QB5b
Reasons why 
disclose
What are the most important reasons why you 
disclose such information in online shopping?
To asses the reasons why people disclose 
personal data in eCommerce, whether for 
leisure, to get better offers, to save time, 
etc.
QB6b
Control on 
information 
disclosed
How much control do you feel you have over the 
information you have disclosed when shopping 
online, e.g. the ability to change, delete or correct 
this information?
To determine the level of perceived control 
on the data disclosed in eCommerce. This is 
related both to the right of access to one’s 
information, and to the capacity of people 
to actually control their data once they have 
disclosed it.
QB7b
Risks related to 
disclosure
I will read out a list of potential risks. According to 
you, what are the most important risks connected 
with disclosure of your personal information to 
buy goods or services via the Internet?
To explore the risks people associate 
with the disclosure of personal data 
in eCommerce. Several risks may be 
associated with disclosure, including risks 
to reputation, to personal safety, to data 
integrity and others.
QB8b1 & 
QB8b2
Responsibility to 
protect
Who do you think should make sure that your 
information is collected, stored and exchanged 
safely when you buy goods or services via the 
Internet? Firstly? And secondly?
To help determine who people think is 
responsible for the protection of personal 
data once it’s been disclosed. 
data disclosed in the context of eCommerce, see 
Table 2:
2.2 Legal context
The main legal instruments in the area of 
eCommerce are the following:
•	 Electronic	 Commerce	 Directive:	 Directive	
2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce in the Internal Market. 
It creates the basic legal framework for 
electronic commerce in the Internal Market, 
removes obstacles to cross-border online 
services in the European Union and provides 
legal certainty to business and citizens alike. 
It also establishes harmonised rules on issues 
such as the transparency and information 
requirements for online service providers, 
commercial communications, electronic 
contracts and limitations of liability of 
intermediary service providers.
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border, and the very little difference between 
percentages of people buying inside and 
outside the EU, underline the relative lack of 
success of the Directive in promoting “trust” 
in eCommerce sites located outside the 
Member State of the buyer, as well as in the 
digital single market as a whole. Moreover, 
it is seen as encouraging self-regulation and 
“privacy/identity by design” solutions.
•	 The	Distance	Selling	Directive:	Directive	97/7/
EC on the protection of consumers in respect 
of distance contracts. This directive applies to 
any consumer distance contract made under 
the law of an EU-Member State as well as the 
European Economic Area (EEA). It provides 
a number of fundamental legal rights for 
consumers in order to ensure a high level of 
consumer protection throughout the EU.
•	 Additional	 EU-wide	 law	 includes:	 (the	
choice of) law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome Convention 1980); 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments 
(Brussels Regulations 44/2001); unfair terms 
in consumer contracts (93/13/EC); the sale of 
goods and associated guarantees (1999/44/
EC); and e-money (2000/46/EC).
Other important directives and strategic 
documents within the eCommerce legal 
framework are the following:
•	 Data	 Protection	 Directive:	 Directive	 95/46/
EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data. 
This directive is the general EU law in the 
field of protection of personal data and the 
most prominent legislative act regulating the 
processing of personal data. Its objective is 
to protect the privacy of individuals while 
enabling the free flow of personal data within 
the EU in the context of the internal market. 
It lays down obligations on data controllers 
and specifies the rights of data subjects. 
 The results presented in this fact sheet 
seem to indicate a societal change in the 
perception of privacy vis-à-vis the one 
entailed in the current EU legislation. This is 
based on the observed behaviour regarding 
the disclosure of personal information [what 
is considered personal data and what is 
disclosed]. In essence, although a large 
majority of people consider identifiers (such 
as name, address, nationality, financial 
information) as personal information, they 
are obliged to disclose it on eCommerce 
sites. Without doubt this behaviour is 
eroding the established values of privacy and 
identity as these are defined in the directive. 
eCommerce users’ control over their own 
information in eCommerce sites is another 
issue that relates to the implementation of 
the Directive.
•	 ePrivacy	Directive:	Directive	2002/58/EC	of	
the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector. This 
directive particularises and complements 
the Data Protection directive with respect 
to the processing of personal data in the 
electronic communications services over 
public communications networks to ensure 
confidentiality of communications and 
security of their networks, including an 
obligation to notify personal breaches to the 
competent authority at national level. This 
directive is relevant and applicable in the 
case of disclosure of personal information 
in the online environment, namely in 
eCommerce sites. 
•	 Directive	 98/48/EC	 of	 the	 European	
parliament and of the Council of 20 July 
1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying 
down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the field of technical standards 
and regulations. This Directive provides the 
definition of information society services 
(Art.1(2)) which applies to eCommerce sites.
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•	 Digital	Agenda:	The	Communication	named	
“A Digital Agenda for Europe.” is one of the 
seven flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 
Strategy, set out to define the key policies 
and actions necessary to deliver sustainable 
economic and social benefits from a digital 
single market based on fast and ultra fast 
internet and interoperable applications.
 The low numbers of eCommerce cross border 
transactions identified in this fact sheet is 
also confirmed by the DAE scoreboard: “less 
than one in ten eCommerce transactions are 
cross-border”.
 The DAE key actions planned by the EC in 
the area of self-regulation and alternative 
dispute resolution (EU-wide Online 
Dispute Resolution system for eCommerce 
transactions by 2012) are confirmed 
by attitudes identified in relation to the 
allocation of responsibility for the protection 
of personal data to individuals and 
companies (rather than to public authorities)
 The strong correlation between Internet 
use and proportion of people shopping 
online (frequent users shop more across 
borders) emphasizes the relevance and 
urgency of Key Action 8: “[a]dopt in 2010 
a Broadband Communication that lays 
out a common framework for actions at 
EU and Member State to meet the Europe 
2020 broadband6 targets.”
2.3 Location of eCommerce: national, 
x-border and out-EU7
European Internet users were asked what 
activities they undertook online [Table 3]. 
A majority of Internet users (60%) reported 
purchasing goods or services online, such 
as travel, holiday, clothes, books, tickets, 
film, music, software, or food. eCommerce is 
becoming mainstream in Europe as about 40% of 
all citizens engage in this activity.
Table 3. Purchase of good and services online at different locations
% of Internet 
users
% of EU 27
population
Purchase goods or services online/ online shopping 60% 39%
Buy goods in own country 46% 30%
Buy goods in EU 18% 12%
Buy goods outside EU 13% 8%
Base: Internet users and EU27.
Source: QB1a & QB1b.
 
6 The Europe 2020 Strategy has underlined the importance 
of broadband deployment to promote social inclusion and 
competitiveness in the EU. It restated the objective to bring basic 
broadband to all Europeans by 2013 and seeks to ensure that, 
by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European 
households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps.
7 QB1a For each of the following activities, please tell me if it 
is an activity that you do, or not, on the Internet. 3. Purchase 
goods or services online\ online shopping (e.g. travel & 
holiday, clothes, books, tickets, films, music, software, food)
 QB1b Which of the following activities do you also do on 
the Internet? (ONLY IF “YES” in QB1a.3) Purchase goods or 
services from a seller located in (OUR COUNTRY).
 Purchase goods or services from a seller located in another 
EU country.
 Purchase goods or services from a seller located outside 
the EU.
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Within this figure, the bulk of eCommerce 
occurs within Member States (46% of all Internet 
users); there are very limited online purchases 
cross border and very little difference between 
percentages of people buying inside and outside 
the EU (18% and 13% respectively).8 The notion 
of EU single digital market is still absent in users’ 
Internet activities. Also notable is the relation 
between different locations of eCommerce. 
National eCommerce strongly underpins both 
in-EU and out-EU eCommerce: virtually nobody 
shops in-EU and out-EU without shopping in 
their own country [Table 4].
Also, eCommerce activities are most similar 
to other ‘transactional’ activities [eServices], 
generally carried out within one own country 
8 These numbers are confirmed from findings by the DAE 
scoreboard: “Fragmentation also limits demand for cross-
border eCommerce transactions. Less than one in ten 
eCommerce transactions are cross-border, and Europeans 
often find it easier to conduct a cross-border transaction 
with a US business than with one from another EU MS.”
– home banking and eGovernment [Table 5]. It 
may well be that eServices are a ‘single bundle’ 
in people’s eyes and experience. This may also 
mean that the three activities may grow together, 
if proper interoperable systems are provided that 
make it easier to transact elsewhere [outside one’s 
country]; the question remains open whether 
eCommerce could assist eGovernment, which 
currently very low in EU27 [23% of Internet users].
Factor analysis was conducted to see whether 
each of the possible places where people shop 
online were akin to other Internet activities [table 
not reported]. People shopping online in their 
own countries also tend to do home banking and 
eGovernment, while people who shop in the EU 
and outside the EU tend to do that alone, as a 
separate activity [which, strangely, co-occur with 
advanced software behaviour]. This confirms the 
different nature of eCommerce in MS and across 
MS: more ingrained in the national Internet 
experience the former, building on national 
eCommerce and more advanced the latter. 
Table 4. Purchase of good and services online in Member States vs. other locations
In EU Outside EU
Yes No Yes No
In MS Yes 16% 30% 11% 35%
No 2% 52% 2% 52%
In EU Yes 9% 9%No 4% 78%
Base: Internet users. 
Source: QB1a & QB1b.
Table 5. Factor analysis of activities carried out on the Internet
Factor 1.
Social activities
Factor 2.
Transactions
Factor 3.
Software activities
Use a social networking site .78
Use a sharing site .75
Instant Messaging .71
VoIP .41
Home banking .79
eCommerce .68
eGovernment .68
Own website .69
Browser plug-ins .59
Blog .58
Cloud software .32 .50
Peer-to-peer software .42 .46
Auto values 2.88 1.67 1.08
% Variance explained 24 14 9
Source: QB1a & QB1b.
Base: Internet users.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; factor analysis by main components; Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.781; Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 4 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .03 are omitted.
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To further test this concept, we crossed cross-
border eCommerce and MS-based eCommerce 
by frequency of Internet use (a proxy for Internet 
expertise), and with overall number of Internet 
activities carried out. The assumption was that both 
indicators are better predictors of cross-border 
eCommerce than of MS-based eCommerce. 
We also looked at general socio-economic 
characteristics and at regulatory references.
We found that males are those who shop 
primarily from outside the EU, and slightly more 
cross-border; as we expected, frequent Internet 
users shop slightly more across borders; the 
strongest predictor is the overall number of Internet 
activities carried out. First, it has a significant, strong 
correlation with the number of contexts where 
people shop [Pearson’s r = .36]. Thus people who do 
more online in general also shop in more contexts – 
MS, cross-border, non-EU. Second, there is a small 
difference on top of this regarding where people 
shop: more activities are more strongly related 
further distance of eCommerce [eta respectively 
.28, .29, .30]. Finally, people shopping online in 
different places have remarkably similar regulatory 
preferences concerning the protection of personal 
data – specifically all support to a large degree the 
need for coherent regulation of data disclosure in 
eCommerce.
2.4 National differences in eCommerce
While a large majority of European Internet 
users purchase goods or services online (60%), 
the uneven take-up of eCommerce in MS is 
striking. A high percentage of respondents shop 
online in northern and western Member States: 
Denmark and the Netherlands (81%), the United 
Kingdom (79%), Sweden (78%), Ireland (73%), 
Germany (72%) and Finland (69%). In contrast, 
respondents in the south and east are least likely 
to purchase online: Bulgaria (21%), Portugal 
(22%), Greece (25%) and Romania (26%).
Figure 1. eCommerce by country
Source: QB1a.3.
Base: Internet users (66% of total sample).
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Source: QB1a.3 crossed by D62.
Base: EU27.
Figure 3: Country scatter plot of Internet use and eCommerce
Source: QB1a.3 crossed by D62.
Base: EU27.
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Furthermore, at country level, there is a 
strong correlation between rate of Internet use 
and proportion of people shopping online. 
In Figure 2 we show how Internet use and 
eCommerce relate across EU27. The proportion 
of people shopping online [yellow bar] increases 
rapidly vs. people not buying online [red bar] as 
Internet access increases [the shorter the blue bar 
gets]. This is also evident looking at the grey dot 
distribution in Figure 3, showing a very strong 
relation [r = 0.79] between eCommerce and 
Internet use across EU27. This is not intuitive: one 
may think that, given Internet access, people in 
different countries will have the same propensity 
to shop online. This is not so: there appears to be 
two groups of Europeans: one at a lower level of 
eCommerce, and the other at a higher level of 
eCommerce [two distinct lines in Figure 3]. For 
both blocks there is an almost perfect correlation 
between Internet use and eCommerce. This we 
interpret to mean that there are national factors 
that influence eCommerce uptake – supply, 
structure of the digital market, or regulation 
[these are well explained by existing evidence, 
recently summarised in the DAE scoreboard].9
There are also other factors such as that 
Internet use and eCommerce have common 
roots, namely the socio-economics underpinning 
Internet uptake [affluence, education, age], 
which also strongly influence online shopping 
[Figure 4]. We may think of this as a funnel 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/
scoreboard/index_en.htm 
Figure 4. Socio-economic profile of eCommerce users
Source: QB1a.3.
Base: Internet users.
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sophisticated and financially costly behaviours 
[such as eCommerce; the same happens, 
with different variables into play, for political 
participation online].10 Overall, the typical 
eCommerce user is older (25-55), typically 
male, better educated, heavy Internet users, in 
management positions or self-employed and 
generally more affluent. When one compares 
this profile to the typical SNS user profile, who 
is more likely to be younger, typically female, 
well educated, a heavier Internet user and is still 
studying or is unemployed, it is rather obvious 
that these profiles are distinct. 
This adds a note of caution to the 
interpretation of results, beyond usual 
considerations of statistical significance 
of small samples. For eCommerce, socio-
economic characteristics of respondents may 
explain results more accurately than country 
of residence. Especially, this is true of countries 
with lowest Internet penetration and lower 
uptake of eCommerce [Portugal, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Rumania, Hungary] and lower GDP, and 
of countries with highest Internet penetration 
and eCommerce rates [Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands] and higher GDP. In turn, looking 
at these blocks separately may help determine 
the weight of cultural determinants of online 
shopping, including identity and data protection 
behaviours and perceptions.
2.5 Personal data disclosure in 
eCommerce11
Then, questions were asked directly regarding 
disclosure, identity management and data 
protection in eCommerce. Around nine out of ten 
respondents reveal their name (90%) and their 
home address (89%) on eCommerce sites [Table 
10	 Lusoli,	W.	(2012).	Voice	and	equality	that	state	of	electronic	
democracy in Britain. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
11 QB4b Thinking of the occasions when you have purchased 
goods or services via the Internet, which of the following 
types of information have you already disclosed?
6]. In addition, almost half give mobile phone 
number (46%), and a third their nationality (35%) 
or financial information such as salary, bank details 
and credit record (33%). Almost one in five give 
national identity number, identity card number, or 
passport number (18%). There is a thus common 
core of disclosure of name and address, to lesser 
extent nationality and mobile number.
Very	 few	people,	6%	share	 their	activities	
in the context of eCommerce [willingly or 
at least consciously]. As this information is 
not normally asked by eCommerce sites, the 
low number is understandable. People share 
their activities elsewhere, such as in Social 
Networking Sites, and they may move onto 
eCommerce sites based on the preferences 
expressed there; advertising seems to be an 
increasingly important selling point for SNS 
and an important source of revenue.
This may also mean that traditional 
eCommerce vendors may have been less rapid 
that SNS companies to see the value of web2.0 
for offering to customers products [generally 
digital, such as music, but not only] tailored 
to and anticipating their preferences. If this is 
the case, which need to be further probed by a 
market survey, then again European eCommerce 
companies and sites [which are where most 
people buy] may be at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis largely US-owned SNS sites.12
Factor analysis consolidates these results 
[Table 7]. There are four main types of information 
people disclose ‘jointly’: social information, 
biographical information, sensitive information 
and security-related information. It is interesting 
that financial information does not belong in the 
security group, but in the sensitive information 
group. This pattern of behaviour may be good 
news for those wishing to create a disclosure 
12 With the obvious exception of Amazon, for instance, 
again US-owned, that makes large use of collaborative 
filtering based on previous purchasing behaviour and 
click-stream data.
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% of eCommerce users
Name 90
Address 89
Mobile number 46
Nationality 35
Financial 33
National identity number 18
Activities 6
Work history 5
Preferences 5
Photos 4
Websites visited 4
Medical information 3
Friends 2
Fingerprints 2
Other 1
None 2
Don’t know 1
Source: Qb4b.
Base: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
Table 7. Factor analysis of personal data disclosed on eCommerce sites
Factor 1.
Social
information
Factor 2. 
Biographical 
information
Factor 3.
Sensitive 
information
Factor 4.
Security information
Friends .715
Photos .708
Preferences .697
Activities .649
Websites .620
Address .823
Name .809
Financial .722
Medical info .613
Fingerprints .593
Employment .361
Identity number .760
Mobile number .582
Nationality .493
Auto values 2,98 1,94 1,28 ,98
% Variance explained 21,2 13,9 9,1 7,0
Source: Qb4b.
Base: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0.749; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 3 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue .98.
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than on direct disclosure of bank or credit related 
information.
2.5.1 Personal data disclosure in eCommerce 
by country and socio-economic status
The similarity between MS in relation to 
personal disclosure of what was defined as 
‘biographical data’ (name, address) is truly 
remarkable [Table 8]. 
On the one hand, this may reflect 
homogenous, well-established transactions that 
require standard information; on the other, the 
similarity of user experience with disclosure of 
core data while shopping online should allow for 
significant harmonisation and, should problems 
exist (and they do exist, we argued above), be 
addressed across EU27, by either technical 
(identity by design, credential cores) or legal 
means (harmonisation, standards, …).
Table 8. Disclosure of personal data by country
Name
(%)
Address
(%)
Mobile
number (%)
Nationality
(%)
Financial
(%)
Identity
number (%)
EU27 90 89 46 35 33 18
Austria 90 85 55 60 34 11
Belgium 94 88 44 52 26 18
Bulgaria 84 79 42 29 16 25
Cyprus 92 80 36 43 31 13
Czech Republic 94 94 71 17 13 13
Denmark 96 91 73 49 56 32
Estonia 90 82 65 23 19 47
Finland 95 95 67 46 34 38
France 93 93 51 31 44 9
Germany 92 92 30 51 32 12
Greece 93 83 45 30 24 22
Hungary 93 85 59 15 36 19
Ireland 94 90 55 56 41 5
Italy 69 67 34 27 21 32
Latvia 93 85 71 11 28 57
Lithuania 84 76 51 16 14 19
Luxemburg 93 91 47 34 47 18
Malta 86 95 25 74 30 17
Poland 91 90 64 17 6 13
Portugal 72 60 26 26 19 23
Rumania 76 67 45 29 17 33
Slovakia 90 90 71 20 19 23
Slovenia 95 89 61 19 26 20
Spain 88 74 43 46 38 51
Sweden 96 94 76 35 26 72
The Netherlands 98 96 55 42 37 20
United Kingdom 89 92 42 24 39 5
Source: QB4b.
Base: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
Notes: Table reports % of people disclosing personal data items in EU27 and in individual MS.
Other items, largely of social and sensitive nature, are not reported as they are below 6%.
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On the other hand, however, there are 
differences across regional blocks, rather than 
across individual MS for other personal data, 
such as mobile phone and nationality. We noted 
that regional differences in the disclosure of 
personal data may be due to the uneven ‘culture’ 
of eCommerce across EU27. In fact, Internet 
shoppers in the Nordic countries and in Eastern 
Europe are the most likely to have given their 
mole phone number. But nationality is given 
largely in Nordic country, while far less so in 
Eastern Europe. A second exception regards the 
disclosure of identity numbers, which varies 
considerably across MS. Such variety may have 
to do with identity-related legislation in different 
member states and constitutes a significant 
barrier for the deployment of both technical and 
legal interoperable systems in the EU (within 
eCommerce).
To provide a more structured view on the 
results, we looked at country differences in the 
provision of ‘clusters’ of personal data, as they 
were determined using factor analysis: biography, 
social, sensitive and security related [Table 9]. 
There is a slight difference between north and 
Table 9. Disclosure of personal data categories by country
Social information
Biography 
information
Sensitive 
information
Security information
EU27 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.21
Austria 0.46
Belgium -0.07
Bulgaria -0.39 -0.26
Cyprus -0.07
Czech Republic -0.44 0.09
Denmark -0.30 0.26 0.19 0.49
Estonia -0.11 -0.37 -0.19 0.65
Finland -0.21 0.14 -0.08 0.58
France 0.24 -0.21
Germany 0.14 -0.14
Greece 0.54 -0.12 -0.23 -0.02
Hungary -0.11 0.01
Ireland 0.23 0.26 -0.05
Italy 0.35 -0.93 0.21
Latvia -0.24 -0.26 -0.22 0.76
Lithuania -0.44 -0.35 0.01
Luxemburg -0.19 0.17 -0.05
Malta 0.14 0.05
Poland -0.12 -0.17 -0.49 0.08
Portugal 0.31 -0.97 0.17 -0.02
Rumania -0.11 -0.77 -0.11
Slovakia -0.35
Slovenia -0.26 0.03
Spain 0.14 -0.37 0.18 0.62
Sweden -0.38 -0.23 1.19
The Netherlands 0.28
United Kingdom -0.38
Source: QB4b.
Basis: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
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south of Europe as to the provision of social 
information, which is however provided very 
seldom in eCommerce. Conversely, there is 
more variance across MS regarding the provision 
of security-related information. Increasingly 
more often, eCommerce sites make use of 
authentication techniques based on identity 
number, mobile number (via SMS) and other 
ways of pegging ‘virtual identity’ to real identity. 
This type of disclosure, which we interpreted 
as security-related, is highest in countries with 
established systems of electronic authentication, 
such as Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, The 
Netherlands and Sweden. Possibly, there is a case 
for extending this practice to other countries, 
and to other possible credentials (such as name 
and address), via burgeoning effort of identity 
credentials, which may well work cross-borders.13
In terms of socio-economic status, education 
appears to play a role in the disclosure of some 
information [Table 10]. Online shoppers who 
13 More analysis is required of this aspect, by means of 
micro-macro data integration.
Table 10. Disclosure of personal data categories by socio-economic status
Financial
(%)
Identity
Number (%)
Name
(%)
Address
(%)
Nationality
(%)
Mobile
Number (%)
EU27 33 18 90 89 35 46
Terminal 
education age
15- 28 15 83 37
16-19 15 89
20+ 36 22 91 49
Still Studying 87
Age [brackets]
15-24 51
25-39 37 49
40-54 47
55+ 28 35
Occupation
Self-employed 27 22 51
Managers 20
Other white 
collars
20 50
Manual 
workers
38
House person 40 12
Unemployed 36 51
Retired 26 13 33
Students 30
Personal 
mobile phone
No 77 29 21
Yes 90 36 47
Difficulties to 
pay bills
Most of the 
time
38
From time to 
time
36
Almost never/ 
never
31
Base: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
Notes:	Only	significant	differences	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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studied until the age 20 or later are more likely 
to disclose home address (91%), financial 
information (36%), mobile phone number (49%) 
than those who finished school before the age of 
16 (respectively 83%, 28%, 37%). In general, we 
found three main patterns:
1 Older people, generally with lower levels 
of formal education, tend to disclose less 
information of different types; younger people 
are more likely to disclose mobile number.
2 Ownership of mobile phones makes a 
difference to security-related disclosure.
3 Less affluent people tend to disclose slightly 
more financial information.
2.5.2 Disclosure of data in relation to what is 
personal and reasons for disclosure14
We then crossed disclosure of data with 
perception that this data is actually personal 
[Table 11]. This tells us whether people who 
disclose personal data consider it as such.15 
Results are very surprising, in two respects. 
First, overall, there is no apparent relation 
between considering one’s data personal and 
disclosing it on eCommerce sites. So even if 
people consider information personal, still they 
disclose it. This may indicate that there is no 
real alternative available to people other than 
disclose this information (they are “forced” to 
disclose such data).16
Table 11. Data disclosure in eCommerce crossed by what is personal data
Data disclosed Consider it personal
Financial No 82%
Yes 90%
Identity number No 78%
Yes 76%
Name No 34%
Yes 47%
Address No 49%
Yes 63%
Nationality No 28%
Yes 35%
Mobile number No 62%
Yes 66%
Source: Qb4b by Qb2.
Base: Internet users who purchased good or services online.
Notes: Only items disclosed by more than 6% of people are reported.
 
14 QB2: Which of the following types of information and 
data that are related to you do you consider as personal?
15 Questions were asked in an order that does not influence 
the responder they first asked what information is personal 
data, and then what has been disclosed.
16 The principle of privacy by design implies that IDM 
systems should allow for anonymous and pseudonymous 
interactions in the context of commercial transactions 
(service providers within the commercial sector do not 
need to receive clients’ extensive identity information that 
they currently demand).
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Second, and more surprising, for many 
items [name, address, nationality, financial 
information], there is a positive relationship; 
that is the more people consider this information 
personal, the more they disclose it on eCommerce 
sites [!]. This may mean that this information 
takes on personal connotation for people when it 
is disclosed, rather than having ‘a priori’ personal 
value. In this case, a system of credentials where 
no face-value information is disclosed may help 
people perceive that the information they have 
disclosed is ‘procedural’ rather than personal.
Part of the reason may also be that, in order 
to shop online, some information has to be 
disclosed, regardless of whether it is considered 
as personal. Indeed, the most important reason 
for disclosing personal information when 
shopping online mentioned by a vast majority 
of online shoppers is to access the service (79%) 
[Table 12]. This reason is followed at a distance 
by to obtain a service adapted to their needs 
(27%), and to save time at the next visit (19%). 
It is interesting that the reason to disclose is 
largely functional: accessing the service [thus 
dependent on what information is asked], and to 
save time. Customisation of the service [which 
however includes an element of convenience] 
and personalised offers based on profiling lag far 
behind as reasons to disclose.
Also, there is no clear link between 
information disclosed and reasons for disclosing, 
beyond small predictable variations concerning 
‘needed’ information for dispatch, contact 
information etc [Table 13]. Financial information 
is offered for functional reasons [access service, 
save time], name and address to access the 
service, nationality for a range of reasons. 
Overall, our analysis portrays a picture that is 
not overtly favourable to the deployment of 
customised services based on the enhanced [and 
increased] disclosure of personal data.
2.5.3 Reasons for disclosure, country and 
socio-economic status
Above we noted that a sizeable minority of 
those disclosing nationality, mobile and identity 
number do so to benefit from personalised 
commercial offers or to obtain a service adapted 
to their needs.
We examine here the residence and socio-
economic characteristics of people who disclose 
for those reasons [Table 14]. While there are no 
clear regional patterns, a few countries stand out. 
First, people in Germany, Austria, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are more likely to share to obtain a better 
service. Second, people in The Netherlands and 
in the UK are far less likely than other Europeans 
Table 12. Reasons to disclose personal data in eCommerce
% of  eCommerce users who disclose information
To access the service 79%
To obtain a service adapted to your needs 27%
To save time at the next visit 19%
To benefit from personalised commercial offers 13%
To receive money or price reductions 12%
To get a service for free 11%
To connect with others 6%
For fun 2%
Other 3%
DK 1%
Source: Qb5b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
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Financial Identity # Name Address Nationality Mobile #
To access the 
service
No 29% 18% 85% 83% 33% 38%
Yes 35% 19% 95% 94% 37% 50%
To save time at the 
next visit
No 32% 17% 93% 92% 35% 46%
Yes 39% 22% 93% 91% 45% 55%
To benefit from 
personalised 
commercial offers
No 33% 17% 93% 92% 36% 46%
Yes 36% 27% 90% 88% 41% 56%
To obtain a service 
adapted to your 
needs
No 33% 17% 92% 91% 34% 47%
Yes 35% 21% 94% 93% 44% 48%
Source: qb4b by Qb5b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
Notes: The table reports % of people disclosing items of information in relation to reasons why information is disclosed.
Table 14. Reason to disclose personal data by country
To obtain a service 
adapted to
your needs (%)
To benefit from 
personalised commercial 
offers (%)
To connect
with others (%)
EU27 27% 13% 6%
Austria 38%
Bulgaria 40%
Cyprus 24% 10%
Czech Republic
Finland 35% 24%
France 21%
Germany 43% 10%
Greece 49%
Hungary 22%
Italy 24%
Latvia 7%
Lithuania 44%
Malta 42%
Poland 18%
Portugal 15% 29%
Rumania 23%
Slovakia 38% 20% 10%
Slovenia 38%
The Netherlands 19% 6% 2%
United Kingdom 10% 4%
Source: Qb5b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
Notes:	Only	significant	differences	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to	chance].	Differences	from	average	were	not	significant	for	LU,	ES,	SW,	DK,	EE,	BE,	IE.
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service [what we may call a pragmatic attitude 
regarding disclosing data in eCommerce].
Regarding socio-economics, reasons to 
disclose remain stable across most characteristics 
[table not reported]. However, young people 
disclose more to connect with others; and mobile 
phone users disclose more to obtain a service 
adapted to their needs.
2.6 Risks, control and responsibility on 
data disclosed in eCommerce
2.6.1 Risks of eCommerce disclosure17
We then examined personal data disclosure 
in direct relation with perceived risks of such 
disclosure; with control on the data disclosed; and 
with responsibility concerning the safe handling 
of the data disclosed. Many risks are reported by 
respondents [procedural, substantive, related to 
safety, related to reputation], and no clear picture 
emerges from dimensional reduction via factor 
analysis [e.g. risks are relatively unrelated and 
they form no visible pattern]. In the main, fraud 
(55%), stealth use of and stealth sharing of one’s 
information with a third party (both at 43%), and 
identity theft (35%) are the risks most frequently 
reported. Risks to reputation and to personal 
safety are mentioned by far fewer respondents 
[Table 15].
We thus crossed frequently mentioned risks 
by different modes of eCommerce [in-MS, in-
EU, out-EU]. Perceptions of risks do not vary 
significantly across purchase contexts [Table 16]; 
perception of data protection risks may be as 
much a barrier to cross-border eCommerce as it is 
Table 15. Risks from disclosing personal data in eCommerce
% of service users who disclose personal data
Yourself being victim of fraud 55
Your information being used without your knowledge 43
Your information being shared with third parties without 
knowledge
43
Your identity being at risk of theft online 35
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial 
offers
34
Your information being used in different contexts 27
Your personal safety being at risk 12
Your reputation being damaged 4
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 4
Yourself being discriminated against 3
None 2
DK 1
Other 0
Source: Qb7b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
17 QB7b: I will read out a list of potential risks. According 
to you, what are the most important risks connected with 
disclosure of your personal information to buy goods or 
services via the Internet?
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to national eCommerce. Thus reasons other than 
risk perceptions in relation to disclosure hamper 
cross-border eCommerce. A few of these 
reasons were identified in previous surveys,18 
such as security concerns, language and lack 
of supply of cross-border eCommerce. More 
detailed analysis of attitudes to risks, crossing 
with surveillance, concern for over exposure 
of personal data on the Internet and profiling 
questions to detect similarity is proposed in the 
last section of this chapter.
Risks by country and socio-economic status
There is no clear pattern of risks at 
country level, as respondents mention different 
combinations of risks in different countries [Table 
17]. The same is true of socio-economic traits 
[table not reported], with some minor variance. 
First, young people again stand out, in that they 
are slightly more worried about personal safety, 
and less about their information being shared 
with third parties without them knowing or in 
different contexts than the original. Second, 
people owning personal mobile phones are more 
concerned about their information circulating 
without them knowing, and about fraud.
18 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/facts_en.htm. 
2.6.2 Control on personal data disclosed in 
eCommerce19
We examined the degree of control people 
perceive to have on personal data they have 
disclosed on eCommerce sites. Less than one in 
five thinks they have total control on their own 
information [Table 18]. About one in three thinks 
they have no control at all. About half think 
they have some control. This may be normal, as 
except for large eCommerce portals such as eBay, 
for most online purchases people do not have a 
profile page available to them, or a single point 
of entry or a purchase history (what they bought 
in past interaction, what they searched for, offers 
looked at). Further to this, we found that people 
feel slightly less in control when they disclose 
more of their biographical information [r = -0.1]. 
This may make it harder for people to feel in 
control of personal data they have disclosed one-
off, several times on different sites.
One may speculate on the relative merits 
of a tool that allowed a degree of personal data 
integration, for the benefit of the buyer rather than 
of the seller. Of course, any such ‘control’ tool 
would need to comply with the a priori principle of 
data minimization, and help organise information 
19 QB6b: How much control do you feel you have over 
the information you have disclosed when shopping 
online, e.g. the ability to change, delete or correct this 
information?
Table 16. Risks from disclosing information in eCommerce crossed by eCommerce location
% of reported risks
Buy goods
in own country
Buy goods in EU
Buy goods 
outside EU
Yourself being victim of fraud 57% 57% 61%
Your information being used without your knowledge 45% 42% 42%
Your information being shared with third parties without knowledge 45% 48% 43%
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial offers 36% 36% 35%
Your identity being at risk of theft online 37% 36% 39%
Your information being used in different contexts 28% 28% 25%
Source: Qb7b by Qb1b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
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Yourself 
being 
victim of 
fraud
Your 
information 
being used 
without your 
knowledge
Your 
information 
being 
shared with 
third parties 
without 
knowledge
Your identity 
being at 
risk of theft 
online
Your 
information 
being used 
to send you 
unwanted 
commercial 
offers
Your 
information 
being used 
in different 
contexts
Your 
personal 
safety being 
at risk
EU27 55% 43% 43% 35% 34% 27% 12%
Austria 42% 54% 20% 42%
Belgium 43% 45%
Bulgaria 36% 67% 31% 22% 11%
Cyprus 64% 18% 28%
Czech 
Republic
41% 19% 48%
Denmark 40%
Estonia 30% 6% 26%
Finland 43% 24%
France 71% 43% 17%
Germany 59% 24% 41%
Greece 51% 22%
Hungary 42% 51% 48% 15%
Ireland 59% 52% 11% 22%
Italy 33% 34% 25%
Latvia 52% 19% 14%
Lithuania 16% 11%
Luxemburg 42%
Malta 34% 23% 15%
Poland 24%
Portugal 25% 25% 24%
Rumania 27% 60% 27% 8%
Slovakia 38% 17% 26%
Slovenia 53% 40% 22% 20%
Spain 35% 29% 21% 17% 26%
Sweden 68% 46% 7%
The 
Netherlands
36% 55% 56% 4%
United 
Kingdom
65% 34% 33% 56% 22%
Source: Qb7b. 
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
Table 18. Control over information disclosed in eCommerce
% of service users who disclose information
No control at all 30
Partial control 50
Complete control 18
DK 2
Source: Qb6b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
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that is strictly necessary for the transaction, rather 
than elicit further personal data. 
Control on data disclosed by country and socio-
economic status
People from a group of countries from the 
south and east of Europe [Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Poland, Italy] has a higher perceived 
control on personal data disclosed; conversely, 
the one, single country were people feel far less 
in control is Germany [Table 19]. From previous 
analysis [Table 17], we also gather that Germans 
perceive particularly high risks of mishandling 
of their personal data by third parties. Germany, 
in fact, is where people may have the greatest 
awareness of their information rights, as they 
are protected by the constitutional principle of 
informational self-determination. Whether the 
perception of a right in relation to protecting one’s 
own personal data correlates with perceived lack 
of control is however to be tested. We will test 
later whether perceived control has a positive or 
negative effect on the practical measures people 
take to protect their identity online. Regarding 
socio-economic status, unmarried, young people 
who are still studying have the highest perceived 
control on the data they disclose in eCommerce. 
There are very limited differences outside this 
social group. Overall, perceived control can be 
explained jointly by residence, as described, and 
by young age.
Table 19. Control over information by country
No control at all Partial control Complete control
% of young people 
in country
EU27 30% 50% 18% 15 %
Portugal 11% 66% 17%
Hungary 11% 60% 28% 14.5%
Malta 12% 43% 17.5%
Cyprus 15% 37% 48% 19%
Ireland 17% 62% 19%
Poland 18% 58% 17.5%
Italy 23% 29% 12%
Germany 42% 9% 13%
Source: Qb6b.
Base: eCommerce users who disclosed personal data.
2.6.3 Responsibility for safe handling of data 
disclosed20
Turning to responsibility for the protection of 
personal data once it’s been disclosed, a minority of 
eCommerce users (20%) consider public authorities 
responsible [Table 20]. But about the same 
20 QB8b1: Who do you think should make sure that your 
information is collected, stored and exchanged safely 
when you buy goods or services via the Internet? Firstly? 
QB8b2: And secondly?
proportion (40%) argue that they or companies are 
responsible	to	keep	their	personal	data	safe.	Very	few	
people claim that they do not know. Also, two thirds 
of people who say they are primarily responsible 
also think that online sites are responsible in the 
second place [Table 21]. The reverse does not hold, 
as people who think shopping sites are primarily 
responsible also see a secondary, equal role for 
themselves and authorities. Overall, abut one in 
two respondents do not see public authorities as 
having either primary or secondary responsibility 
for protection of personal data safety.
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However, we found significant differences 
in perceived responsibility by the level of 
perceived control [Table 22]. Indeed, people 
who think they have no control on their personal 
data [again: once they’ve been disclosed], tend 
to see higher co-responsibility of industry and 
regulators. Conversely, those who think they 
have total control tend to see joint self-company 
responsibility. In all cases, companies are seen 
as responsible regardless of level of perceived 
control [e.g. their conferred responsibility 
remains relatively stable across perceived 
control]. Finally, the more people disclose what 
we defined as ‘biographical data’, the more they 
think responsibility lies with online shopping 
sites and regulators [table not reported].
Table 20. Overall responsibility for personal data safety in eCommerce
% of  eCommerce users
 Firstly Secondly
You 41 27
The site owners 39 37
Public authorities 19 33
Other 0 1
DK 1 2
Source: Qb8b.
Base: eCommerce users.
Table 21. Conjoint responsibility for personal data safety in eCommerce
Responsibility secondly
Responsibility firstly Column % Total %
You
(41%)
The online shopping sites 64% 26%
Public authorities 36% 15%
The online shopping sites
(39%)
You 51% 20%
Public authorities 49% 19%
Public authorities
(19%)
You 37% 7%
The online shopping sites 63% 12%
Source: Qb8b.
Base: eCommerce users.
Responsibility by country and socio-economic 
status 
People in different countries attribute 
different responsibility21 concerning the 
protection of personal data shared in 
eCommerce to themselves, companies they deal 
with and authorities [Table 23]. So, in Italy and 
in Spain people attribute more responsibility to 
21 For clarity in this section, we use a single composite 
measure of responsibility; we give a value of ‘2’ to people 
who attribute first responsibility to any of the agents 
mentioned [self, site, authorities]; and a value of ‘1’ to 
people who attribute secondary responsibility to these 
agents. Then, we check this measure for every agent 
against country of residence and socio-economic traits.
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Responsibility 
firstly
Responsibility 
secondly
Total control Partial control No control
You 
The online shopping 
sites
34% 28% 20%
Public authorities 14% 15% 13%
The online shopping 
sites
You 23% 21% 18%
Public authorities 17% 18% 24%
Public authorities 
You 5% 7% 9%
The online shopping 
sites
6% 11% 17%
Totals 100% 100% 100%
Source: Qb8b.
Base: eCommerce users.
Table 23. Responsibility to protect personal data by country
Self Company Authorities
EU27 1.1 1.2 0.7
Denmark .9
Spain 1.1
Ireland 1.4
Italy .9 1.1
The Netherlands .9
Sweden .8 1.5
United Kingdom .5
Slovenia 1.3 .4
Source: Qb8b.
Base: eCommerce users.
Note:	Results	 reported	are	 total	weighted	scores	 for	 responsibility,	where	first	 responsibility	 to	 the	agents	 [self,	 site,	authorities]	 is	
attributed a value of ‘2’; and a value of ‘1’ goes to secondary responsibility.
authorities, while UK and Slovenian residents 
much less so. Company responsibility is seen 
of highest priority in Sweden and lowest 
in the Netherlands. Concerning individual 
responsibility, Irish and Slovenian residents rank 
it highest, while it is lowest Sweden, Denmark 
and Italy. Apart from telling an interesting tale 
about regulatory preferences, these results give 
important indication of people’s willingness of 
to protect themselves in online transactions, 
beyond socio-demographic traits. Indeed, 
there are very small differences in attributing 
responsibility based on socio-economic traits. 
The only discernible pattern concerns younger 
people [especially young females], who tend 
to indicate companies rather than authorities 
as responsible for protecting the personal data 
they disclose. Conversely, retired and older 
people tend to attribute responsibility in the 
reverse order. 
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Fist, we checked ‘disclosure’ in relation to a 
number of other data form the survey, specifically 
identity-relevant questions and regulatory 
questions. The idea is that identity systems may 
mitigate or compound some of the issues in 
relation to disclosure (over-disclosure, perception 
of risks, degree of control, for one). Results are 
reported descriptively below; all coefficients are 
reported in Table 25.
2.7.1 Disclosure
First, data shows that disclosure behaviour is 
related to other Internet behaviours, rather more 
strongly than it is related to attitudes towards 
disclosure. That is: the steering of certain desired 
behaviours in terms of disclosure depends more 
on ‘behavioural’ remedies and tools than with 
greater awareness and enhanced perceptions, 
especially of risks. More specifically, disclosure 
behaviour is associated with 
•	 Use	 of	 credentials	 in	 daily	 life	 [business	
related: r = .23]; people who disclose 
biographical information also use credentials 
such as credit cards and customer cards 
in their daily lives. But these credentials 
are much less strongly associated with the 
disclosure of sensitive information and 
security information. Government-issued 
credentials have a much lower correlation 
with disclosure of personal data. This finding 
is explored below in more detail.
•	 Identity	 protection	 behaviours	 [do	 not	
disclose: r = .18; adjust: r = .19]; people who 
disclose more biographical information also 
minimise what they disclose and adjust the 
information according to context as coping 
strategies in daily life, online and offline. 
Provision of security information is also to 
some extent adjusted to context. This may 
be good news for enforcing the principles of 
data minimisation of purpose-binding.
•	 Internet	identity	protection	[r	=	.17].	The	more	
people disclose biographical information 
online, the more they try to stay protected online 
using a range of strategies. Again, this may be 
good news for those interested in developing 
tools allowing people to protect their data. This 
is consistent with the relation discussed above 
between disclosure and control.
Beyond actual behaviours, disclosure 
behaviour in eCommerce is related to:
•	 Possibility	 to	delete	personal	data	 [r	=	 .13];	
people who disclose more biographical 
information would like to be able to delete 
personal data whenever they want.
•	 Awareness	 of	 identity	 theft	 and	 data	 loss	
[media awareness: r = .10, social awareness 
r = -.08]; people who disclose more 
biographical information tend to be more 
aware of issues of identity theft and data loss 
through the media; but they also tend to be 
less socially aware of the same issue (i.e. 
it has not happened to people they know). 
What seems to be happening is increased 
general awareness for people disclosing 
less sensitive information, and increased, 
specific awareness (social, family) for people 
disclosing sensitive and security information.
2.7.2 Disclosure and credentials in eCommerce
We noted above that those who use a number 
of identity credentials are more likely to disclose 
biographical info, mainly name and address in 
eCommerce. This is natural for travel reservations, 
for delivery details and miscellanea for other 
service-specific reasons. And that bank cards 
and credit cards are at the centre of the system 
of disclosure, again a fact we are familiar with, 
as credit cards underpin the structure of today’s 
eCommerce. More interestingly: credit cards 
and store cards are also linked to the disclosure 
of information people consider as sensitive, 
while this is not the case for other credentials 
[Table 24]. A range of credentials are linked to 
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the disclosure of what we called security-related 
information (mobile number, identity number and 
nationality). Overall, the structure of disclosure in 
eCommerce is dominated by privately-released 
credentials: credit cards and customer cards; 
government cards and identity cards only have 
a marginal role in the structure of disclosure. 
This should not be overstated. National identity 
cards are often the carrier of identity number 
and nationality that are disclosed by 18% and 
35% of respondents, respectively. However, the 
use of ID cards is unrelated to disclosure of most 
information in eCommerce. 
2.7.3 Risk
Risk perceptions in eCommerce are similar 
to risks perceived by other Internet users 
(including SNS users). However, there are also 
marked differences [all coefficients are reported 
in Table 25] which are briefly mentioned below:
•	 Those	 who	 are	 happier	 to	 disclose	 have	 a	
higher perception of identity theft risk than 
other people [r = .08, consistent with result 
on media awareness of identity theft risk, see 
Identification fact sheet].
•	 The	 minority	 of	 respondents	 who	 trust	
companies to protect their data perceive less 
risks of misuse of their data in eCommerce 
across the board [stealth use, unwanted 
offers, fraud]; the same does not work for 
institutions as data controllers – people who 
trust them and do not trust them do not have 
perceivably different attitudes to online data 
protection risks.
•	 Those	 using	 government-issued	 credentials	
are less likely to fear identity theft risk 
[r= -.12]; those using business-related 
credentials are more likely to fear identity 
theft risk [r = .06].
•	 People	 who	 fear	 risks	 of	 different	 nature	
are also more likely to take active steps to 
protect their personal identity, both online 
and offline.
Table 24. Use of credentials by disclosure of different types of personal data
Biography 
information
Sensitive 
information
Security 
information
Use of credit cards and 
bank cards
Yes .06 .01 .01
No -.63 -.08 -.12
Use of customer cards
Yes .12 .05 .07
No -.17 -.07 -.09
Use of passport
Yes .07 .06
No -.10 -.08
Use of government 
entitlement cards
Yes .12
No -.25
Use of driving licence
Yes .08
No -.29
Use of national identity 
cards/ residence permit
Yes .04
No -.07
Source: QB4b  by QB14.
Base: eCommerce users.
Notes:	Results	reported	are	means	of	disclosure	of	type	of	information	[derived	from	factor	analysis].	Only	significant	differences	in	
the	two-sided	test	of	equality	for	column	means	are	reported	(p<	0.01:	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	differences	reported	are	not	
due to chance).
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risk of unwanted commercial offers [r = .07] 
but not other risks to personal data.
•	 In	 the	 context	 of	 eCommerce,	 concern	
about unauthorised reuse of personal data 
is related to risks of identity theft and fraud, 
not with risks of unwanted commercial offers 
of stealth use of data [therefore substantive 
rather than procedural risks].
2.7.4. Responsibility
•	 People	 thinking	 that	 disclosure	 is	
unavoidable are more likely to think hey are 
responsible for protecting their own data, 
rather than companies. People who are 
happy to disclose think it is authorities who 
are responsible, rather than companies.
•	 Trust	in	companies	as	personal	data	controllers	
seem to reduce perceived authorities 
responsibility [r = -.13], and increase the 
perception of company and self responsibility 
[respectively r = .08 and r = .04].
•	 People	 considering	 authorities	 responsible	
have heightened concerns about observation 
[r = .10], reduced comfort about online 
profiling [r = -.10] and are more concerned 
about re-use of their data [r = .06]. In all 
these cases, people are also slightly more 
likely to think companies, rather than 
oneself, are responsible for correct handling 
of personal data [understandably, as there is 
little they can do].
•	 There	 is	 no	 relation	 between	 self	
responsibility and Internet protection 
behaviours and very little relation with 
identity protection behaviours in general. 
As found in previous surveys, even people 
feeling responsible do [as little] as the next 
person to protect their personal data once 
they have been disclosed. As it was noted 
above, this may be due to the lack of tools 
allowing people to take care, effectively 
if at all. But when tools are available, such 
as privacy notices, people do read them if 
they feel responsible [r = .10 for read and 
understand privacy statement, and negative 
relations for company and authorities 
responsibility]. 
•	 There	 is	no	relation	between	perceptions	of	
responsibility in eCommerce and most other 
regulatory perceptions: possibility to delete 
one’s data, portability of one’s data and 
awareness/experience of identity theft and 
data loss.
2.7.5 Control
People who feel in control of their data trust 
companies and institutions to protect their data 
[r = .25 (!) and r = .12]; they are less concerned 
about observation [r = -.10], about re-use of their 
data [r = -.08] and more comfortable with online 
profiling [r = .18]; furthermore, they are far less 
likely to enjoy disclosing information [r = -.18].
In terms of behaviours, they do not shy away 
from disclosing [r = -.07], and do not engage any 
more frequently in online and offline identity 
protection behaviours. However, they are more 
likely to read and understand privacy statements [r 
= .13] and more likely to appreciate the possibility 
to move their data form one service provider to 
another [r = .10]. They do not have particular views 
on the possibility to delete their personal data.
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Variables Disclosure Risks Responsibility Control
Measurement
3 Factors 4 Values
3 x 3-point
scales
3-point
scale
Values
Bi
og
ra
ph
ic
Se
ns
iti
ve
Se
cu
rit
y
St
ea
lth
 u
se
Un
w
an
te
d 
of
fe
rs
Id
en
tit
y 
th
ef
t
Fr
au
d
Se
lf
Co
m
pa
ny
Au
th
or
iti
es
Attitudes 
towards 
disclosure
2 Factors
Unavoidability -.08 -.05 -.07 .04 -.04 .08 -.06 .06
Propensity .07 -.05 -.09 .04 .08 .04 -.07 .06 -.18
Trust
2 Factors
Trust in 
institutions
.08 .07 .08 .12
Trust in 
companies
-.08 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05 .04 .08 -.13 .25
Concern about 
observation
1 Factor .04 .04 -.07 .10 -.10
Use of 
credentials in 
daily life
2 Factors
Business-related .23 .04 .07 .04 .06 .06 -.07
Government 
issued
.09 .06 -.12 -.04 .09 -.10
Identity 
protection 
behaviours
4 Factors
Do not disclose .18 -.11 .07 .05 .06 .09 -.07
Adjustment .19 .09 .07 .12 .04 -.05
Low-tech -.04 -.05 .04 .05 -.05
Deception .09 .05 -.06 .04 -.05
Internet identity 
protection
9-points
scale
.17 .05 .06 .06 .09 .08
Awareness of 
identity theft  
and/or data loss
4 Values
Media awareness .10 .06 .05 .09 .04 -.06
Social awareness -.08 .07 .07
Self-family 
experience
.11 .05 .04
No -.05 -.05 -.07 .05
Comfort with 
online profiling
4-point
scale
-.06 -.07 .04 .04 -.10 .18
Read privacy 
statements
3 Values
Read and 
understand
-.06 -.05 -.04 .10 -.06 -.05 .13
Read no 
understand
.04 .04 -.04
No read .05 -.04 -.08 .07 -.09
Concern about 
reuse
4-point
scale
-.05 .05 .04 -.07 .06 -.08
Possibility to 
delete personal 
data
1 Value
Whenever one 
wants
.13 .04 .05 .05
Importance of 
personal data 
portability
4-point
scale
-.04 .05 .05 .10
As	the	sample	is	large,	only	significant	relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99.9%	probability	that	the	relation	
reported is not due to chance].
Results reported are:
1.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
2. Point-biserial correlation for factors and/or scales crossed by values.
3. Phi for relations between values, when they can be considered as multiple categorical (e.g. colour: white, red, or green).
Note: Social information was excluded as it is marginal to the analysis, as it was noted in text.
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3 FACT SHEET: Social Networking Sites
3.1 Question context
The questionnaire included several questions 
regarding disclosure and protection of personal 
data disclosed in the context of SNS, see Table 
26:
Table 26. eID survey questions relevant to SNS
Question 
code
Shorthand Formulation Rationale
QB4a
Personal data 
disclosure
Thinking of your usage of social networking 
sites and sharing sites, which of the following 
types of information have you already 
disclosed (when registering, or simply when 
using these websites)?
To gauge the extent of disclosure of different 
types of personal data; this question follows on 
a previous questions asked of all respondents 
regarding what information they though was 
personal.
QB5a
Reasons why 
disclose
What are the most important reasons why 
you disclose such information on SNS and\ or 
sharing sites?
To assess the reasons why people disclose 
personal data in SNS, whether for leisure, to 
get better offers, to save time, etc.
QB6a
Control on 
information 
disclosed
How much control do you feel you have over 
the information you have disclosed on social 
networking sites and\ or sharing sites, e.g. 
the ability to change, delete or correct this 
information?
To determine the level of perceived control on 
the data disclosed in SNS. This is related both 
to the right of access to one’s information and 
to the capacity of people to actually control 
their data once they have disclosed it.
QB7a
Risks related to 
disclosure
I will read out a list of potential risks. According 
to you, what are the most important risks 
connected with disclosure of personal 
information on SNS and\ or sharing sites?
To explore the risks people associate with the 
disclosure of personal data in SNS. Several 
risks may be associated with disclosure, 
including risks to reputation, to persona safety, 
to data integrity and others.
QB8a
Information 
about 
consequences 
of disclosing 
personal 
information
Please tell me whether you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: SNS and\or 
sharing sites sufficiently inform their users 
about the possible consequences of disclosing 
personal information.
To assess user satisfaction with the information 
provided by SNS on the possible consequences 
of disclosure. Also to measure indirectly the 
awareness of these consequences.
QB9a1 & 
QB9a2
Responsibility to 
protect
Who do you think should make sure that your 
information is collected, stored and exchanged 
safely on social networking sites and\ or 
sharing sites? Firstly?
To help determine who people think is 
responsible for the protection of personal data 
once it’s been disclosed. 
QB10a Privacy settings
Have you ever tried to change the privacy 
settings of your personal profile from the 
default settings on a social networking site 
and\ or sharing site?
To identify people’s behaviours regarding 
privacy settings.
QB11a
Privacy settings 
difficulties 
How easy or difficult did you find it to change 
the privacy settings of your personal profile?
To identify people’s perception of ease 
regarding privacy settings changes.
QB12a Privacy settings 
Why did you not try to change these privacy 
settings?
To understand the reasons why people do not 
try to change their privacy settings.
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in the survey, please refer to the main report. 
Some of the question in the survey we asked 
both of social networking site users and of people 
using online sharing sites. In this fact sheet, we 
examine the responses – behaviours, attitudes – 
of social networking site users [henceforth: SNS 
users].
3.2 Legal context 
Taking into account that Social Networking 
Sites are not currently regulated, the main legal 
instruments and policy initiatives with regard to 
SNS are the following:
•	 Directive	 95/46/EC	 on	 the	 protection	 of	
individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. Specifically the survey asks questions 
related to the information received on the 
collection of personal data and on the type of 
information disclosed on SNS (such as health 
information and/or information regarding third 
parties), useful to understand the effectiveness 
on Internet of some specific Data protection 
restrictions. In addition, the survey asks 
questions relevant to data loss and data breach 
notification,22 which may assist the number of 
people that are happy to disclose personal data, 
that are less likely to minimise data and that 
rarely use software measures to protect their 
data. On the right balance to be stroke between 
enhanced control and self-protection and 
enforcement of actor-based rules. And on the 
relation between online identity management 
and people’s regulatory preferences regarding 
data protection. Questions regarding the 
effective use of data subject’s right of access to 
data in order to update it or delete it are also 
22 “… the possible modalities for the introduction in the 
general legal framework of a general personal data breach 
notification, including the addressees of such notifications 
and the threshold beyond which the obligation to notify 
should apply” (in “A comprehensive strategy on data 
protection in the European Union”, EC 2010).
relevant for the current discussion on the so-
called right to be forgotten and for a possible 
revision on how should such right be obtained 
from the controller.23
•	 Directive	 1999/93/EC	 on	 a	 Community	
framework for electronic signatures, and 
the proposal for a revision of the eSignature 
Directive with a view to provide a legal 
framework for cross-border recognition and 
interoperability of secure eAuthentication 
systems [DAE Key Action 16]. The survey does 
not look specifically at the use of eSignature, 
as individual users’ uptake is low across 
Member States; however, it looks at use of 
credentials and at strategies for protecting one’s 
identity and transactions online, including in 
eCommerce [in MS, cross-border], eGov and 
SNS (for example asking what measures are 
adopted to protect one’s own identity). One 
of the main reasons for disclosure when using 
SNS is to access the service and to connect 
with others. This may assist the framing of the 
eSignature debate in wider terms (towards 
reaching a more secure Digital Single Market).
•	 Directive	 2006/123/EC	 on	 services	 in	 the	
internal market. The survey looks at the 
relation between identification mechanisms, 
online self protection and the fruition of 
eServices such as eCommerce, SNS and 
home banking.
•	 Directive	 2002/58/EC	 (“e-privacy”)	
concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector (Directive 
on privacy and electronic communications), 
namely the need for users to ‘opt in’ – that is 
consent following clear and comprehensive 
information. The survey asks questions related 
23 E.g. through privacy-friendly default setting, given the 
fact that, as stressed by the EDPS in its Opinion of 18th 
March 20101 on promoting Trust in the Information 
Society by fostering data protection and privacy, users are 
often unaware of their acting as data controllers of other 
people’s data.
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to users’ awareness of possible accessibility 
of their data by third parties, information 
received on privacy settings as well as about 
the use of tools to limit unwanted email or 
cookies; questions regarding users’ concerns 
about further uses of data than original 
ones, and about profiling (the majority of 
the interviewers are uncomfortable about 
that) are important for the preannounced 
review of the Directive. As stressed by 
EDPS,24 “social network […] should also 
require user’s affirmative consent before 
any profile becomes accessible to other 
third parties, and restricted access profiles 
should not be discoverable by internal search 
engines”. Questions about the reasons for 
deleting personal data, importance of data 
portability across providers and platforms 
and incidence of changing privacy settings 
on social networking sites are also relevant 
for the future comprehensive framework on 
DP focused on enhancing users’ control over 
their data (including the strengthening of the 
right to be forgotten and data portability).25
•	 Directive	 2006/24/EC	 on	 the	 retention	 of	
data generated or processed in connection 
with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or 
of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC. The survey 
asks several questions relevant to understand 
the awareness of users about the conditions 
of data collection and about the further 
uses of data when joining SNS; questions 
on perception of risks by the users and on 
reasons for deleting data are also relevant for 
the current debate of the Directive.
•	 Directive	 2009/136/EC	 amending	 Directive	
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications 
24 EDPS, European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on 
promoting Trust…cit supra note.
25 Communication from the Commission A Comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union, COM (2010) 609, 2.1.
networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
This Directive introduced in particular the 
obligation of data breach notification, though, 
up to date, applies only to providers of publicly 
available electronic communication services. 
The concerns (about data over-disclosure, loss 
or theft) emerging from the questions asked 
in the survey give evidences on the need for 
a comprehensive framework on DP, extending 
the security obligations across sectors.
•	 The	 Consumer	 Rights	 Directive,	 still	 at	
proposal stage, which should replace and 
merge 4 existing consumers rights Directives 
(Sale of consumer goods and guarantees 
(99/44/EC); Unfair contract terms (93/13/EC); 
Distance selling (97/7/EC); Doorstep selling 
(85/577/EC) and the revision of the EU data 
protection regulatory framework with a view 
to enhancing individuals’ confidence and 
strengthening their rights [DAE Key action 
4]. The survey examines issues of internet 
skills in relation to identity protection online 
and offline, and awareness of identity theft 
and data breach.
•	 Considering	 the	 use	 of	 SNS	 and	 the	 risks	
perceived by users as emerging from the 
survey, applicable norms are also those of the 
Directive 2001/95 on general product safety 
(art 2 defines a product as ‘any product - 
including in the context of providing a service 
– which is intended for consumer or likely”).26
26 See: Whereas 7: “This Directive should apply to products 
irrespective of the selling techniques, including distance 
and electronic selling” and Whereas 9: “This Directive 
does not cover services, but in order to secure the 
attainment of the protection objectives in question, its 
provisions should also apply to products that are supplied 
or made available to consumers in the context of service 
provision for use by them”. 
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Parliament and of the Council on combating 
sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography, repealing Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, COM/2010/0094 
final - COD 2010/0064,27 (Art 21 of the 
proposal is on Blocking access to websites 
containing child pornography) . The survey 
asks about the perceived risks associated 
with the use of SNS (among which emerge 
the perception of personal safety being at 
risk, of own information being shared with 
third parties without consent, of personal 
data being used in different contexts and of 
own identity being at risk of theft online), 
that, though not expressly mentioned, can 
be risks related to child pornography (the 
majority of ‘digital natives’ use Internet and 
SNS).28
•	 Self-regulation	 of	 social	 networking	 sites	
has been encouraged by the European 
Commission, as part of its Safer Internet 
Plus Programme; all those who create new 
interactive tools are encouraged to adopt rules 
and principles themselves (self-regulation). 
This is the case of the so-called Safer 
Social Networking Principles (ec.europa.
eu/information_society/activities/social_
networking/docs/sn_principles.pdf), which 
have been developed by SNS providers in 
consultation with the European Commission, 
to provide good practice recommendations 
for the providers of social networking and 
other user interactive sites, enhancing the 
safety of children and young people using 
their services. Questions posed by the survey 
regarding the disclosure of personal data 
27 OJ L 13, 20.1.2004, p. 14.
28 The objectives – as stated in the same proposal – “are 
consistent with the Safer Internet Programme set up 
to promote safer use of the internet and new online 
technologies, particularly for children, and to fight against 
illegal content […] and also with the new EU Youth 
Strategy (Council Resolution 27 November 2009), which 
targets children and young people within the age range 
13-20, and anchors European youth policy cooperation 
firmly in the international system of human rights”.
and the control on information disclosed, 
and especially the questions concerning 
risks related to disclosure and responsibility 
attribution for the collection, storage and 
the safe exchange of information on SNS 
sites, are of direct relevance to the above 
mentioned SNS principles. Namely to the one 
that enables and encourages users to employ 
a safe approach to personal information and 
privacy. Questions regarding the use of tools 
to limit unwanted email or cookies, as well 
as questions regarding users’ concerns about 
the further uses of data than the original 
ones, and about profiling are relevant for 
the implementation of the principle that 
empowers users through tools and technology. 
The data collected in this survey regarding the 
attitudes and the behaviours of young people 
using SNS may prove to be important for the 
further development and implementation of 
SNS legal principles at the EU level.
3.3 SNS users: socio demographic 
characteristics / Internet activities
More than half of Internet users (52%), 
therefore about a third of all Europeans, use SNS. 
This is less than the number of Internet users 
that purchase goods or services online (60%). 
However, several differences appear in terms of 
socio demographic characteristics, in particular 
regarding age; education, occupation, and 
Internet use [see Figure 5]. Specifically, SNS users 
are more likely to be younger, typically female, 
well educated, they are heavier Internet users and 
are still studying or are unemployed. In contrast, 
eCommerce users are older (25-55), typically 
male, better educated, heavy Internet users, in 
management positions or self-employed and 
generally more affluent.
To confirm the complementarities of Internet 
activities, means of variables and their correlation 
were checked. More than half of SNS users 
also utilised websites to share pictures, videos, 
movies, etc, (68%); instant messaging, chat 
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websites (57%) and have purchased goods or 
services online (57%). Other advanced Internet 
activities, such as use of online software, making 
or receiving phone calls or video calls over 
the Internet and use of peer-to-peer software 
to exchange music are reported by a third of 
European SNS users. Therefore, SNS users are as 
’green’ as generally believed; but they are also 
able to harness the Internet to a greater extent 
than previously known.
Factor analysis was used to assess item 
correlations and identify common relationships 
between similar items, allowing the items to 
be categorized into themes or factors.29 This 
analysis yields three statistically significant and 
conceptually meaningful factors [see Table 27]. 
29 An analysis of the correlation matrix (KMO and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity) was carried out to check that the 
correlation matrixes were factorable. Data reductions 
were undertaken by principal components analysis 
using	 the	Varimax	option	 to	 identify	possible	underlying	
dimensions.
The first factor includes Internet activities that 
are related with the use of SNS: use of sharing 
site; instant messaging and phone calls or video 
calls over the Internet. Therefore, it is labelled 
as representing “Social” Internet activities. The 
second factor Internet activities included home 
banking; purchase goods or services online 
and submit tax declaration or use other online 
government services, and may be interpreted as 
“Transactional” Internet activities. Finally, the 
third factor includes activities such as designing 
or maintaining a website (not just a blog); install 
plug-ins in your browser to extend its capability; 
keep a blog (also known as web-log); use online 
software and use peer-to-peer software or sites 
to exchange movies, music. Unlike the previous 
two factors, that are largely conducted online, 
these activities are all related with the utilisation 
of software, online and offline. Thus, this factor 
is labelled as “Software”, representing an 
advanced use of the Internet.
Figure 5. Socio-economic profile of SNS users
Source: QB1a.2.
Base: Internet users.
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Finally, we sketch a profile of SNS users, 
based on their attitudes, behaviours and 
regulatory preferences regarding personal identity 
data disclosure, vis-à-vis other Internet users who 
do not use SNS, and the general public [Table 28, 
Table 29, Table 30]. This helps contextualise the 
analysis of actual disclosure taking place in SNS, 
which comes later in this fact sheet.
Attitudes of SNS users [Table 28]:
•	 SNS users care as much about their sensitive 
information [medical, financial, etc.] as the 
next Internet user, but they care much less 
about their social information. SNS users 
consider their social information [friends, 
activities, etc.] more personal than offline 
respondents do, and much less than the 
average Internet user. But they consider their 
sensitive information [financial, medical 
fingerprints] as personal as Internet users do 
[and much more than the general public]. 
This may give indication on the appropriate 
Table 27. Factor analysis of Internet activities
Factor 1.
Social activities
Factor 2.
Transactions
Factor 3.
Software activities
Use a social networking site .78
Online sharing sites .75
Instant messaging, chat websites .71
VoIP .41
Home banking .79
Purchase goods or services online .68
eGovernment .68
Design or maintain a website (not just a blog) .69
Browser plug-ins .59
Keep a blog (also known as web-log) .58
Use online software .50
Use peer-to-peer software or sites .42 .46
Auto values 2.87 1.67 1.08
% Variance explained 24 14 9
Source: QB1a and QB1b.
Base: Internet users.
Notes: Rotated components matrix: factor analysis by main components; Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.781; Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 4 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .04 are omitted.
level of co-regulation of industrial practice in 
the field of SNS: sensitive information needs 
outright protection online, while social 
information may need ad-hoc safeguards, 
as SNS users are less cautious [more on this 
later in the sheet].
•	 SNS users are more realistic than the 
average Internet user regarding the need 
to disclose, but they are less virtuous. 
SNS users have stronger feelings about 
disclosure than Internet users and non-
users; on the one hand, they think that 
disclosure is unavoidable in today’s’ life, 
much more so than Internet users and the 
general public [also see Table 35]. But on 
the other hand they do not seem to resist 
the push to disclose: they are far happier 
to disclose their personal information than 
Internet users [strikingly, Internet users are 
even less happy to disclose personal data 
than people offline].
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•	 SNS	users	are	as	concerned	as	others	about	
being ‘observed’ in a range of situations 
online and offline. If anything, they are 
slightly less wary of observation, possibly 
due to their younger age. Interestingly, SNS 
users are less concerned in relation to 
online observation, and also significantly 
more comfortable with online profiling 
in exchange for free services. This may be 
due to SNS users’ higher level of trust in 
institutions and companies as controllers of 
their personal data than otherwise internet 
users.
Behaviours of SNS users [Table 29]:
•	 SNS	users	are	less	likely	than	Internet	users	to	
use private credentials [credit cards, driving 
license, etc]; this may be due to younger 
age. They are also less likely than any other 
group to use government-related credentials. 
What this means for online identification 
and authentication is explored in greater 
depth in the Identification fact sheet.
•	 SNS	 users	 are	 more	 likely	 than	 Internet	
users to report to have been informed about 
data collection conditions when disclosing 
personal data to access an online service; 
however, they also felt they were required 
to provide more personal information than 
necessary to access the online service. 
•	 SNS	 users	 use	 a	 slightly	 wider	 range	 of	
strategies to protect their personal data 
online than the average Internet user. What 
is more interesting is that they are less 
likely to use traditional security measure 
[not revealing user names etc.] and ‘offline’ 
protection [use cash]; and they are more 
likely to use software-based responses 
Table 28. Attitudes of Internet non-users, Internet users and SNS users
Measurement
No 
Internet
Internet 
-SNS use
Internet 
+SNS use
At
tit
ud
es
Biography information is personal
Social information is personal
Sensitive information is personal
Factor score
Factor score
Factor score
.07
-.15*
-.34*
.05
.39*
.06
.12*
.17*
.07
Disclosure is unavoidable
…[Internet users only with specific questions]
Factor score
Factor score
-.20*
---
-.03*
-.13
.17*
.11
Disclose happily
…[ Internet users only with specific questions]
Factor score
Factor score
-.06
---
-.10
-.16
.13*
.14
Concern regarding observation on the Internet
Concern regarding observation in a public space
Concern regarding observation in a private space 
Concern regarding observation via mobile phone/ mobile 
Internet
Concern regarding observation via payment cards
Concern regarding observation via store or loyalty cards
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
3.3
2.3
2.4
2.7
2.8
2.6
2.7
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.3
Comfort with online profiling
Concern about stealth re-use of personal data for other 
purpose than original
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
---
2.91*
2.12*
3.01*
2.45*
2.86*
Trust in institutions as personal data handlers
Trust in companies as personal data handlers
Factor score
Factor score
-.19*
-.25*
-.01*
-.08*
.13*
.22*
Source: qb1a_2_RCb, qb1_RC_#_all, FAC1_2 qb2, FAC2_2 qb2, FAC3_2 qb2, FAC1 qb3 [all], FAC2 qb3 [all], qb13_1, qb13_2, 
qb13_3, qb13_4, qb13_5, qb13_6, qb_13_FAC1_all, FAC2_4, FAC1_4, qb16_#_total, qb16_factors, qb17_RC,   qb21_RC, FAC1_7, 
FAC2_7, qb22_RC,   qb26_RC, qb28.1, qb29_RC, qb31_RC , qb32_RC.
Base: EU27 and Internet users [where the “---“ mark is used].
Notes:	*	means	that	differences	are	significant	at		p	<	0.001	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	difference	reported	is	not	
due to chance].
Results	 and	 figures	 should	 be	 interpreted	 ‘horizontally’	 only	 across	 dividing	 lines,	 as	 the	 scale	 of	 measurement	 varies	 between	
variables.
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[e.g. anti-spam], and active information 
management strategies [e.g. using search 
engines to maintain awareness]. This 
is a clear case of horses for courses, 
and relatively sophisticated focusing of 
protection behaviour on a perceived threat.
Strikingly, SNS users have similar regulatory 
preferences to Internet users concerning the 
protection of personal data [Table 30], both quite 
more vigorous than non Internet users; therefore, 
technology-specific and local regulatory solutions 
[control tools, breach notification, portability, 
deletion on demand] may be more suitable to 
tackle issues of disclosure in SNS environments 
than general regulation [however important this 
remains]. SNS users are slightly more in favour of 
such local solution that the average internet user.
Table 29. Behaviours of Internet non-users, Internet users and SNS users
Measurement
No 
Internet
Internet 
-SNS 
use
Internet 
+SNS 
use
Be
ha
vi
ou
rs
Use of credentials in daily life - Private
Use of credentials in daily life - Government
Factor score
Factor score
-.52*
.16*
.36*
-.02*
.18*
-.15*
Informed about data collection conditions when disclosing 
to access a service
1-4 scale --- 2.59* 2.87*
Required to provide more personal information than 
necessary for online services
1-4 scale --- 2.04* 2.29*
Tot number of online identity protection measures taken 1-9 scale --- 2.04* 2.60*
Reactive identity protection
Proactive identity protection
Withholding identity protection
Low-tech identity protection
Factor score
Factor score
Factor score
Factor score
---
---
---
---
-.12*
-.15*
.08*
.07*
.11*
.14*
-.07*
-.07*
Source: qb1a_2_RCb, qb1_RC_#_all, FAC1_2 qb2, FAC2_2 qb2, FAC3_2 qb2, FAC1 qb3 [all], FAC2 qb3 [all], qb13_1, qb13_2, 
qb13_3, qb13_4, qb13_5, qb13_6, qb_13_FAC1_all, FAC2_4, FAC1_4, qb16_#_total, qb16_factors, qb17_RC,   qb21_RC, FAC1_7, 
FAC2_7, qb22_RC,   qb26_RC, qb28.1, qb29_RC, qb31_RC , qb32_RC.
Notes:	*	means	that	differences	are	significant	at		p	<	0.001	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	difference	reported	is	not	
due to chance].
Results	 and	 figures	 should	 be	 interpreted	 ‘horizontally’	 only	 across	 dividing	 lines,	 as	 the	 scale	 of	 measurement	 varies	 between	
variables.
Table 30. Regulatory preferences of Internet non-users, Internet users and SNS users
Measurement
No
Internet
Internet
-SNS 
use
Internet
+SNS 
use
Re
gu
la
tio
n
Possibility to move personal data between service providers
Importance of having same data protection right across Europe
Desire to be informed by controller whenever personal data is 
lost/stolen
Possibility to delete personal data held whenever you decide to 
delete it
1-4 scale
1-4 scale
% agree
% agree
---
3.34*
87%
---
2.95*
3.54
92%
73%
3.04*
3.56
93%
77%
Source: qb1a_2_RCb, qb1_RC_#_all, FAC1_2 qb2, FAC2_2 qb2, FAC3_2 qb2, FAC1 qb3 [all], FAC2 qb3 [all], qb13_1, qb13_2, 
qb13_3, qb13_4, qb13_5, qb13_6, qb_13_FAC1_all, FAC2_4, FAC1_4, qb16_#_total, qb16_factors, qb17_RC,   qb21_RC, FAC1_7, 
FAC2_7, qb22_RC,   qb26_RC, qb28.1, qb29_RC, qb31_RC , qb32_RC.
Base: EU27 and Internet users [where the “---“ mark is used].
Notes:	*	means	that	differences	are	significant	at	p	<	0.001	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	difference	reported	is	not	
due to chance].
Results	 and	 figures	 should	 be	 interpreted	 ‘horizontally’	 only	 across	 dividing	 lines,	 as	 the	 scale	 of	 measurement	 varies	 between	
variables.
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3.4 National differences in SNS use
Beyond social characteristics, we found that 
there are significant national differences in the 
uptake of SNS users in Europe [Figure 6]. Social 
networking sites are used most often in Hungary 
(80%), Latvia (73%), Malta (71%), Ireland 
(68%), Cyprus, Slovakia (both 66%), Poland 
and Denmark (both 63%), and least in 
Germany (37%). 
Figure 6. Distribution of SNS users in EU27
Base: Internet users (66% of total sample).
There is a clear correlation between the rate 
of Internet use in a country, and the proportion of 
people using SNS online: the more the internet 
is widespread, the more Internet users also use 
SNS. This is not intuitive: one may think that, 
given internet access, people [young people, 
mainly] in different countries will have the same 
propensity to use SNS [Figure 7]. It is evident that 
the proportion of people using SNS [yellow bar] 
increases vs. people not using SNS, [red bar], as 
Internet access increases [blue bar]. Indeed, the 
correlation is strong [r = 0.61] between SNS and 
Internet use across EU27 [Figure 8]. This apparent 
idiosyncrasy is due to the socio-demographics 
underpinning internet uptake [affluence, 
education, age], which also strongly influence 
SNS use.30
Nevertheless, in the case of SNS use unlike 
in the case of eCommerce, age plays a key role 
at national level. We have identified four different 
30 See socio-demographic characteristics of SNS users as 
presented in [Figure 5].
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Base: Total population.
Figure 8. Linear Internet and non SNS use and Internet and SNS use EU27
Base: Total population.
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relation to Internet vs. SNS use [Figure 9]. In other 
words, younger people in most EU countries use the 
Internet very little outside SNS, almost necessarily 
for people aged 15-24 years old, but also strongly 
for people aged between 25-39 years of age. The 
situation is very different for people aged 55+: SNS 
use is largely rigid on Internet use, which means 
that older people who use SNS do it for reasons 
different than other internet use; alternatively, that 
SNS is not quite built into Internet use overall. For 
these two groups, age and Internet dynamics matter 
more than country in predicting SNS use. For the 
other group [40-54], there is a positive relation 
between the two, as was described above: in 
countries where Internet use is high, people tend to 
use more SNS as well.
This dispels the idea that SNS may be an 
‘easier’ entry point for all into other Internet 
activities; SNS rather tends to be unrelated 
Table 31. Personal information disclosed in SNS
% of  SNS users
Name 84%
Photos 57%
Nationality 51%
Activities 43%
Who friends are 43%
Address 41%
Preferences 36%
Mobile Number 23%
Work history 19%
Website visited 15%
National identity Number 13%
Financial 9%
Medical information 5%
Fingerprints 4%
None 4%
Other 1%
D.K. 1%
Source: QB4a.
Base: SNS users.
to Internet use for older groups [use is more 
similar across countries regardless of Internet 
penetration]; it tends to build on and reinforce 
the same factors predicting Internet uptake for 
middle-age Europeans; but it tends to be an 
entry point and substitute other Internet uses 
for younger people. For young professionals, 
specifically, country of residence counts as much 
as age in predicting uptake of SNS. In fact, it 
also remains true that some countries, across 
age brackets and Internet usage, host more SNS 
users as a percentage of Internet users, and less 
respectively: Nordic countries on the one hand, 
Portugal, Rumania and Greece on the other hand.
3.5 Personal data disclosure in SNS
SNS users were then asked about the 
types of information they disclosed when they 
registered or simply used these website.31
31 Question QB4a: Thinking of your usage of social 
networking sites and sharing sites, which of the following 
types of information have you already disclosed (when 
you registered, or simply when using these websites)?
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Factor 1.
Social information
Factor 2.
Sensitive information
Factor 3.
Traditional identifiers
Who friends are .76
Photos .75
Activities .75
Preferences .73
Websites visited .46
Work history
Fingerprints .76
Medical information .75
Financial information .69
National Identity number .61 .33
Address .81
Mobile number .67
Name .31 -.35 .58
Nationality .42 .51
Eigenvalue 3.10 2.43 1.56
% Variance explained 22.2 17.3 11.1
Source: QB4a.
Base: SNS users.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0. 786; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 4 iterations; Minimum 
eigenvalue 1; Values below 0.3 are omitted.
Most SNS users revealed their name (84%) 
and more than half revealed photos (57%) and 
nationality (51%). Furthermore, activities and 
friends were disclosed by 43% of SNS users 
while address is disclosed by 41%. Financial 
information, medical information and fingerprints 
are all disclosed by less than 10% of SNS users.
To confirm the several internal 
complementarities of the personal information 
disclosed in SNS, factor analysis was carried out (see 
Table 32). This analysis identified three statistically 
significant and conceptually separate types of 
information disclosed. The first type includes who 
friends are, photos, activities, preferences and 
websites visited. Therefore, it is labelled “Social 
information”. The second factor includes work 
history, fingerprints, medical information, financial 
information and national identity number. These 
types of information appears to be biographical in 
nature, and are disclosed by far fewer respondents 
than other information; we thus named it “Sensitive 
information”. Finally, the third factor includes 
address, mobile number, name and nationality; thus, 
this factor is labelled as “Traditional identifiers”. 
This may be a slight misnomer, as ‘mobile phone’ is 
included in the factor. Alongside email disclosure, 
which is mandated by almost every SNS operator, 
these are items that people ‘have to’ disclose if they 
want a profile set up on SNS. The place of mobiles 
in the structure of identification / authentication 
is discussed in greater depth in the fact sheet on 
eCommerce.
In terms of socio-economic status, age appears 
to play the most important role in the disclosure of 
many of the items reported. SNS users who are still 
studying are more likely to disclose more items 
than less educated individuals [up to 15 years 
old regarding age left education], especially of 
social nature [Table 33]. Students, single people 
with mobile phones also tend to disclose more 
information across the board than average SNS 
users; strangely, the difference is greater for mobile 
phone users concerning disclosure of biographical 
information such as age, address and nationality. 
We then examined whether people disclosed 
more or less of different types of information in 
different countries. To provide a more structured 
view on the results, we looked at country 
differences in the provision of ‘clusters’ of personal 
data, as they were determined using factor analysis: 
social information, sensitive information and 
traditional identifiers [Table 34].32 Overall, we 
32 A breakdown for individual items by every single country 
is reported in Section 3.9.
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found no discernible regional patterns concerning 
overall disclosure. In terms of social information, 
people disclose much less in Poland [but in general 
also in other east European countries], and much 
more in Sweden, UK and Luxembourg and Austria. 
Regarding sensitive information, people in Spain, 
Austria, Estonia and Romania disclose more, while 
people in the UK, France and Poland disclose less. 
When we turn to traditional identifiers, people 
in Sweden, Denmark and Latvia disclose more 
[possibly due to higher mobile phone number 
disclosure or as a result of their increased use of 
eGov services], while people in the UK and Italy 
disclose less [possibly because in the UK they 
use less traditional identifiers and in Italy since 
e-services are not as diffused]. These fragmented 
results, apart from national exceptions, may mean 
that SNS are still very national, as people do 
Table 34. Information disclosed in SNS by country
Social
information
Sensitive
information
Traditional
identifiers
Belgium 0.1 0.02 0.07
Denmark 0.2 -0.01 0.43
Greece -0.2 0.03 -0.09
Spain 0.01 0.39 0.1
Finland 0 -0.1 0.23
France 0.04 -0.16 -0.04
Ireland 0.21 0.03 0.17
Italy 0.06 0.23 -0.3
Luxemburg 0.39 -0.15 -0.1
The Netherlands 0.14 -0.14 -0.01
Austria 0.28 0.34 0.32
Portugal -0.18 0.28 -0.21
Sweden 0.23 0.13 0.69
United Kingdom 0.16 -0.21 -0.35
Germany -0.07 -0.1 0.15
Bulgaria 0.02 -0.06 -0.21
Cyprus -0.06 -0.12 0.16
Czech Republic -0.18 0.06 0.25
Estonia 0.02 0.39 0.3
Hungary -0.12 0.19 0.1
Latvia -0.17 0.13 0.38
Lithuania -0.06 -0.14 -0.17
Malta 0.3 -0.07 0.16
Poland -0.46 -0.17 0.26
Romania -0.13 0.32 -0.15
Slovakia -0.03 0.05 0.31
Slovenia -0.08 -0.11 0.22
EU27 0.02 0.03 0.12
Source: QB4a.
Base: SNS users.
disclose different types of information on language 
based-sites [for instance Tuenti {www.tuenti.com} in 
Spain]; results may also be due to country specific 
culture and regulation which was not tapped in the 
survey.33
3.5.1 Need to disclose in SNS
Turning to perceptions of the necessity of 
disclosing personal information, respondents 
were asked seven statements addressing this
33 This, in turn, hints at the importance of conducting 
supply-side analysis of the type of information required / 
elicited by different SNS operators across EU27.
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issue [Table 35].34 Individuals who use SNS are 
more likely than non SNS users to agree that 
‘disclosing personal information is an increasing 
part of modern life’ (84%). SNS users feel more 
of an obligation to disclose than non SNS users 
(44%). They have a stronger perception that the 
government asks for increasingly more personal 
34 Qb5b. What are the most important reasons why you 
disclose such information on social networking sites?
Table 35. Perceptions of the necessity of disclosing personal information by SNS use
Totally Agree
 
% of 
non SNS user
% of 
SNS user
Nowadays you need to log into several systems using several usernames and passwords 79%* 86%*
Disclosing personal information is an increasing part of modern life 78%* 84%*
The (NATIONALITY) Government asks you for more and more personal information 69%* 72%*
There is no alternative than to disclose personal information if one wants to obtain products or 
services
64%* 72%*
You feel obliged to disclose personal information on the Internet 33%* 44%*
You don’t mind disclosing personal information in return for free services online (e.g. free email 
address)
32%* 44%*
Disclosing personal information is not a big issue for you 30%* 39%*
Base: EU27.
Source: QB5b.
Note:	*p<0.001	are	reported.
Figure 10. Attitudes to disclosure in EU27 countries
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB5b.
information and that there is no alternative than 
to disclose personal information if one wants 
to obtain products or services (both at 72%). 
However, SNS users are more likely not to mind 
disclosing personal information in return for free 
services online (e.g. free email address) (44%). 
We then looked at country level, to see 
whether there are national differences in the 
relation between the feeling of unavoidability 
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to disclose, and the desire to disclose.35 At 
country level, the situation is different and 
interestingly, pointing at context effects on the 
relationship [Figure 10]. In some countries, SNS 
users are slightly more likely to disclose happily 
[Italy, Estonia], and to think that disclosure is 
unavoidable. Conversely, in other countries 
[Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia], people are less likely 
to be happy to disclose their personal data; they 
also think that disclosure could be avoided. 
Unavoidability of disclosure is also related to 
the benefit of the service obtained through data 
disclosure.
3.5.2 Disclosure in SNS: what is personal and 
reasons for disclosure
We then crossed disclosure of data with the 
perception that this data is actually personal. This 
tells us whether people who disclose personal 
data consider it as such.36 Overall, there is no 
apparent relation between considering one’s 
data personal and disclosing them on SNS. So 
even if people consider information personal, 
still they disclose it. If anything, people disclose 
information slightly more if they consider it 
personal; this may be because people attribute 
importance ex-post facto having disclosed the 
information. Of course, this may be due to the fact 
that people need to disclose social information 
if they want to socialise online. Indeed, the 
most important reasons for disclosing personal 
information when using SNS are to access the 
services (61%) followed by connect with others 
(54%).37 Both reasons are related with a functional 
requirement and with core socialisation – the 
main aim of SNS. Other reasons, such as ‘for fun’ 
(23%), to get a service for free and to obtain a 
customised service (both at 17%) point out that 
35 In the Appendix, Table 52, Table 54 report country-level 
values of discrete indicators as to willingness to disclose.
36 The questions were asked as not to influence the 
responder, that is first asked what information is personal 
data from a list and then, in context, what has been 
disclosed from the same list.
37 QB5a: What are the most important reasons why you 
disclose such information on social networking sites and\ 
or sharing sites? is reported in Section 3.9.
‘functional’ aspects are also considered by SNS 
users to disclose information, albeit to a much 
lesser extent.
Furthermore, there is a clear link between 
information disclosed and reason for disclosing 
information in relation ‘to connect with others’ 
and ‘fun’ [Table 37]. Both reasons are related 
to disclosure of social information on SNS, as 
users have to generate or distribute contents 
to be able to socialize. Again, it seems that 
‘social’ information is disclosed rather less to 
get services for free, customised services or 
offers. This points once more at the distinction 
between the ‘commercial’ and the ‘social’ in 
SNS, in the eyes of their users; it also points 
at the relevance in this respect of concepts of 
‘purposefulness’ of data provision and limited 
reuse of personal data that lies at the heart of 
the data protection directive. Having said this, 
more people provide commercially valuable 
information on SNS than people provide 
social information on eCommerce sites. This 
may point to an advantage of SNS operators 
over eCommerce providers regarding viability 
of business plans based on Web2.0 dynamics 
– extracting monetary value from people’s 
personal information.
We then checked reasons to disclose by 
country and by socio-economic characteristics 
of SNS users.38 In terms of countries, we found 
no significant regional pattern. In terms of 
socio-demographic characteristics, again we 
found limited variance: people from different 
background appear to disclose on SNS for 
similar reasons. The only small difference 
concerns young people who are slightly more 
likely to disclose information for fun and to 
connect with others.
38 Tables 52 – 55 in Section 3.9 provide country and socio-
demographic breakdowns of different reasons to disclose 
in SNS.
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People who disclosed… % who consider it personal
Financial information
No
Yes
78
84
Name
No
Yes
40
46
Photos
No
Yes
50
52
Nationality
No
Yes
24
29
Activities
No
Yes
24
28
Who friends are
No
Yes
30
35
Address
No
Yes
64
60
Preferences
No
Yes
27
30
Work history
No
Yes
30
33
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB4a and QB2.
Notes:	Mobile	phone,	website	visited	and	national	identity	number	had	no	significant	differences.
Only	items	disclosed	by	more	than	6%	of	people	are	reported.	Differences	reported	are	significant	at	p	<	0.001.
Table 37. Reasons to disclose information in SNS by items disclosed
To 
access
the 
service
To save
 time at
 the 
next 
visit
To receive
money or 
price 
reductions
To benefit 
from
personalised
commercial 
offers
To get a
 service
for free
To obtain 
a
service 
adapted 
to
your 
needs
For fun
To 
connect
with 
others
Overall 61% 12% 6% 8% 17% 17% 23% 54%
Financial 
information
68% 24% 18% 17% 25% 26% 14% 34%
Work history 17% 9% 15% 23% 58%
National identity 
number
74% 23% 13% 16% 25% 26% 14% 33%
Name 64% 5% 7% 56%
Address 72% 19% 9% 11% 22% 24% 16% 45%
Nationality 65% 14% 9% 20% 20% 25% 59%
Activities 59% 5% 7% 32% 68%
Preferences 33% 67%
Photos 59% 10% 4% 6% 16% 16% 31% 67%
Friends 59% 10% 4% 5% 16% 33% 72%
Web visited 66% 17% 11% 22% 25% 30% 63%
Mobile 74% 18% 9% 12% 25% 24% 18% 49%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB5b. 
Note:	Only	items	disclosed	by	more	than	6%	of	people	are	reported.	Only	differences	that	are	significant	at	p<0.001	are	reported.
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3.6 Risks of data disclosed in SNS39
Overall, virtually all respondents (98%) 
perceive some sort of risk connected to SNS 
disclosure [Table 38]. It is true however that 
different people perceive different risks, and that 
these do not cluster neatly, as other variables 
were reported to do (i.e. risks are seen are 
rather dissimilar and discrete by respondents). 
SNS users are likely to consider use of their 
information without their knowledge the greatest 
risk in SNS (44%), followed by fraud (41%). 
‘Your information being shared with third parties 
without knowledge’ is the next most important 
risk (38%). They are also likely to consider 
identity being at risk of theft online (33%). 
Personal safety is perceived as a lesser issue 
(20%); as well as views and behaviours being 
misunderstood (11%) and being discriminated 
against (e.g. in job selection, receiving price 
increases, getting no access to a service) (7%). 
It is interesting to compare these results with 
the risks perceived by people who use eCommerce 
[Figure 11; also see Table 15 on page 38]. The ranking 
of respondents’ risk perceptions is very similar for 
social networking or sharing sites as for shopping 
online, with the exception of being the victim of 
fraud: this item is the second most important risk 
associated with social networking but the most 
important risk in the case of shopping online (41% 
versus 55%). Other risks are mentioned more for 
social networking than for shopping online: personal 
safety being at risk (20% and 12% respectively), 
reputation being damaged (12% and 4%), views and 
behaviours being misunderstood (11% and 4%), and 
discrimination in areas like recruitment, pricing, or 
availability of services (7% and 3%).
Table 38. Risks from disclosing information in SNS
% of SNS users
Your information being used without your knowledge 44
Yourself being victim of fraud 41
Your information being shared with third parties without agreement 38
Your identity being at risk of theft online 33
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial offers 27
Your personal safety being at risk 20
Your reputation being damaged 12
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 11
Yourself being discriminated against (e.g. in job selection) 7
None (SPONTANEOUS) 2
Source: QB7a. 
Base: SNS users.
Note:	Only	differences	that	are	significant	at	p<0.001	are	reported.
39 QB7a. I will read out a list of potential risks. According 
to you, what are the most important risks connected with 
disclosure of personal information on social networking 
sites and\ or sharing sites?
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It thus seems that the nature of the 
transaction environment [monetary vs. social], 
which is in turn related to the data actually 
disclosed, determines only in part the perception 
of different types of risk – apart from specific 
risks. And even for these specific risks [reputation 
on the one hand, fraud on the other], differences 
are not as large as it may have been expected.
It is then interesting to examine perceived 
risks in relation to the information people actually 
disclosed on SNS, in terms of number and in terms of 
type of information disclosed – traditional identifiers, 
social information and sensitive information [Table 
39]. Results are surprising. Overall, there is no 
positive association between high perception of risk 
and low disclosure, across almost all the risks people 
mentioned and across types of information people 
disclosed; this mean that people disclose regardless 
of risk. So risks do not constitute a deterrent to 
disclosure. What is more, for commercial-procedural 
risks and for risks to reputation, there is a small, 
positive relation; this means that people who perceive 
these risks actually disclose more of their social 
and sensitive data. This may depend on increased 
alertness to risks once people have actually disclosed 
information about themselves. This is confirmed by 
a relatively robust correlation [r = .19] for overall 
number of risks perceived and number of personal 
data items disclosed in SNS. However, on the bright 
side, sensitive information show mixed correlations 
with a number of risks, namely it is negatively related 
to commercial – procedural risks, and to overall 
number of risks perceived; risks in this case may 
actually make people more cautious in releasing 
sensitive information. 
To conclude, we should note that the 
questionnaire did not measure risks that may 
have prevented people to sign up for SNS in 
the first place; some people [not young people, 
obviously], may be put off by the risks mentioned 
and not take up SNS. But once they do take up 
SNS, then risks do not seem to be a deterrent 
to people disclosing their personal data, as 
described above. In the last section, we will 
Figure 11: Perception of risks in SNS vs eCommerce
QB7: Basis: SNS users (40% of whole sample) and online shoppers (39% of whole sample).
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examine the overall perception of SNS users 
regarding the Internet, to see if people who then 
go on to disclose on SNS are more likely to 
happily disclose in general, or if this behaviour is 
limited to their SNS frequentation.
In terms of socio-demographics, older SNS 
users are more likely to be concerned about the 
use of their information (information being shared 
with third parties without agreement; information 
being used to send unwanted commercial offers); 
younger SNS users are rather likely to worry about 
the impact of these uses [Figure 12]. Respondents 
aged 40-54 are more likely to mention the use of 
their information without their knowledge (48%) 
and their information being shared with third 
parties without their agreement (43%), whereas 
the oldest respondents (aged 55+) are more likely 
to mention their information being used to send 
them unwanted commercial offers (35%) and the 
risk of online identity theft (37%). This last item 
is also more often seen as a risk by respondents 
who left school at the age of 15 or younger (37%) 
than by those who remained longer in education.
More in general, education and occupation 
also make a difference. Manual workers and 
house persons (both 45%) are most likely to 
report that they fear becoming a victim of 
fraud; managers and house persons (both 42%) 
are most likely to mention their information 
being shared with third parties without their 
agreement, compared to 34% among students. 
Self-employed respondents (32%) more often 
cite the risk that their information may be used to 
send them unwanted commercial offers, and this 
item is also mentioned more frequently by retired 
respondents (36%), after the risk of identity theft 
(38%) and the use of their information without 
their knowledge (50%). 
Table 39. Perceived risks in relation to SNS disclosure
# SNS 
items
disclosed
Traditional
identifiers
Social
information
Sensitive
information
Your information being used without your knowledge 0.06 -0.06
Your information being shared with third parties without 
knowledge
0.06 0.05 0.06
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial 
offers
0.04 0.05
Your information being used in different contexts 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.05
Your identity being at risk of theft online
Your personal safety being at risk
Yourself being victim of fraud 0.04
Yourself being discriminated against 0.05 0.06
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 0.06 0.08 0.06
Your reputation being damaged 0.05 0.06 0.07
Index of risk of disclosure in SNS [0-3] 0.19 0.13 0.15 -0.04
Source: QB4a and QB7a.
Base: SNS users who disclosed information.
Notes:	Only	significant	 relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	 [i.e.	when	there	 is	a	99.9%	probability	 that	 the	relation	 is	not	due	 to	
chance].
Results reported are:
1.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
2. Point-biserial correlation for factors and/or scales crossed by values.
3. Phi for relations between values, when they can be considered as multiple categorical (e.g. colour: white, red, or green).
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Concerning country difference, we looked at 
the issue in a more structured fashion, as difference 
for all these possible risks by EU27 are intricate.40 In 
general, very different risks are perceived in different 
countries. We mapped differences for ‘identity 
theft’ and ‘unauthorised third party use’, as they 
both imply the intervention of a third party in the 
handling of one’s data, and are both high in people’s 
concern [Figure 13]. Among the high variance 
noted above, there appear to be three groups of 
countries that stand out. First, in some countries 
there are high perceived risks of unauthorised 
re-use of personal data, but low perceived risk of 
identity theft on SNS [The Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria]. People in these countries may assume 
that SNS are internally safe but controlled 
environments. In a second group, there are high 
40 The interested reader may look at Table 56 in Section 3.9, 
for figures on perception of risks from disclosing personal 
information in SNS in each country.
perceived risks of identity theft, but low perceived 
risks of unauthorised reuse of personal information 
disclosed in SNS [UK, France, Sweden, Denmark]. 
In these countries, people may trust SNS operators 
more than the average EU citizen. Finally, there 
are countries where both the mentioned risks are 
below EU27 average [Poland, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Italy]. To further test these points, we constructed a 
scale of perceived risks, to see how countries fare 
against each other overall [table not reported].41 
SNS users living in the north of Europe, specifically 
Germany, Sweden, France, Ireland and Denmark 
41 As only three choices were given to respondents, out of 
ten possible risks, most people will have mentioned three 
risks [76% of SNS users]. However, we assume that SNS 
users who mentioned one or two risks, rather than three, 
have a lesser perception of threat. Of course, it may be the 
case that people only mentioned one risk as they though 
it overshadowed others. After checking, the similarity of 
response of the three types of respondents is remarkable. 
The only difference regards the slightly higher propensity 
for people reporting ‘fraud’ as one single risk. 
Figure 12. Risks from disclosure in SNS by socio-demographic profile
Source: QB7a.
Base: Social networking site users (40% of whole sample).
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appear to have more concerns about SNS risk, 
as measured by the number of times mentioned 
[2.8 to 2.9 average]. Conversely, residents of Italy, 
Romania, Poland and Portugal [2.3 to 2.4 average], 
that is mainly the south-east of Europe, are likely to 
perceive lesser risk in SNS activity.
3.7 Control on data disclosed in SNS
A key concept in relation to personal data 
disclosure is that of control: how much control 
SNS users think they have on data they disclose. 
Control is a key component of the data protection 
framework, one that may be enabled and to 
some degree enforced by technical means and 
solutions on SNS and, overall, on the Internet. 
SNS users were asked about how much control 
they feel they have over the information disclosed 
on these sites.42 A total of 26% of them stated that 
they feel they have complete control; 52% partial 
control and 20% no control at all.43 Overall, 
individuals tend to feel more in control over 
‘social’ information they disclose – such as 
Figure 13. Risk of identity theft and third party re-use of personal data in SNS by country
Table 40. Perception of control disclosing personal information by age
15-24 25-39 40-54 55+
Complete control 31% 25% 24% 22%
Partial control 54% 54% 50% 48%
No control at all 14% 21% 26% 30%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB6a.
Note:	All	differences	are	significant	at	p	<	0.01.
42 Question QB6a. How much control do you feel you 
have over the information you have disclosed on social 
networking sites and\or sharing sites, e.g. the ability to 
change, delete or correct this information?
43 2% of SNS users answered ‘Do not know’.
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they disclose ‘sensitive’ information – such as 
financial or medical – or traditional ‘identifiers’ 
– such as mobile number or address [Table 59, 
in Section 3.9]. We then crossed perception of 
control by age [Table 40] and level of education 
[Table 60, in Section 3.9]. There are significant 
differences concerning age: very young and 
young users are more likely to feel they have 
complete or some control over the information 
they disclosed. Also, better educated SNS users 
are more likely to feel more control over the 
information. Nevertheless due to age, SNS users 
who are still studying are more likely to also feel 
more control. 
Finally, we noted no consistent regional 
patterns; SNS users in Cyprus, Malta, and The 
Netherlands tend to report higher perceived 
control on their personal data; conversely, 
respondents in Germany, Latvia and Romania 
report lower control on the personal data they 
have disclosed in SNS. Difference may be 
due to the uptake of different SNS services in 
these countries [see Figure 6 and Figure 8]. We 
thus checked for network effects, to see if SNS 
uptake in a country was in any way related to 
feeling of control. The point is that people may 
feel more in control if more of their friends are 
online, or if a technology is seen as mature. 
It is interesting that this is indeed the case: a 
relation exists between uptake of SNS as % 
of internet users in a country, and feeling of 
control on information disclosed [r = .41, see 
Figure 14]. This holds true for age in general, 
and for all age groups except SNS users who 
are 55+ years old. This could be due to classical 
network effects [linked to increasing numbers]; 
it may be linked to technology maturity or to 
uptake of a particular SNS application across a 
group of countries. Survey data does not help 
us adjudicate between alternative explanations. 
However, feeling of control does increase 
as more and more diverse Internet users start 
using SNS [thus beyond the usual suspects: the 
digital natives].
Usually, perceptions of control are associated 
to what people actually disclose and to the risks 
perceived in relation to the information disclosure 
Figure 14. Control on information disclosed in SNS and uptake at country level
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB6a.
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[Table 41].44 Perceived control increases as 
people disclose more social information, but 
decreases in relation to the increased disclosure 
of biographical information; in other words, 
people may think they have more control on the 
social information they post to their profiles, than 
on the biographical information [name, address, 
mobile number] that is usually required to sign 
up for the service. The less is required, the more 
users feel in control over it. This may imply that 
minimisation of biographical information or use 
of encrypted, portable credentials for sign-up in 
SNS may increase user perceived control on their 
data. Finally, as it may be natural, the more risks 
people perceive associated with SNS activity, the 
less control they feel they have on the information 
they have disclosed. However, control is not 
associated to any specific risk.
3.7.1 Privacy settings in SNS
One practical tool in relation to control is 
the ability to change one’s privacy setting on a 
SNS profile from default, to protect some or all 
of one’s data from view. SNS users were asked 
about this.45 Overall, 56% of SNS users stated 
that they have tried to change privacy settings 
of SNS personal profile from default options 
and 43% have not tried.46 Thus, if SNS providers 
44 QB7a. I will read out a list of potential risks. According 
to you, what are the most important risks connected with 
disclosure of personal information on SNS and\ or sharing 
sites?
45 QB10a. Have you ever tried to change the privacy settings 
of your personal profile from the default settings on a 
SNS?
46 1% Do not know.
have not set appropriately high safeguards to 
protect people’s personal data by default, a 
feat that not all operators accomplish,47 just 
less that half of European SNS users may have 
left their personal data unprotected in these 
environments.
To investigate these further, SNS users who 
have not tried to change the default privacy 
settings, were probed about reasons why not 
[Table 42].48 A total of 31% SNS users who 
have not tried reported that they trust the site to 
set appropriate privacy settings [which makes 
all the more important that these settings are 
appropriately, and not conservatively set]; 24% 
stated that they did not know that you could 
change the settings; 21% mentioned that they 
are not worried about personal data; and 20% 
do not know how to proceed with changing the 
settings. Finally, having the time to look at the 
available options was selected by 13% of the 
sample. Therefore, the most important reasons 
to not try to change privacy settings are firstly 
related with awareness and digital skills, and 
then trust in the SNS service provider.
Users who tried to change the default privacy 
settings were instead asked how easy or difficult 
47 “Assessment of the Implementation of the Safer Social 
Networking Principles for the EU on 14 Websites: 
Summary Report” June 2011 at: http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/activities/social_networking/docs/
final_report_11/part_one.pdf
48 QB12a. Why did you not try to change these privacy 
settings?
Table 41. Control over information disclosed by actual disclosure, perceived risks and information
Disclosure: social 
information
Disclosure: 
sensitive 
information
Disclosure: 
biography 
information
Index of
risk of 
disclosure
Control on personal 
data disclosed
.06 -.10 -.07
Base: SNS users who disclosed information [control].
Source: QB6a.
Note:	Only	significant	relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99.9%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to	chance].	Results	reported	are	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
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this was.49 Most considered it very easy (36%) and 
fairly easy (46%); less than 15% stated that this 
change was fairly difficult or very difficult (3%). 
Thus, if the possibility is offered, users appear to 
be comfortable in contributing to protecting their 
personal data online.
3.7.2 Information about the possible 
consequences of disclosing in SNS
One of the key principles of the data 
protection framework in Europe is that of 
informed consent; regarding the ‘informed’ part, 
users have to be informed of the conditions 
of data collection and of the intended uses 
of the personal data they provide; SNS users 
were asked if SNS sites inform them about the 
possible consequences of disclosing personal 
information.50 This question does not imply only 
information on the part of the user; it goes further 
in that it probes SNS operators’ transparency 
concerning the risks and consequences that 
may affect users of the service [unforeseen by 
Directive 95/46]. SNS users appear to be split on 
this question: about half (49%) agree that they are 
49 QB11a. How easy or difficult did you find it to change the 
privacy settings of your personal profile?
50 QB8a. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with 
the following statement: Social networking sites and\ 
or sharing sites sufficiently inform their users about the 
possible consequences of disclosing personal information.
sufficiently informed of possible consequences, 
but a similar proportion (46%) disagree.
We then looked at how the two concepts 
overlap: informed consent [gauged via QB17], 
and information about consequences in SNS. 
First, we note that among Internet users, SNS 
users are more likely to report that they have been 
informed of data collection conditions [Table 43]. 
This may not be extraordinary, as users 
of different online services report similar 
percentages (for instance, eCommerce, reported 
in the same table). However, more SNS users 
tend to report suitable information about 
collection conditions, rather than having been 
informed about possible consequences. We 
thus looked comparatively at the two types of 
information provided to SNS users [Table 44]. 
Largely, the two perceptions overlap [phi = .32, 
r = .24], but not to the extent that we expected. 
Table 44 can be divided in four quadrants. In 
red, 19% of all SNS users claim not have to been 
informed of either conditions or consequences. 
This is a clear area of action for the enforcement 
of Directive 95/46. In green, a significant 
proportion of SNS users [overall 29%] report 
having been informed; however, they are not 
happy with the degree of information about 
possible consequences. A relative majority 
in blue [40%] have been informed about 
collection conditions and consequences. And 
Table 42. Reasons why you did not try to change privacy settings
% of SNS users who have not tried to change privacy 
settings
You trust the site to set appropriate privacy settings 31%
You did not know that you could change the settings 24%
You are not worried by having personal data on SNS 21%
You do not know how to proceed to change these settings 20%
You did not find the time to look at the available options 13%
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 7%
DK 5%
Base: SNS users who have not tried to change privacy settings.
Source: QB12a.
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service
Never Rarely Sometimes Always
SNS
No 22% 18% 37% 23%
Yes 12% 17% 41% 29.5%
eCommerce
No 20.5% 18% 38% 23.5%
Yes 12.5% 17% 41% 40%
Total Yes 15.5% 17.5% 40% 27%
Base: Internet users.
Source: QB1.2 & QB1.3 by QB8a.
Note: Figures are approximated to the closest half integer.
Table 44. Informed consent in online services by informed on consequences in SNS
SC sites sufficiently inform their users about the possible 
consequences of disclosing personal information
Totally 
disagree
Tend to 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Totally 
agree
Total
Informed about data 
collection conditions 
when disclosing personal 
data to access a service
Never 5% 4% 3% 2% 14%
Rarely 4% 6% 4% 2% 16%
Sometimes 5% 13% 19% 3% 40%
Always 4% 7% 13% 7% 30%
Total 18% 30% 39% 13% 100%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB8a by Q17.
Note: Figures are approximated to the closest half integer.
a small group in brown [11%] are happy about 
SNS sites informing them of consequences, but 
have hardly been given information on how the 
data collected will be used [which may depend 
on the distinction between SNS sites and other 
online services]. 
Overall, the picture is not reassuring for 
the policymaker, as significant work is required 
to enforce informed consent and enhanced 
information about what may happen with 
people’s personal data once it is disclosed. Also, 
results confirm what mentioned above: that more 
work is needed on the second count, and that 
sufficient information on possible consequence 
is a step further [therefore less frequent] than 
informed consent.
This line of reasoning leads us to check the 
relation of informed consent, information about 
possible consequences with the degree of control 
people have on data disclosed in SNS. Namely, 
we wish to determine which of the two types of 
information is more strongly related with feeling 
of control on the data disclosed [Table 45]. First, 
the feeling of control increases both in relation 
to increased information on uses of data and to 
information on possible consequences. Second, 
the feeling of control increases more rapidly 
in relation to increased feeling of information 
regarding possible consequences. Third, feeling 
of control grows the fastest for people who are 
fully informed about uses, and are informed 
about consequences. To compound the picture, 
we found that information about possible 
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of disclosure
Informed about consequences
Totally
disagree
Tend to
disagree
Tend to
agree
Totally
agree
Informed about 
data collection 
conditions 
Never 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Rarely 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3
Sometimes 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3
Always 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.5
Base: SNS users.
Source: qb6a by  QB8a x Q17.
Note: Figures reported are mean values of ‘control’; ‘control’ is measured on a 1-3 scale, where 1 is no control at all over data one 
has disclosed in SNS, and 3 is total control.
Table 46. Sites sufficiently inform their users about the possible consequences of disclosing personal 
information by country
Total ‘Agree’
Portugal 76%
Italy 69%
Hungary 69%
Malta 67%
Ireland 63%
Rumania 60%
Poland 59%
Bulgaria 59%
United Kingdom 56%
Spain 56%
Lithuania 55%
Slovakia 54%
Estonia 54%
EU27 53%
Latvia 52%
Sweden 51%
Cyprus 50%
Finland 49%
Greece 48%
Austria 48%
Denmark 45%
Czech Republic 45%
Belgium 44%
Slovenia 43%
Germany 40%
The Netherlands 39%
France 36%
Luxemburg 33%
Note:	p<0.001.
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB8a.
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consequences has a negative relation with overall 
perception of risks in SNS [r = -.12]; the same is 
not true for information about the uses of data 
in online services [no significant correlation]. 
Overall, this means that while information 
overall is good at increasing people’s feeling of 
control, contextual information about possible 
consequences has the strongest correlation with 
feeling of control on the information disclosed 
and decreases the overall perception of risks.
Concerning socio-economic status, 
we noted small differences only [table not 
reported]. Specifically, older people, people 
with university education, managers and very 
skilled internet users are more likely to disagree 
that SNS sites do a good job in informing them 
of possible consequences. On the other hand, 
there are significant country differences [Table 
46]. While in EU27 about one in two people 
think they have been informed regarding 
consequences, at country level this ranges 
from two in three people in southern countries 
[Portugal, Italy, Malta, but also Hungary]; to one 
in three people in northern countries [Germany, 
The Netherlands, France, Luxemburg]. Once 
again country of residence [and of fruition of 
SNS service] is more important than individual 
socio-economic status traits to explain social 
SNS users’ behaviours and perceptions.
3.7.3 Responsibility for personal data safety in 
SNS51
We then asked questions concerning 
who is perceived to be responsible for the safe 
collection, handling and storage of personal 
data online [Table 47].52 It was surprising to see 
that most respondents claim they are personally 
responsible (49%), followed by site owners (34%) 
and by public authorities (17%). Results on 
who is responsible secondly largely confirmed 
this. Two thirds of people who say they are 
primarily responsible also think that online sites 
are responsible in the second place [conjoint 
table not reported]. Also, people who think 
shopping sites are primarily responsible also 
see an important secondary role for themselves. 
The structure of perceived of responsibility in 
SNS is clearly more tilted towards individuals 
and companies than the one people see in 
eCommerce [see also 2.6 on page 36]. 
Therefore, people feel responsible even if, as 
we pointed out above, they think they only have 
partial control on what they disclose and perceive
Table 47. Responsibility for personal data safety in SNS
Firstly Secondly
You - as you need to take care of your information 49% 27%
The social networking sites - as they need to ensure they process your information fairly 34% 42%
Public authorities - as they need to ensure that citizens are protected 17% 30%
DK 1% 2%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB9a1, QB9a2.
51 QB9a1. Who do you think should make sure that your 
information is collected, stored and exchanged safely on 
social networking sites and\ or sharing sites? Firstly? and 
QB9a2. Secondly?
52 See question QB8b.
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risks to be related to other parties’ behaviours, 
rather than their own. But, we found significant 
differences in perceived responsibility and control 
[Table 48]. People who think they have no control 
on their personal data [again: once they’ve been 
disclosed], tend to see higher co-responsibility 
of industry and regulators. Conversely, those 
who think they have total control tend to see 
almost exclusive self-company responsibility. 
In all cases, companies are seen as responsible 
regardless of level of perceived control [e.g. their 
conferred responsibility remains relatively stable 
across perceived control].
It is no surprise that significant differences 
were also found in perceived responsibility and 
level of information provided about disclosing 
by SNS sites. SNS users holding that they are 
sufficiently informed are slightly more likely 
to perceive that they themselves or the SNS are 
responsible of personal data safety. Considering 
this, and considering the indirect influence of 
information of consequences on control we 
reported above, it may be wise for companies 
and policy-makers to foster full understanding 
of the working of personal data in SNS, if they 
wish to ensure that users take better care of their 
personal data.
Finally, we looked at socio-demographic 
and country difference in perceptions of 
responsibility [Section 3.9].53 There are very 
few differences overall, which mainly relate to 
age. Concerning self responsibility, if anything, 
older SNS users tend to consider themselves 
responsible. Older people also hold public 
authorities more responsible than other SNS 
groups. On the other hand, younger people are 
more likely to consider SNS site responsible, 
while older people to consider them less 
responsible. Concerning country differences, 
there are four interesting tales [Figure 15]. First, 
[top left corner], there are countries where 
people consider SNS sites mainly responsible, 
and themselves much less so [Denmark, Latvia, 
53 For clarity in the assessment of the relation between 
responsibility, SES and other variables, we employ a single 
composite measure of responsibility; we give a value of 
‘2’ to people who attribute first responsibility to any of 
the agents mentioned [self, site, authorities]; and a value 
of ‘1’ to people who attribute secondary responsibility to 
these agents. Then, we check this measure for every agent 
against country of residence and socio-economic traits.
Table 48. Responsibility for personal data safety in SNS by perception of control
Complete control
Partial
control
No control
at all
You 58% 48% 44%
SNS sites 32% 36% 33%
Public authorities 10% 16% 22%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB9a1.
Table 49. Responsibility for personal data safety in SNS and information about possible consequences
Informed about consequences
Total ‘Disagree’ Total ‘Agree’
You 44% 56%
SNS sites 49% 51%
Public authorities 55% 45%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB9a1 and QB8a.
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Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic]. Second, 
in some countries people feel personally 
responsible to protect their own data, and 
SNS sites much less so [Romania, Cyprus, 
Malta, Ireland]. Third, regardless of views on 
self vs. company, in some countries there is 
less support for public authority responsibility 
[Ireland, UK, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia]. 
We may call this lack of demand for public 
authority supplementation. Fourth, in some 
specific countries where people are not seen as 
responsible, public authority responsibility is 
the highest [Spain, Italy and Greece]. We may 
call this "substitution" of responsibility.
Figure 15. Responsibility to protect personal data disclosed by country
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Table 50. Correlations between SNS-related variables and other relevant variables
Variables Disclosure Risks Responsibility Control
Measurement 3 Factors 4 Values
3 x 3-point
scales
3-point
scale
Values
So
ci
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Se
ns
iti
ve
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
id
en
tifi
er
s
St
ea
lth
 u
se
Un
w
an
te
d 
of
fe
rs
Id
en
tit
y 
th
ef
t
Fr
au
d
Se
lf
Co
m
pa
ny
Au
th
or
iti
es
Attitudes 
towards 
disclosure
2 Factors
Unavoidability -.11 -.04 -.11 -.04 .06 .-05 .07
Propensity -.09 -.10 -.09 -.07 .05 -.06 .04 -.13
Trust 2 Factors
Trust in 
institutions
.07 .07 .06 .06 -.05 .14
Trust in 
companies
.04 -.05 -.05 .06 .05 -.05 .22
Concern about 
observation
1 Factor -.09 .04 .06 -.07 .09 -.07
Use of 
credentials in 
daily life
2 Factors
Business-
related
.19 .12 .04 .06 .07 .06 .05 .04 -.05 -.05
Government 
issued
.12 .06 -.06 .08 -.10
Identity 
protection 
behaviours
4 Factors
Avoidance .10 -.11 .06 .07 .06 .08 .06 .05 -.05
Adjustment .13 .08 .08 .12 .04 -.04
Low-tech -.08 .04 .08 -.04 .04
Deception .08 .04 -.04
Internet identity 
protection
9-points
scale
.17 .09 .04 .10 .06
Awareness of 
identity theft  
and/or data loss
4 Values
Media 
awareness
.04 .05 .06 .05 -.34
Social 
awareness
.05 .09 -.04
Self-family 
experience
.06 .04
No -.05 -.07 -.05 -.06 -.04 .05
Comfort with 
online profiling
4-point
scale
.06 .05 -.04 -.04 -.32 .15
Read privacy 
statements
3 Values
Read and 
understand
.05 .12
Read no 
understand
-.07 .04 -.04
No read .1 -.04 -.09
Concern about 
reuse
4-point
scale
-.11 -.04 .04 .07 .06 -.04 -.05 .08 -.08
Possibility to 
delete personal 
data
1 Value
Whenever one 
wants
.07 -.08 .05 .05 .05
Importance of 
personal data 
portability
4-point
scale
.04 .07
As	the	sample	is	large,	only	significant	relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99.9%	probability	that	the	relation	
reported is not due to chance].
Results reported are: 
1.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
2. Point-biserial correlation for factors and/or scales crossed by values.
3. Phi for relations between values, when they can be considered as multiple categorical (e.g. colour: white, red, or green).
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3.9 Additional tables and figures for 
SNS use
Table 51. SNS users and Internet activities
% of  SNS users 
also doing other activities
Use websites to share pictures, videos, movies, etc. 68%*
Instant messaging, chat websites 61%*
Purchase goods or services online 57%*
Home banking 50%*
Make or receive phone calls or video calls over the Internet 32%*
Use online software 30%*
Use peer-to-peer software and\ or sites to exchange movies, 
music, 
22%*
Install plug-ins in your browser to extend its capability 17%*
Keep a blog (also known as web-log) 10%*
Design or maintain a website (not just a blog) 9%*
Source: QB1b. Which of the following activities do you also do on the Internet?.
Base: Internet users.
Notes:	*	p<0.001.
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% of  SNS users who disclose information
To access the service 61
To connect with others 54
For fun 23
To get a service for free 17
To obtain a service adapted to your needs 17
To save time at the next visit 12
To benefit from personalised commercial offers 8
To receive money or price reductions 6
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 1
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB5b.
Table 54. Reasons to disclose in SNS by country
To access the 
service
To get a service
for free
To obtain a 
service adapted 
to your needs
For fun
To connect with 
others
EU27 62% 17% 20% 22% 51%
Belgium 61% 13% 16% 27% 47%
Denmark 74% 21% 29% 18% 54%
Greece 55% 17% 22% 6% 57%
Spain 73% 23% 18% 17% 43%
Finland 68% 14% 24% 25% 59%
France 60% 11% 17% 23% 55%
Ireland 75% 13% 21% 28% 42%
Italy 61% 18% 17% 29% 44%
Luxemburg 45% 8% 17% 33% 73%
The Netherlands 50% 11% 14% 28% 65%
Austria 58% 40% 25% 20% 41%
Portugal 50% 13% 14% 27% 43%
Sweden 79% 10% 21% 39% 61%
United Kingdom 53% 7% 7% 28% 61%
Germany 60% 33% 25% 15% 62%
Bulgaria 56% 16% 16% 36% 55%
Cyprus 79% 14% 20% 14% 47%
Czech Republic 60% 14% 24% 27% 49%
Estonia 70% 18% 18% 7% 50%
Hungary 63% 15% 17% 16% 49%
Latvia 61% 14% 24% 24% 53%
Lithuania 58% 18% 18% 11% 59%
Malta 67% 11% 33% 22% 40%
Poland 69% 22% 19% 6% 34%
Romania 58% 22% 17% 18% 33%
Slovakia 56% 19% 25% 32% 51%
Slovenia 64% 18% 24% 11% 53%
Notes:	p<0.001.
Only reasons mentioned by at least 15% of respondents were reported in the table.
Base: SNS users. 
Source: QB5b.
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To save time 
at the next 
visit
To benefit from 
personalised 
commercial 
offers
To get a 
service 
for free
To obtain 
a service 
adapted to 
your needs
For 
fun
To 
connect 
with 
others
EU27 12% 8% 17% 17% 23% 54%
Age [brackets]
15-24 11% 6% 20% 15% 26% 58%
25-39 13% 9% 56%
40-54 10% 15% 21% 18% 48%
55+ 16% 5% 19% 47%
Terminal 
education age
15- 3% 13% 30% 48%
16-19 9%
20+ 21% 21% 52%
Still Studying 6% 14% 26% 60%
Occupation
Self-employed 9% 13% 23% 44%
Managers 20% 20%
Other white 
collars
14% 10% 21%
Manual workers 19%
House person 9% 13% 59%
Unemployed 17% 13%
Retired 48%
Students 11% 6% 14% 26% 60%
Personal mobile 
phone
No 8%
Yes 18%
Difficulties to 
pay bills
Most of the time 11%
From time to time 9%
Almost never/ 
never
7%
Household 
composition
1 28%
2
3 20% 21%
+4
Notes:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Base: SNS users.
Source:Qb5b.
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How old were you when 
you stopped full-time 
education?
Complete control Partial control No control at all
15- 6%* 4%* 9%*
16-19 44%* 39%* 44%*
20+ 25%* 33%* 34%*
Still Studying 25%* 23%* 13%*
Note:	*p<0.001.
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB6a by terminal education age.
Table 59. Information disclosed by SNS users and control perception
Complete control Partial control No control at all
Activities 27% 56% 17%
Preferences 27% 57% 16%
Photos 29% 55% 16%
Who friends are 28% 56% 16%
Websites visited 25% 59% 16%
Note:	Only	categories	that	display	significant	difference	at	p<0.001	are	reported.
Source: QB4 and QB6a.
Base: SNS users.
Table 60. Perception of control disclosing personal information in SNS by country
No control at all [1] Partial control [2] Complete Control [3] Mean
Cyprus 7% 36% 57% 2.5
The Netherlands 10% 58% 32% 2.3
Malta 11% 44% 44% 2.3
Finland 10% 61% 29% 2.2
Ireland 15% 53% 32% 2.2
Italy 15% 50% 35% 2.2
Portugal 8% 66% 26% 2.2
United Kingdom 16% 50% 33% 2.2
Hungary 10% 57% 33% 2.2
Lithuania 13% 55% 32% 2.2
Belgium 21% 48% 31% 2.1
Denmark 21% 53% 26% 2.1
Bulgaria 18% 55% 26% 2.1
Estonia 15% 59% 26% 2.1
Poland 16% 61% 23% 2.1
Slovakia 14% 58% 28% 2.1
EU27 18% 54% 28% 2.1
Greece 23% 52% 26% 2
Spain 22% 55% 24% 2
France 29% 45% 26% 2
Luxemburg 17% 58% 25% 2
Austria 20% 63% 17% 2
Sweden 22% 53% 24% 2
Czech Republic 25% 56% 20% 2
Slovenia 25% 50% 25% 2
Germany 29% 52% 18% 1.9
Latvia 28% 56% 16% 1.9
Romania 29% 52% 19% 1.9
92
3 
Fa
ct
 S
he
et
: S
oc
ia
l N
et
w
or
ki
ng
 S
it
es Table 61. Responsibility for personal data safety in SNS by socio-demographic traits
You
SNS
sites
Public
authorities
All SNS users 1.3 1.1 .6
Terminal education 
age
No full-time education 1.5 .7 .8
15- 1.2 1.0 .8
16-19 1.3 1.1 .6
20+ 1.3 1.1 .7
Still Studying 1.2 1.2 .6
Gender
Male 1.2 1.1 .7
Female 1.3 1.1 .6
Age
15-24 1.3 1.2 .6
25-39 1.2 1.1 .6
40-54 1.2 1.1 .7
55+ 1.3 .9 .8
Occupation
Self-employed 1.1 1.1 .7
Managers 1.3 1.1 .6
Other white collars 1.2 1.1 .7
Manual workers 1.3 1.1 .6
House person 1.3 1.1 .6
Unemployed 1.3 1.1 .6
Retired 1.4 .9 .7
Students 1.2 1.2 .6
Personal mobile 
phone
No 1.2 .9 .9
Yes 1.3 1.1 .6
Difficulty paying 
bills
Most of the time 1.2 1.1 .7
From time to time 1.2 1.1 .7
Almost never/ never 1.3 1.1 .6
Internet use access 
index
Low 1.3 1.0 .7
Medium 1.3 1.1 .6
High 1.2 1.2 .6
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB9a1, QB9a2. 
Note:	p<0.001.
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You SNS sites Public authorities
Belgium 53% 30% 16%
Denmark 41% 49% 9%
Greece 43% 27% 30%
Spain 38% 30% 33%
Finland 46% 46% 8%
France 55% 29% 16%
Ireland 68% 25% 7%
Italy 39% 33% 29%
Luxemburg 62% 23% 15%
The Netherlands 53% 32% 15%
Austria 45% 41% 14%
Portugal 58% 27% 15%
Sweden 45% 45% 10%
United Kingdom 57% 35% 8%
Germany 49% 35% 16%
Bulgaria 59% 30% 11%
Cyprus 71% 14% 14%
Czech Republic 43% 44% 13%
Estonia 52% 34% 14%
Hungary 51% 37% 12%
Latvia 42% 40% 19%
Lithuania 49% 38% 14%
Malta 67% 11% 22%
Poland 46% 38% 16%
Romania 72% 17% 11%
Slovakia 50% 40% 10%
Slovenia 62% 28% 11%
EU27 52% 33% 15%
Base: SNS users.
Source: QB9a1, QB9a2. 
Note:	p<0.001.
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4 FACT SHEET: Identity and Authentication in Europe
4.1 Question context
The questionnaire included various questions 
regarding identity management, both offline, and, 
to a large extent, on the Internet. In the order they 
are addressed in text, questions considered are:
Table 63. eID survey questions relevant to identity and authentication
Question code Shorthand Formulation Rationale
QB14 Use of credentials
Which of the following do you currently use?
Credit cards and bank cards
Etc.
To determine the use of 
credentials in everyday life.
QB15
Identity protection 
behaviour
In your daily life, what do you do to protect your 
identity? Please indicate all that apply in the following 
list.
Use cash instead of recorded transactions
Etc.
To explore what people do, 
if anything, to protect their 
identity.
QB16
Online identity 
protection behaviour
And, specifically on the Internet, what do you do to 
protect your identity? Please indicate all that apply in 
the following list.
Use a dummy email account  
Etc.
To explore what people do, 
if anything, to protect their 
identity online.
QB30
Awareness of data 
loss
In the last 12 months, have you heard about or 
experienced issues in relation to data losses and 
identity theft?
Awareness [personal, social 
media] of episodes of identity 
theft and data loss.
4.2 Legal context
Taking into account that identity management 
and authentication are not currently regulated by 
a specific and comprehensive piece of legislation 
at the EU level, the main legal instruments and 
policy initiatives with regard to electronic identity 
management are the following:
•	 Directive	 95/46/EC	 on	 the	 protection	 of	
individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data. Specifically, the survey asks 
questions relevant to data loss and data 
breach notification,54 which may assist the 
54 “… the possible modalities for the introduction in the 
general legal framework of a general personal data breach 
notification, including the addressees of such notifications 
and the threshold beyond which the obligation to notify 
should apply” (in “A comprehensive strategy on data 
protection in the European Union”, EC 2010).
number of people that are happy to disclose 
personal data, that are less likely to minimise 
data and that rarely use software measures to 
protect their data. On the right balance to be 
stroke between enhanced control and self-
protection and enforcement of actor-based 
rules. And on the relation between online 
identity management and people’s regulatory 
preferences regarding data protection. 
Questions regarding the effective use of data 
subject’s right of access to data in order to 
update it or delete it are also relevant for the 
current discussion on the so-called right to 
be forgotten and for a possible revision on 
how should such right be obtained from the 
controller. 
•	 Directive	 1999/93/EC	 on	 a	 Community	
framework for electronic signatures, and 
the proposal for a revision of the eSignature 
Directive with a view to provide a legal 
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framework for cross-border recognition and 
interoperability of secure eAuthentication 
systems [DAE Key Action 16]. The survey 
does not look specifically at the use of 
eSignature, as individual users’ uptake is 
low across Member States; however, it looks 
at use of credentials and at strategies for 
protecting one’s identity and transactions 
online, including in eCommerce [in MS, 
cross-border], eGov and SNS. This may assist 
the framing of the eSignature debate in wider 
terms.
•	 Directive	 2006/123/EC	 on	 services	 in	 the	
internal market. The survey looks at the 
relation between identification mechanisms, 
online self protection and the fruition of 
eServices such as eCommerce, SNS and 
home banking.
•	 Directive	 2002/58/EC	 concerning	 the	
processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy 
and electronic communications).
•	 Directive	 2009/136/EC	 amending	 Directive	
2002/22/EC on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws.
•	 The	 Consumer	 Rights	 Directive,	 still	 at	
proposal stage, which should replace and 
merge 4 existing consumers rights directives 
(Sale of consumer goods and guarantees 
(99/44/EC); Unfair contract terms (93/13/EC); 
Distance selling (97/7/EC); Doorstep selling 
(85/577/EC) and the revision of the EU data 
protection regulatory framework with a view 
to enhancing individuals’ confidence and 
strengthening their rights [DAE Key action 
4]. The survey examines issues of internet 
skills in relation to identity protection online 
and offline, and awareness of identity theft 
and data breach.
•	 The	 proposal	 for	 a	 Council	 and	 Parliament	
Decision to ensure mutual recognition of 
e-identification and e-authentication across 
the EU based on online ‘authentication 
services’ to be offered in all Member States 
(which may use the most appropriate official 
citizen documents – issued by the public or 
the private sector).
•	 EU	 Cookies	 Directive	 (Directive	 2009/136/
EC), namely the need for users to ‘opt 
in’ – that is consent following clear and 
comprehensive information. The survey 
queried strategies people use to protect 
their identity online (i.e. data on how many 
people delete cookies – 35%). 
Before discussing how Europeans protect 
their identity in daily life and on the Internet, we 
examine the types of credentials they use, i.e. the 
types of identity papers and identity cards they 
usually use.
4.3 Use of credentials in Europe
Respondents were asked what personal 
credentials they use [Figure 16].55 Almost three 
people in four use credit cards and bank cards 
(74%). Around two-thirds use national identity 
cards or residence permits (68%), government 
entitlement cards (65%) and driving licences 
(63%). About half of the interviewees use 
customer cards, such as loyalty cards and frequent 
flyer cards (47%), or a passport (43%). In terms of 
online credentials, about one in three European 
(one every two Internet users) also claim to use 
an Internet account (34%). This is consistent with 
other data in the survey that shows that about half 
55 QB14: Which of the following do you currently use?
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of EU internet users (52%) have an account on 
social networking or sharing sites. 
It is interesting that respondents with high 
Internet-use are more likely to also use leisure-
related credentials: driving license, customer 
cards, passports and Internet accounts, but less 
likely to use national identity cards. This points 
to the increasing embedding of credentials, more 
private than public, in the fabric of the Internet. 
This may only be natural, as government-issues 
credentials can be used to carry out online 
commercial transactions in a limited number 
of countries only, including Belgium, Austria, 
Spain and Estonia.56 This is also confirmed by 
data on disclosure in eCommerce [2.7.1]: those 
who use government-related credentials are less 
likely to disclose personal information as they 
shop online [see eCommerce fact sheet, Table 
25 on page 41].
56 Evidence in various figures in the report on “The 
State of the Electronic Identity Market: Technologies, 
Infrastructure, Services and Policies” at: http://ftp.jrc.es/
EURdoc/JRC60959.pdf as well as in the report on “Socio-
Economic Assessment of selected EU eIdentity cross-
border systems” (forthcoming).
Figure 16. Use of credentials
Base: EU27.
Source: QB14.
Figure 17. Use of credentials crossed by use of SNS and eCommerce
Base: Internet users who also use Social Networking sites and eCommerce, respectively.
Source: QB14 by QB1b.
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Online shoppers and social networking 
and sharing site users are logically far more 
likely to use an account on the Internet than 
others [Figure 17]; for instance, 62% of online 
shoppers claim the use such an account, 
compared with only 38% of those who do not 
shop online. However, people who shop online 
are also far more likely to have credit and bank 
cards (91%), a passport (59%) and customer 
cards (59%). This will be further explored when 
looking at the socio-economic characteristics of 
people who actually use credentials online. On 
the other hand, it is striking that a significant 
proportion of respondents – including SNS and 
eCommerce users – claim they are not using an 
Internet account, while they carry out activities 
that clearly require one. Digital Natives are less 
likely to have credentials other than an Internet 
account and are thus much more aware of using 
their data. Much work needs to be done raising 
awareness of Interne users of the personal data 
they routinely provide to online service providers 
via their accounts, without being aware.
Further analysis explored the differences 
noted [Table 64]. Factor analysis examines 
whether people who use some credentials also 
use other credentials, in order to determine 
clusters of credentials used, or ‘factors’. First, 
as we expected, we found two main types of 
credentials: business-related and government-
related credentials. But then, we also found that 
passport and driving license, which are issued 
by governments, are used by people alongside 
other business-issued credentials. This may mean 
that in people’s practice, the intended use – or 
function – of a credential [for instance: travel for 
the passport] is more salient that its issuer.
This is also interesting in relation with 
perceptions of risks in eCommerce [QB7b].57 
People who use business-related credentials 
are more likely to report a slightly higher 
perception of risk of identity theft and fraud due 
to eCommerce disclosure [r = .06]; conversely, 
people using government related credentials 
are likely to report reduced perception of 
risk of identity theft in eCommerce [r = -.12]. 
This may be natural: people are likely to 
associate higher risks to the loss of financial 
rather than governed-related information as it 
constitutes to them a greater and more visible 
asset. However, it is risky: with extended use 
57 Risk factors associated with disclosure, p.57 of EB-359 
report on Attitudes on Data Protection and electronic 
Identity, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf
Table 64. Factor analysis of credentials used in everyday life
Factor 1.
Business-related credentials
Factor 2. 
Government-related credential
Credit cards and bank cards .74
Driving licence .71
Passport .65
Customer cards .60
National identity cards/ residence permit .86
Government entitlement cards .62
Eigenvalue 2.03 1.23
% Variance explained 40 20.5
Source: QB14.
Base: EU27.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0.68; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 3 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .4 are 
omitted.
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of “phishing” techniques and by collating 
apparently un-related data, loss of government 
related data can prove as damaging as loss of 
financial data.
To further expand on the intertwining of 
credentials and Internet activities, we examined 
the relation of credentials with eGovernment 
online activity (carried out by 23% of Internet 
users) and with home banking (47%); these 
two activities stand out as ‘transactional’, as 
they are similar to eCommerce and different 
from other types of activities [see fact sheet on 
eCommerce, “Transactional Activities, Table 5, 
on page 26”]. By this we are interested to know 
whether the use of specific transactions (by 
Internet users) correlate with use of credentials 
in daily life. We found that both have a positive 
relation with business-related credentials (the 
more credentials used, the more home banking 
and the more eGovernment activity), and with 
government entitlement cards [Table 65]. But 
both have a negative relation with the use of 
a national identity card. This may depend on 
high adoption of eGovernment and home 
banking in countries that do not issue identity 
cards to their citizens. To confirm this point, 
use of passports – which are indeed issued 
by governments – has a positive relation with 
both activities. Of course, this is also related 
with the different socio-demographic profile of 
people using different credentials – explored to 
a greater extent in the relevant section [4.3.2].
4.3.1 Use of credentials by country
Country analysis shows that credit cards and 
bank cards are used by vast majorities in Sweden 
(97%), the Netherlands (96%), Denmark (94%), 
and Finland (93%), but by fewer than half of 
respondents in Romania (43%), Greece (44%) 
and Poland (49%). In general, respondents from 
the north and the west of Europe are more likely 
to use credit cards and bank cards than those in 
eastern Member States.
In relation to this, we checked whether this 
depended on trust in the banking system rather 
than on country-specific cultural elements. 
Results of stepwise logistic regression [table not 
reported] indicate that trust alone makes only a 
little difference in the likelihood of having a bank/
credit card [+7% per each additional unit of trust, 
on a 1-4 scale]. Conversely, controlling for trust, 
country of residence makes a large difference 
[e.g. +21% for people living in Sweden, and -44% 
for residents of Greece]. Also, controlling for 
country and trust, we found that social position 
[+4% per additional point on 1-10 social scale] 
and younger age make more of a difference.
The use of national identity cards or 
residence permits varies greatly across countries. 
They are the most frequently used (of all eight 
types of personal credentials) in thirteen Member 
States, led by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Spain, 
Hungary (all 95%), Malta (93%) and Poland 
Table 65. Use of credentials in relation to Home Banking and eGovernment
Home banking eGovernment
Use of credit cards and bank cards .28 .17
Use of customer cards .21 .18
Use of national identity cards/ residence permit -.05 -.05
Use of passport .16 .13
Use of government entitlement cards .11 .09
Use of driving licence .21 .17
Source: QB14 by QB1b.
Base: Internet users.
Notes:	results	reported	are	Phi	correlations.	Only	significant	relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99.9%	probability	
that the relation reported is not due to chance].
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(92%). In contrast, they are scarcely used in 
Latvia (1%), Denmark (3%), the United Kingdom 
and Ireland (both 9%). Thus respondents from the 
east and south of the European Union are more 
likely to use national identity cards than those 
living in the north and west. Interestingly, there 
are no such differences in the use of passports.
Similarly, the use of government entitlement 
cards differs markedly across countries. They are 
widely used in Denmark, Slovenia (both 96%), 
the Czech Republic (94%), Hungary, Slovakia, 
Finland (each 93%), Belgium, Germany (92%) 
and Austria (91%), but rarely in Bulgaria (3%) 
and Romania (7%). This is hardly surprising since 
in latter countries, national identity cards are 
being widely used.
To simplify the view on this data, we 
examined country values for business-related and 
government-related credential use. By this, we 
are looking at what kind of credentials people 
are using in different countries [Figure 18]. 
Results show that differences are not necessarily 
regional or related to GDP and macro-economic 
indicators, but rather they respond to the structure 
of credentials in place in single countries.58 In 
conjunction with what we noted above – that 
eGovernment is associated with increased use 
of business-related credentials - this fragmented 
structure may not bode well for the adoption of 
cross-border eGov services.
On the one hand, there are two groups 
of counties where use of government issued 
credentials is not very widespread: Latvia, 
Sweden, Ireland and the UK (marked in 
green); and Austria, Denmark, Finland and the 
Netherlands (marked in brown). Both groups 
include Member States whose citizens are 
slightly less likely to use government credentials 
and also more likely than people anywhere else 
to use business-related credentials (especially the 
second group). On the other hand, a number of 
Member States in ‘continental’ Europe (Belgium, 
Germany, France, Slovenia and Slovakia – 
marked in blue) significantly rely on both sets of 
58 Stevens, T., Elliott, J., Hoikkanen, A., Lusoli, W., & Maghiros, 
I. (2010). The State of the Electronic Identity Market: 
Stakeholders, their Roles and Strategies (JRC Scientific and 
Technical Reports No. EUR 24567 EN). Sevilla: EC JRC 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies.
Figure 18. Use of business-related credentials and government-related credentials by country
Base: EU27.
Source: QB14.
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credentials – but do not use business-credentials 
as much as the group marked in brown. People 
in a fourth group of countries, namely Spain, 
Portugal, Hungary, Greece, and Poland (marked 
in orange) tend to rely to a great extent on 
government-related credentials. However, 
citizens of Romania and Bulgaria and also Italy 
tend to use slightly more government-related and 
slightly less business-related credentials, though 
they use fewer of either kind than citizens in the 
rest of Europe do.
Finally, there are also significant national 
differences in the relation between disclosure 
in eCommerce and use of credentials [Table 
66]; in other words, what credential people 
use as they transact online. In some countries 
where the structure of electronic authentication 
Table 66. Use of credentials in countries by disclosure of different types of personal data in eCommerce
Disclosure
Country Use of credentials
Biography 
information
Sensitive 
information
Security 
information
Belgium
Credit cards and bank cards
No -.95 1.16
Yes .09 -.13
National identity cards/ residence permit
No -.24 .24
Yes .14 -.18
Austria
Credit cards and bank cards
No -.66 -.30
Yes .13 .17
National identity cards/ residence permit
No .06
Yes .36
Germany
Credit cards and bank cards
No -.54
Yes .18
National identity cards/ residence permit
No -.27 -.37
Yes .20 -.11
Spain National identity cards/ residence permit
No -.22
Yes .67
Sweden National identity cards/ residence permit
No -.28
Yes -.08
Poland National identity cards/ residence permit
No -.60 -.14
Yes -.13 -.53
Italy Credit cards and bank cards
No -1.73 -.21
Yes -.63 .32
Estonia Credit cards and bank cards
No -1.47
Yes -.32
United 
Kingdom
Credit cards and bank cards
No -.33
Yes .14
Ireland Credit cards and bank cards
No -.16
Yes .31
Source: QB4b  by QB14.
Base: eCommerce users.
Notes: Results reported are means of disclosure of type of information [derived from factor analysis].
Only	significant	differences	 in	the	two-sided	test	of	equality	 for	column	means	are	reported	(p<	0.01:	there	 is	a	99%	probability	
that differences reported are not due to chance). Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a column of each innermost 
subtable using the Bonferroni correction.
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is most advanced [Austria, Belgium, Germany] 
people use government-related and business-
related credential in relation to eCommerce 
disclosure. Again, the former credentials are 
usually associated with lower level of disclosure 
of sensitive information. In some countries, 
government related credentials are dominant 
[Spain, Sweden and Poland], while in some 
countries business credential underpin most of 
people’s disclosure in eCommerce [UK, Ireland, 
Italy and Estonia]. These findings largely resound 
with industry-level analysis on the structure of 
the electronic identity market in Europe.59
4.3.2 Use of credentials by socio-economic 
status
Socio-demographic analysis yields some 
differences between groups in terms of gender, 
age, household composition, education, 
occupation, financial situation and social 
position [Figure 19]. This is true particularly for 
driving licenses, customer cards, passports and 
Internet accounts. Men are more likely than 
women to use these items – with the exception 
of customer cards and government entitlement 
cards. Respondents aged 15-24 are less likely 
Figure 19: Use of credentials by socio-economic status
Source: QB14.
Base: EU27.
59 See report on the state of the electronic Identity Market, 
referenced in footnote 57.
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to have any of the items other than an internet 
account. Self-employed people, managers, other 
white collar workers and manual workers are the 
occupational groups most likely to have these 
items, with one exception: 54% of students have 
an Internet account. Furthermore, people who 
have difficulties with paying their bills and / or 
who place themselves low on the social scale are 
less likely to have leisure-related credentials – the 
latter group more often have national identity 
cards instead.
To further explore the nature of credentials, 
we examined the relative importance of the 
Internet in relation with the use of business- 
and government-related credentials. We used 
ordinary least square regression analysis to 
predict the use of credentials [table not reported]; 
results suggest that country, more than Internet 
access, matters for the use of government-issued 
credentials, controlling for other possible social 
determinants [e.g. age, affluence and gender]. 
Conversely, a combination of age, internet 
access, affluence and country predicts the use of 
business-related credentials. This may indicate 
that public institutions have a prominent role to 
play concerning the widespread adoption and 
use of credentials for government.
4.4 Awareness of identity theft and data 
loss
A question was included in the survey 
concerning the awareness of people of episodes 
of data loss and identity theft. The question aimed 
at gauging both the incidence of the phenomenon 
and the source origin of awareness, be it family 
discussion, social talk or derived from media 
information [Figure 20].60 Overall, awareness 
of issues in relation to data losses and identity 
theft is widespread but not universal (58%); this 
awareness is mainly linked to news in the media 
(42% of all respondents); personal experience is 
marginal (2%). In more detail, few respondents 
Figure 20. Awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss
Source: QB30.
Base: EU27.
60 QB30 In the last 12 months, have you heard about or 
experienced issues in relation to data losses and identity theft?
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experienced issues related to data losses and 
identity theft affecting their acquaintances (7%), a 
member of their family (3%), or themselves directly 
(2%). For the sake of comparison, identity theft 
only [but not data loss], affected about 3.5 % of US 
residents in 2010,61 about double the EU figure.
The question was formulated in such as 
way as to elicit multiple responses; respondents 
could chose one or more sources of awareness, 
for instance reporting both media induced 
awareness and personal experience. Therefore, 
we conducted multi-dimensional scaling 
analysis of results, to see how different responses 
are related [Figure 21]. Unsurprisingly, ‘No’ 
responses stand alone, as the response is a 
clear opt-out. What is more interesting is that 
also media awareness stands alone, relatively 
61 Source: US representative sample of 5,004 adults via 
phone interview, conducted in November 2010. Javelin 
2011 Identity Fraud Survey Report at: https://www.
javelinstrategy.com/research/Brochure-209
unrelated to other responses; in other words, 
media awareness, as a category, do not imply 
any other type of encounter with identity theft 
and data loss. Outside these two, other items 
form a seeming continuum of proximity, ranging 
from the closeness of personal experience to the 
relative distance of word of mouth.
Looking at geographical differences [Figure 
22], respondents are most likely to have heard 
of or experienced issues related to data loss 
or identity theft are in Latvia (74%), Sweden 
(73%), Ireland (72%), Denmark (71%), Finland 
(69%), and the UK (66%). This depends largely 
on media-related awareness and on a smaller 
degree on incidence of identity theft and data 
loss for self and family. Indeed, hearing through 
television, radio, newspapers and the Internet 
was by far most frequently mentioned in 
Latvia (69%), Sweden (62%), Denmark (61%) 
and Finland (59%) and the least in Portugal 
and Romania (both 22%). Hearing through 
by word of mouth happens most frequently in 
Figure 21. Dimensions of awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss
Source: QB30.
Base: EU27.
Note: Data is un-weighted.
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Ireland (25%) and Austria (23%). Experiences 
of issues related to data losses or identity theft 
affecting an acquaintance are most frequent 
in Sweden (14%), Greece (12%) and Italy and 
Austria (both 11%); those affecting a family 
member in the UK (7%), Ireland (6%), Italy 
(5%) and Sweden (4%); and those affecting 
respondents themselves in the UK and Sweden 
(both 5%) followed by Luxembourg (3%). 
It therefore appears that the awareness and 
experience of identity theft and data loss is 
heightened for specific reasons in the restricted 
score of countries reported, rather than being 
widespread across EU27.
We note that on the one hand media-
related awareness for EU27 (42%) is already 
high, compared to for instance the share of total 
EU27 population that is involved in eCommerce 
(39%). However, it is does not seem to have any 
direct impact on lowering the incidence of either 
Identity theft or data loss.
Figure 22. Awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss by country
Source: QB30.
Base: EU27.
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We then examined the socio-demographic 
traits of respondents who report no awareness, 
media awareness and personal and family 
awareness [Table 67].62 First, overall awareness 
is far higher for formally educated people, in 
managerial and white collar positions, and in 
mid-life. It is far lower for older, retired people 
with lower levels of formal education. Second, 
media awareness if lowest for the older people 
described above, but also for students; again 
it is higher for people with university degrees 
and managers. Third, managers and other office 
workers and their families have been hit more 
frequently by identity theft and data loss; and 
again, retired people with lower levels of formal 
education have been less affected. Overall, 
results portray a clear social profile of people 
62 Gender and marital status made very little difference to 
awareness of identity theft [not reported in the table].
who are aware of and have been affected by 
identity theft and data loss.
We then examined the relation with Internet 
use and activities [Table 68]. Overall, Internet 
access makes a large and significant difference 
to awareness and experience of identity theft 
and data loss. Internet users are more likely to 
report overall awareness, media awareness and 
experience with the phenomenon. When people 
are online, different activities are associated 
with varying levels of awareness and incidence 
of identity theft and data loss. First, those that go 
online very often from different places are more 
likely to score higher on all three indicators. The 
relation between incidence of identity theft and 
data loss and number of activities conducted 
online is also strong [table not reported]. The 
incidence of identity theft is particularly high for 
people who are most time online and for their 
Table 67. Awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss by socio-demographics
Overall Media Self / family
EU27 55% 42% 5%
Terminal education 
age
15- 44% 34% 4%
16-19 55% 42% 5%
20+ 65% 52% 6%
Still Studying 56% 37% 6%
No full-time education 42% 26% 2%
Age
15-24 56% 39% 5%
25-39 59% 44% 6%
40-54 58% 45% 6%
55+ 49% 40% 4%
Occupation
Self-employed 59% 45% 6%
Managers 68% 54% 7%
Other white collars 61% 45% 7%
Manual workers 56% 43% 5%
House person 50% 39% 4%
Unemployed 54% 40% 5%
Retired 46% 38% 4%
Students 56% 37% 6%
Source: QB30.
Base: EU27.
107
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
, A
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
Po
lic
y 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
as
 re
ga
rd
s 
Pe
rs
on
al
 Id
en
tit
y 
D
at
a 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
families [three times higher than for non Internet 
users, 9% vs. 3%]. 
Second, about four in ten people who do not 
use the Internet are aware of identity theft and 
data loss; this is a lower than we expected for a 
phenomenon making the front page very often in 
most EU countries. It is certainly far lower than 
for people who actually use the Internet. The 
evidence reported in previous surveys conceding 
identity theft and data loss as an impediment 
to the uptake of the Internet may therefore be 
overstated.63 Third, among internet users, people 
who do social networking and eCommerce 
appear to be more vulnerable to incidences of 
the phenomenon [7% vs. 5%]. Fourth, people 
doing eCommerce and home banking are very 
aware, both via the media and differently, of the 
issue of identity theft and data loss.
All in all, results confirm that identity theft 
and data loss are more of a reality online than 
offline; that the more people use the Internet, the 
more they become aware of the issue, but also 
that they become significantly more vulnerable 
to incidence; thus, general Internet skills alone 
63 Related information (perception of concern from Eurostat 
Household survey data) as presented in Pillar 3, DAE 
scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
digital-agenda/scoreboard/docs/pillar/security.pdf
do not provide and answer to identity theft and 
data loss [in a later section, we will examine the 
relation of incidence with specific data protection 
behaviours]; results also show that increased 
awareness, especially media awareness, may 
do little to mitigate incidence of negative 
experiences.
Finally, we crossed awareness and 
experience of identity theft and data loss with 
use of credentials, which were discussed above 
[Table 69]. We found three main results.
1 People with customer cards are more likely 
to have reported incidence of identity theft 
and data loss [6% vs. 4%]; the reverse is true 
for holders of national identity cards [4% of 
holders vs. vs. 8% of non-holders].
2 People who do not use credentials, especially 
bank and credit cards, are far less aware of 
identity theft and data loss via the media. 
Again, selective attention may explain this 
result.
3 People who use credentials, especially 
passports, are more aware of identity theft 
and data loss. People who travel may be 
particularly sensitive to the issue and to news 
related to it.
Table 68. Awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss by Internet use
Overall Media Self / family
EU27 55% 42% 5%
Internet use and access index
No Internet
Low
Medium
High
42%
56%
63%
72%
32%
45%
48%
54%
3%
5%
7%
9%
eCommerce NoYes
54%
67%
40%
52%
5%
7%
Home banking NoYes
59%
65%
43%
52%
6%
6%
Use of SNS & sharing sites NoYes
60%
62%
48%
47%
5%
7%
Source: QB30 by D62, QB1a and QB1b.
Base: EU27 for Internet use and access index, Internet users for other variables.
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4.5 Identity protection behaviour, 
online and offline
Then, questions were asked directly 
regarding the way in which people protect their 
identity in their daily life and on the Internet.
4.5.1 Offline identity protection
A range of strategies are available to 
people to shield their identity from unwanted 
attention, from companies, largely, but also 
from fellow citizens and governments.64 To 
protect their identity in daily life [Figure 23], 
a majority of Europeans give the minimum 
required information (62%) or do not disclose 
their bank details or PIN numbers (56%), while 
almost half disclose information only to people 
and organisations they trust (47%) or do not 
disclose their user names and passwords (45%). 
Overall, these numbers appear to us to be low, 
as significant minorities do not try to minimise 
disclosure, do no withhold bank details, 
provide information to controllers they do not 
trust and disclose usernames and passwords. As 
about 66% of people also use the Internet, the 
latter figure falls short of protecting everybody 
64 QB15. In your daily life, what do you do to protect your 
identity? Please indicate all that apply in the following list.
from prevalent internet crime such as phishing. 
All in all, this is in line with the widespread 
perception that disclosure is unavoidable in 
modern life [QB3, 74% of respondents see 
p.22 of EB-359 DP+eID report for correlations]. 
However, lack of protection is not caused by 
resignation: people who think disclosure is 
unavoidable are actually slightly more likely to 
protect themselves [r = .05 overall]. 
In relation to other specific behaviours, 
around three out of ten Europeans use cash 
instead of recorded transactions such as bank 
cards and transfers (30%), shred old bills, bank 
statements and the like (29%), do not disclose 
payment card details online (29%), and adjust the 
information they disclose to different contexts, for 
example depending on whether they are dealing 
with a company, a bank or a website (27%). 
Finally, only a few provide wrong information to 
protect their identity in daily life (7%).
Therefore, it seems that passive strategies, 
such as withholding personal information, occur 
more frequently than active strategies, such as 
deliberately providing wrong information or first 
evaluating the context and then adjusting the type 
of personal information disclosed. Factor analysis 
consolidates these results on identity protection 
behaviours, both for all respondents [Table 70] 
Table 69. Awareness and experience of identity theft and data loss by use of credentials
Overall Media Self / family
Use of credit cards and bank cards NoYes
45%
58%
29%
46%
4%
5%
Use of customer cards NoYes
50%
60%
37%
48%
4%
6%
Use of national identity cards/ residence 
permit
No
Yes
58%
53%
42%
42%
8%
4%
Use of passport NoYes
49%
63%
36%
50%
4%
6%
Use of government entitlement cards NoYes
52%
56%
36%
45%
6%
5%
Use of driving licence NoYes
49%
58%
34%
46%
5%
5%
Source: BQ30 by QB14.
Base: EU27.
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tFigure 23. Offline identity protection behaviours
Source: QB15.
Base: EU27.
Table 70. Factor analysis of offline identity protection behaviours
Factors
Minimise
information
Deception
Low tech
actions
Do not disclose your bank details or PIN numbers .69
Disclose information only to entities you trust .64
Give the minimum required information .61
Adjust the information you disclose to different contexts .52 .40
Provide wrong information .94
Use cash instead of recorded transactions .90
Shred old bills .44 .49
Eigenvalue 1.80 1.05 1.01
% Variance explained 25.8 15 14.6
Source: QB15.
Base: EU27.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0. 679; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 3 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .03 are 
omitted.
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and for Internet users [Table 71] (to be discussed 
further in section 4.5.3). 
From the analysis of offline behaviours, it 
emerges that people use three identity protection 
strategies [Table 70]. First, they withhold 
disclosure in different ways, by keeping hold 
of some information, by minimising and by 
adjusting disclosure to context and recipient 
[minimisation]. A second strategy is one of 
outright deception, providing wrong information 
[deception]. A third strategy is composed of 
low-tech actions [rather than information 
management strategies], such as shredding bills 
and using cash [low tech].
4.5.2 Offline identity protection by country 
and socio-economic-status
First we will try to analyse the offline 
identity protection methods by country and 
then by socio-economic status [Figure 25]. In 
relation to comparison by country, there are 
marked differences among countries concerning 
the strategies adopted. In the Netherlands and 
in Scandinavian countries [Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland] a high percentage adopts various 
strategies to protect their identity in daily life. 
Identity protection is less common in southern 
European countries Portugal and Italy, the 
Baltic countries Lithuania and Latvia, and the 
eastern and central countries Poland, Hungary 
and Romania.
•	 Giving	 the	 minimum	 required	 information	
and not disclosing bank details or PIN 
number are the most common strategies 
in fourteen Member States; these two 
strategies stand in joint first place in two 
other countries, Denmark (78%) and in the 
UK (66%). But significant differences exist 
between countries. For instance, over three-
quarters of respondents in Finland (78%), 
Luxembourg (76%), and Germany and the 
Netherlands (each 74%) give the minimum 
required information, whereas half or under 
Figure 24. Minimisation vs. low-tech protection behaviours by country
Source: QB15.
Base: EU27.
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do so in Poland (45%), Lithuania and Italy 
(both 50%).
•	 While	 large	 majorities	 in	 Sweden	 (85%)	
and the Netherlands (84%) do not disclose 
their bank details or PIN numbers, around 
a third or less do so in Italy (27%), Poland 
(34%) and Romania (35%). This is mirrored 
by not disclosing user names and passwords: 
around three-quarters of respondents in 
Sweden (78%), Finland (77%) and the 
Netherlands (73%) adopt this strategy 
compared to only 14% in Italy and 16% in 
Bulgaria.
•	 Respondents	 use	 cash	 instead	 of	 recorded	
transactions (such as bank cards and 
transfers) as a strategy to protect their 
identity most often in Poland (44%), Austria 
(40%), Hungary (39%) and Latvia (38%) 
and least often in the Netherlands (15%), 
Finland (17%), France and Denmark (both 
18%). Interestingly, this strategy reverses 
the order of countries found in respect of 
all other strategies. However, it is consistent 
with the enhanced use of the Internet in 
these countries which disallows low-tech 
protection behaviour.
Again, it is interesting to see graphically 
[Figure 24] how different countries fare in 
relation to each other on these traditional 
behavioural actions to protect one’s identity 
use of cash [low tech] vs. relatively recent, 
information based strategies [minimise]. 
In Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands people tend to minimise 
information and not to engage in low-tech 
behaviours, possibly due to the digital nature 
of most transactions. In countries such as 
Germany and the Czech Republic people tend 
to be active on both fronts. As it was noted, 
in southern and eastern countries, people 
tend to score low on both counts. This may 
be explained as follows: offline strategies 
are linked to concerns about observation, 
while minimisation is linked to Internet use, 
especially eCommerce. People in Nordic 
countries are generally less concerned about 
their behaviour being recorded, and are 
more likely to use eCommerce. The situation 
is inverse for countries in the bottom-left 
quadrant of Figure 24.
A socio-demographic breakdown reveals 
great disparities between groups in respect of 
all the strategies to protect identity in daily 
life, as age, education and occupation make 
a difference [Figure 25]. With respect to all 
but two strategies, the longer respondents 
have spent in education, the more likely 
they are to actively protect their identity; the 
two exceptions are the use of cash instead of 
recorded transactions and shredding old bills 
and the like. This reflect the relatively simple 
fact that people with higher education, and 
younger as a result, are more likely to be part 
of the digital economy, rather than of the paper-
based economy.
Turning to occupation, managers and other 
white collar workers are more likely to use 
each of these strategies (apart from the use of 
cash instead of recorded transactions), whereas 
students tend to use most of the strategies less 
with the exception of not disclosing their user 
names and passwords (53%) and providing 
wrong information (11%). Overall, therefore, 
identity protection is more developed in mid-
life, as it may be natural, because people 
engage in a range of financial and social 
transaction around this phase of life. Finally, 
the level and nature of Internet use has an 
impact on results. For instance, 66% of online 
shoppers do not disclose their user names and 
passwords compared with 50% of those who 
do not shop online. Again, 70% of online 
shoppers do not disclose their bank details 
or PIN numbers, compared with only 55% of 
other Internet users. 
112
4 
Fa
ct
 S
he
et
: I
de
nt
it
y 
an
d 
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
in
 E
ur
op
e
Fi
gu
re
 2
5.
 O
ffl
in
e 
id
en
ti
ty
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
by
 s
oc
io
-e
co
no
m
ic
 t
ra
it
s
So
ur
ce
: 
Q
B
15
.
B
as
e:
 E
U
27
.
113
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
, A
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
Po
lic
y 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
as
 re
ga
rd
s 
Pe
rs
on
al
 Id
en
tit
y 
D
at
a 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
4.5.3 Online identity protection
We then looked at the same question for 
Internet users only. But an additional question was 
asked only of Internet users, which gauged the 
extent to which users adopted a range of Internet-
specific behaviours intended to protect their 
personal identity data online.65 The main result 
is that online self-protection is not widespread 
[Figure 26]. Only four in ten European Internet 
users apply tools and strategies to limit unwanted 
emails (spam) (42%), check that a transaction is 
protected or that the site has a safety logo or label 
(40%), or use anti-spy software (39%). One-third 
of respondents delete cookies (35%). A sizeable 
minority of 15% spontaneously say that they do 
nothing to protect their identity on the Internet. 
With the additional responses that made 
sense online, such as not disclosing user names 
and passwords, and not disclosing payment card 
details online, we found overlapping though 
slightly different results: namely four sets of 
overall identity protection behaviours rather 
than three. As for non Internet users, factor 
analysis [Table 71] found minimisation, low-
tech and deception behaviours, very similar to 
what we described above. Additionally, Internet 
users adopt a number of security-enhancing 
withholding behaviours, such as not disclosing 
username and passwords and not disclosing 
payment card details online. Interestingly, 
withholding bank details or PIN numbers now 
belongs to this group of behaviour, rather than to 
Figure 26. Online identity protection behaviours [Internet users]
Source: QB16.
Base: Internet users (66% of total sample).
65 QB16: And, specifically on the Internet, what do you do 
to protect your identity? Please indicate all that apply in 
the following list.
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minimisation behaviours as for the entire sample. 
This protective behaviour appears to be required in 
an online environment where risks of identity theft 
and fraud are especially felt [especially identity 
theft and fraud for eCommerce and SNS, and 
observation for financial transactions for everyday 
life activities; see EB-359 on these points]. Overall, 
this confirms the intuitive idea that being on the 
Internet requires more sophisticated strategies of 
self protection than those one has to implement in 
offline, everyday life.
Largely, protection behaviour rests on 
passive use of existing tools rather than on active 
strategies of information control. This may also 
imply that where these tools are not available, 
or are cumbersome to use for the average user, 
people are unlikely to take proper care of their 
personal identity data online.
4.5.4 Online identity protection by country and 
socio-economic-status
In terms of countries [table not included EB-
359, QB16 by country, p.109], the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Denmark stand out as Member 
States with the largest numbers of Internet 
users who use a variety of strategies to protect 
their identity on the Internet. This habit is least 
common in the Baltic countries Lithuania and 
Latvia, and the eastern EU Member States 
Romania and Bulgaria. Again, there is variance 
within this general figure [Figure 27]. In other 
words, people in some countries tend to stand 
more protected online regardless of the number 
of activities they carry out on the Internet (i.e. 
The Netherlands, Luxembourg); while people in 
Latvia and Lithuania tend to protect themselves 
partially despite higher than EU27 average 
Internet use. Such deviations from the trend hint 
at the importance of variables others than Internet 
use to explain protection; these may have to do 
with national technical culture, with national 
attitudes concerning observation and with 
maturity of the market for online protection tools.
As far as socio-economic status is 
concerned, higher education and occupation 
as a professional make a difference for higher 
identity protection on the Internet; whereas 
Table 71. Factor analysis of identity protection behaviours [Internet users]
Factors
Withhold Minimise Low tech Deception
Do not disclose user names and passwords .83
Do not disclose bank details or PIN numbers .82
Do not disclose payment card details online .69
Give the minimum required information .70
Disclose information only to entities you trust .69
Adjust the information you disclose to different contexts .60
Use cash instead of recorded transactions .91
Shred old bills .48
Provide wrong information .95
Eigenvalue 2,37 1,16 1,10 ,97
% Variance explained 26 12,5 12 11
Source: QB16.
Base: Internet users.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0.723; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 5 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue .975; Values below .04 
are omitted.
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gender and age make smaller differences [table 
not included EB-359, QB16, p. 111]. A general 
pattern emerges in which the more technical 
or procedural (top five) strategies are more 
likely among men than women, among older 
respondents than the youngest (15-24), among 
respondents who spent longer in education than 
less educated interviewees and among managers 
than those unemployed.
However, the largest differences exist 
between groups with different Internet skills: 
active Internet users (++) are more likely than less 
active users (--) to apply each of the strategies. 
Practically the only strategy less active users (--) 
use almost as much as more active users (++) is to 
avoid providing the same information to different 
websites. There is a strong and significant 
correlation [r = .44] between the overall number 
of internet activities carried out [a proxy for 
internet skills], and online protection behaviour. 
In other words, those who are more active online 
also protect themselves more; this is good news, 
as Internet skills thus measured are related to 
years spent online [thus benefiting older users] 
and to young age [thus benefiting younger users]. 
This correlation is slightly weaker if we do not 
consider eCommerce activities [r = .41]. Indeed, 
more than half of online shoppers check that 
the transaction is protected or that the site has a 
safety logo/ label (52%), use tools and strategies 
to limit unwanted emails (spam) (52%) and use 
anti-spy software. Indeed, this is not surprising 
as they have more to lose and are more cautious 
than SNS users.
Finally, we looked jointly at questions 
of online and offline identity protection for 
Internet users. To identify commonalties and 
differences, we conducted factor analysis 
of the two questions jointly. The underlying 
assumption originated above: people seem to 
be more careful in protecting their personal data 
on the Internet than offline. The analysis found 
that European Internet users use six strategies to 
protect their personal identity data [Table 72]. 
Four are strategies described above as common 
to online and offline: minimisation, withhold, 
low-tech and deception. Additionally, the 
analysis found two strategies that we labelled 
Figure 27. Internet protection behaviours in relation with Internet activities
Source: QB16 by QB1b.
Base: Internet users (66% of total sample).
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reactive and proactive. The former includes 
software-based protective behaviours such as 
using anti-spy software, deleting cookies, and 
checking for SSL connection. The latter includes 
activities that require higher user initiative, such 
as use of search engines to maintain awareness 
and asking websites to access the information 
they hold on them.
4.5.5 Offline and online identity protection, 
credentials and identity theft
Then, we wished to examine the relation 
between the extent to which people protect 
themselves in daily life, and the use of 
credentials, on the one hand; and the experience 
and awareness of identity theft and data loss 
Table 72. Factor analysis of online identity protection behaviours
Reactive Withhold Minimise Proactive Deception
Low-
tech
Use anti-spy software .76
Delete cookies .73
Use tools and strategies to limit unwanted 
emails
.58
Check that the transaction is protected .43
Do not disclose your bank details or PIN 
numbers
.81
Do not disclose your user names and 
passwords
.80
Do not disclose payment card details online .70
Disclose information only to entities you trust .68
Adjust the information you disclose to 
different contexts
.62
Give the minimum required information .59
Ask websites to access the information they 
hold on you
.72
Use a search engine to maintain awareness .64
Change the security settings of your browser .49
Avoid providing the same information to 
different sites
.43
Provide wrong information .78
Use a dummy email account .75
Use cash instead of recorded transactions 
(bank ca
.82
Shred old bills .51
Eigenvalue 3.46 1.57 1.31 1.08 1.03 1.03
% Variance explained 19% 9% 7% 6% 6% 6%
Source: QB15 and QB16.
Base: Internet users.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0.81; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 6 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue .975; Values below .04 are 
omitted.
117
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
, A
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
Po
lic
y 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
as
 re
ga
rd
s 
Pe
rs
on
al
 Id
en
tit
y 
D
at
a 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
on the other [Table 73]. We found a number of 
interesting results:
1 Those who are not aware of identity theft 
and data loss are less likely to protect 
themselves, online and offline, especially 
this is true for minimisation of personal data 
disclosed and use of protecting software. 
Media awareness is particularly important 
to make people minimise personal data 
disclosure [r = .20].
2 People who use business-related credentials 
are much more likely to try to minimise the 
information they disclose [r = .44]; Internet 
users are more likely to withhold information 
and to use software to protect themselves. 
However, they are no more likely to engage 
in active strategies of identity protection.
3 People who use government-related 
credentials are also more likely to minimise 
information, though to a lesser degree [r = 
.08]; but those who use the Internet are more 
likely to use proactive rather than reactive 
strategies of identity protection behaviour.
4 Those whose family or themselves have 
suffered identity theft and data loss appear to 
be more likely to use deception behaviour [r = 
.08]; and to use reactive and proactive internet 
strategies to protect their personal data.
Table 73. Offline identity protection by use of credentials and identity theft
Business
-related
Government
-related
No
awareness
Media
awareness
Self-family 
incidence
All users
Minimise        .44 .08 -.16 .20
Deception .05 -.10 .04 .08
Low-tech -.05 -.05 .06
Internet 
users  
Withhold .25 .09 -.04 .11
Reactive .23 -.06 -.13 .12 .07
Proactive .07 -.05 .05
Source: QB15 by D62.
Base: EU27 and Internet users, respectively.
Note:	As	 the	sample	 is	 large,	only	significant	 relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	 [i.e.	when	there	 is	a	99.9%	probability	 that	 the	
relation reported is not due to chance].
Results reported are: 
1.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
2. Point-biserial correlation for factors and/or scales crossed by values.
4.6 Relations with other variables
In this section, we examine use of 
credentials, awareness and experience of identity 
theft and protection of personal data in relation to 
other relevant variables [Table 74].
Use of credentials in Europe
Overall, use of business-related credentials, 
more than use of government-related credential, 
is intertwined with people’s attitudes concerning 
data protection:
•	 For	 Internet	 users,	 use	 of	 business-related	
credentials is strongly associated with 
online transactions such as home banking, 
eGovernment and ecommerce [r = .39]; but it 
is inversely related with online social activities 
[r = -.11]. This is related to life-cycle, as 
reported above. Internet behaviour is unrelated 
to the use of government-related credentials.
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•	 Those	 who	 use	 credentials	 of	 both	 types	
are more likely to trust institutions as data 
controllers, especially business-related 
credentials [r = .13]; those who do not 
trust companies as data controllers are 
likely to make greater use of government-
related credentials [r = -.12]. Therefore, 
use of credentials may be enhanced by 
portability of trust from public institutions 
to commercial institutions, via the greater 
use of government-supported, if not issued 
outright, credentials, or by PPPs.
•	 Those	 who	 use	 business-related	 credentials	
are less concerned about being observed 
in	 their	 everyday	 life	 [CCTV,	 mobile,	
transactions], but when they use the Internet 
they are uncomfortable with online profiling 
[r = -.10] and concerned about use of 
personal data for other aims that the original 
[r = .09].
•	 Concerning	 regulation,	 users	 of	 business-
related credential are strongly in favour of 
homogeneous data protection right across 
EU [r = .19], to be informed when their 
personal data is lost or stolen [r = .17], and 
to be able to edit/delete they data whenever 
they wish so [r = .11]. But they are as keen to 
be able to move their data between providers 
[portability] than people who do not use 
credentials, or do not use them as much 
[figure not reported in Table 74]. It appears 
that remedies requiring more of people’s 
initiative are less popular than institution-
centred remedies.
Awareness of identity theft and data loss
Media awareness emerged from the analysis 
as the most significant variable in relation to 
other opinions expressed by respondents. These 
are reported below and in the table. Results 
for ‘no awareness’ are largely symmetrical to 
results for ‘media awareness’. Results for actual 
personal and family incidence of identity theft 
and data loss do not correlate significantly 
with any other data protection opinions and 
behaviours, except for advanced software use of 
internet users [r = .08]. Both these sets of results 
have been omitted.
•	 Media	 awareness	 of	 identity	 theft	 is	
heightened for people who use the internet 
to carry out transactions [r = .14], it is not 
any higher for people engaging in social 
activities. Identity theft and data loss may 
thus be associated in people’s minds to 
financial rather than to social damage [this 
confirms results reported in the fact sheet on 
eCommerce].
•	 Those	who	do	not	trust	companies	to	protect	
their data, and those who are not very happy 
disclosing data are slightly more likely to 
have heard about the phenomenon in the 
media.
•	 For	Internet	users,	media	awareness	is	related	
to higher concern of reuse of personal data 
for other purposes [r = .11], and to the 
impressions that at some point they had to 
over-disclose personal data [r = .08]. The 
media appears to compound one's own 
experience of over-disclosure.
•	 Concerning	 remedies,	 media	 awareness	
appears intertwined with calls for enhanced 
regulation, including greater harmonisation 
of data protection rights across EU27 [r = 
.15], request for information if/when data 
lost or stolen [r = .12] and the possibility to 
delete personal data [r = .12].
Identity protection behaviour, online and offline
Overall, online and offline personal data 
protection behaviours are strongly associated 
with overall attitudes towards disclosure, with 
trust in data controllers [or lack thereof], and with 
online activities for Internet users. Specifically, 
data minimisation strategies and what we term 
reactive online strategies, based on the use of 
available software, appear to determine and 
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be determined by people’s perceptions and 
regulatory preferences concerning personal data:
•	 People	doing	different	things	on	the	internet	
have significantly different ways of staying 
protected online [or not]. Internet users 
engaging in online transactions are much 
more likely than ordinary internet users 
to take a range of measure to protect their 
data online, including data minimisation [r 
= .30], reactive software use [r = .36] and 
to withhold sensitive information [r = .13]. 
People with advanced internet skills tend to 
use proactive [r = .19], reactive [r = .16] and 
deception [r = .15 !] strategies rather than 
traditional protection measures. Conversely, 
people engaging on social activities are 
less likely to minimise and withhold, but 
more likely to use proactive personal data 
management strategies [r = .16].
•	 Attitudes	 towards	 personal	 data	 disclosure	
in general matter greatly for the protection 
of one’s data. Specifically, those who are 
happy disclosing personal data are much 
less likely to minimise data [r = -.19], as 
may be obvious, but are also less likely to 
withhold sensitive information [r = -.16] 
and to use software measures to protect 
their data [r = -.07]. Same results emerged 
for people who are comfortable with online 
profiling [respectively r = -17 and r = -.12]. 
Conversely, those who see disclosure as 
unavoidable try to protect themselves in a 
range of ways, especially with software [r 
= .14]. Interestingly, high levels of concern 
about observation seems to engender more 
practical responses, including low-tech 
behaviours [r = .08] and proactive data 
management online [r = .05].
•	 Trust	in	institutions	as	data	controllers	seems	
to be associated with higher levels of self-
protection, apart from deception. On the 
contrary, those who trust companies tend to 
be less active protecting themselves across 
the board, but especially they are less likely 
to minimise information they disclose [r = 
-.12], and to withhold sensitive information 
[r = -.10].
•	 All	 in	 all,	 existing	 rules	 and	 principles	 of	
data protection appear to engender virtuous 
responses on the part of internet users 
regarding self-protection. Namely, those 
who think they had to disclose more that 
they wished actually did so [minimisation r 
= -06, withholding r = -11], but may have 
compensated by using reactive, proactive 
and deception strategies [r =~ .10 for the 
three]. Information about data collection 
conditions is associated positively with 
reactive and proactive behaviour, and with 
minimisation. Finally, concern about re-use 
of one’s data is associated with significant 
minimisation of the data disclosed [r = .15].
•	 Data	 minimisation	 appears	 to	 be	 strongly	
correlated with issues of regulation. In other 
short, peoples who minimise the information 
they disclose also tend to have particularly 
strong feeling regarding the needs for 
stronger protection of their rights in EU27 
[r = .20] and enhanced control of their 
personal data, such as deletion on demand [r 
= .17] and data breach notification [r = .21].
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Variables
Use of 
credentials
Awareness 
of identity 
theft and 
data loss
Offline identity 
protection
Online identity 
protection
Measurement 2 Factors 1 Value 3 Factors 3 Factors
Values
Bu
si
ne
ss
-r
el
at
ed
Go
vt
-r
el
at
ed
M
ed
ia
 a
w
ar
en
es
s
M
in
im
is
e
De
ce
pt
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n
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w
-t
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h
W
ith
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ld
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tiv
e
Pr
oa
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iv
e
Internet 
activities
3 Factors
Social internet -.11 -.07 .04 -.09 -.08 .11 .16
Transactions .39 .14 .30 .08 -.06 .13 .36 .08
Advanced .05 .15 .16 .19
Attitudes 
towards 
disclosure
2 Factors
Unavoidability .09 .08 .06 .05 .05 .14 .04
Propensity -.05 -.05 -.06 -.19 -.04 -.11 -.16 -.07
Trust 2 Factors
Trust in 
institutions
.13 .04 .13 -.05 -.07 .04 .04
Trust in 
companies
-.04 -.12 -.06 -.12 -.04 -.07 -.10 -.06
Concern 
about 
observation
1 Factor -.08 .04 .04 .08 .05
Comfort 
with online 
profiling
4-point
scale
-.10 -.08 -.06 -.17 -.05 -.12
Informed 
about data 
collection 
conditions
4-points 
scale
.06 .06 .07 .14 .09
Required to 
over-disclose
4-points 
scale
.08 -.06 .11 -.11 .08 .11
Concern 
about reuse
4-point
scale
.09 .11 .15 .12 .08 .05
Importance 
of same data 
protection 
right across  
EU
4-point
scale
.19 .15 .20 .04 .11 .13
Desire info 
if/when data 
lost or stolen
4-point
scale
.17 .04 .12 .21 -.04 .12 .05
Possibility 
to delete 
personal data
1 Value
Whenever one 
wants
.11 .10 .12 .17 .12 .07
As	the	sample	is	large,	only	significant	relations	at	p	<	0.001	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99.9%	probability	that	the
relation reported is not due to chance].
Results reported are:
1.	Pearson’s	correlation	coefficient	for	pairs	of	factors	and/or	scales.
2. Point-biserial correlation for factors and/or scales crossed by values.
3. Phi for relations between values, when they can be considered as multiple categorical (e.g. colour: white, red, or
green).
Note: For ‘Attitudes towards disclosure’: factors extracted for Internet users only are used.
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tTable 75. Relevant samples for correlations
N for all 
questions
N for online identity protection,
if different
Social internet
17,520Online transactions
Software activities
[all] Disclosure is unavoidable
22,269
[all] Disclose happily
[internet users] Disclosure is unavoidable
15,306
[internet users] Disclose happily
Overall concern about observation 23,021 16,499
Informed about data collection conditions when disclosing 
personal data to access a service
14,293
Comfort with online profiling 16,283
Required to provide more personal information than necessary for 
online services
16,769
Trust in institutions
20,452 15,581
Trust in companies
Concern about unannounced re-use of personal data for different 
purpose than original
25,794 17,265
Desire to be informed by controller whenever personal data held is 
lost or stolen
25,617 17,121
Possibility to delete of personal data held by controllers: Whenever 
you decide to delete it
17,520
Importance of having same data protection right across Europe 25,649 17,228
Perceived effectiveness of DPO to protect personal data in large 
companies
24,070 16,546
Knowledge about national data protection authority 25,596 16,959
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5 FACT SHEET: Medical Information as Personal Data 
in Europe
5.1 Question context
The questionnaire included several questions 
regarding health related information as personal 
information in the context of social computing,66 
namely:
Table 76. Survey questions relevant to health related information
Question  
code
Shorthand Formulation Rationale
QB2
Data considered 
as personal
Which of the following types of information and 
data that are related to you do you consider as 
personal?
To explore the perception of medical 
information as personal information.
Social Networking Sites and sharing sites
QB4a Personal data 
disclosure
Thinking of your usage of social networking 
sites and sharing sites, which of the following 
types of information have you already disclosed 
(when you registered, or simply when using these 
websites)?
To gauge the extent of disclosure of different 
types of personal data; this question 
follows on a previous questions asked of 
all respondents regarding what information 
they though was personal assess.
QB5a Reasons why 
disclose
What are the most important reasons why you 
disclose such information on social networking 
sites and\ or sharing sites?
To assess the reasons why people disclose 
personal data in SNS, whether for leisure, to 
get better offers, to save time, etc.
QB6a
Control on 
information 
disclosed
How much control do you feel you have over 
the information you have disclosed on social 
networking sites and\ or sharing sites, e.g. 
the ability to change, delete or correct this 
information?
To determine the level of perceived control 
on the data disclosed in SNS. This is 
related both to the right of access to one’s 
information and to the capacity of people to 
actually control their data once they have 
disclosed it.
QB7a Risks related to 
disclosure
I will read out a list of potential risks. According to 
you, what are the most important risks connected 
with disclosure of personal information on social 
networking sites and\ or sharing sites?
To explore the risks people associate with 
the disclosure of personal data in SNS. 
Several risks may be associated with 
disclosure, including risks to reputation, to 
personal safety, to data integrity, etc… .
QB25
Trust in different 
institutions
Different authorities (government departments, 
local authorities, agencies) and private companies 
collect and store personal information. To what 
extent do you trust the following institutions to 
protect your personal information?
To explore the level of trust that people 
bestow different institutions with, among 
which medical institutions, to protect their 
personal data.
5.2 Legal context
The main legal instruments related to 
medical information are the following:
66 Just 3% of ecommerce users stated that they have 
disclosed medical information in this context. Due to 
this small figure we have carried out the analysis in the 
context of Social Computing (disclosure is 5%).
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•	 Data	 Protection	 Directive	 (95/46/EC).	 This	
directive is the general EU law in the field 
of protection of personal data and the most 
prominent legislative act regulating the 
processing of medical data. Its objective is 
to protect the privacy of individuals while 
enabling the free flow of personal data within 
the EU in the context of the internal market. 
It lays down obligations on data controllers 
and specifies the rights of data subjects. The 
directive provides special protection for 
personal data related to health,67 prohibiting 
in principle its processing. Limited 
exemptions to this prohibition principle are 
foreseen in the Directive, in particular if 
processing is required for specified medical 
and healthcare purposes, if the data are 
processed by a health professional subject to 
an equivalent obligation of secrecy.
•	 The	 results	 presented	 in	 this	 fact	 sheet	
depict EU citizens’ perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviours regarding the disclosure 
of medical information. These results 
may prove useful to the current revision 
of the data protection directive, namely 
regarding the need to introduce stricter 
rules and/or to harmonise the requirements 
to obtain, administer and comply with 
the requisite of prior informed consent for 
the processing of personal data for health 
purposes. The results obtained regarding 
the citizen’s views on genetic data may 
also be linked to another important theme 
of the current data protection revision, 
that is, the question of whether “genetic 
data” should be considered as a separate 
67 According to the European Court of Justice, the expression 
‘data concerning health’ used in Article 8(1) should be 
given a wide interpretation so as to include information 
concerning all aspects, both physical and mental, of the 
health of an individual. By way of example: reference to 
the fact that an individual has injured her foot and is on 
half-time on medical grounds constitutes personal data 
concerning health within the meaning of Article 8(1) of 
the directive. European Court of Justice, Judgement of 6 
November 2003, Case C-101?01 – Bodil Lindqvist, 50, 51.
new category in the list of categories of 
“sensitive data.” 
•	 ePrivacy	Directive:	Directive	2002/58/EC	of	
the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector. This 
directive particularises and complements 
the Data protection directive with respect 
to the processing of personal data in 
the electronic communications services 
over public communications networks to 
ensure confidentiality of communications 
and security of networks, including an 
obligation to notify personal breaches to the 
competent authority at national level. This 
directive is relevant and applicable in the 
case of disclosure of medical information 
in the online environment, such as in social 
computing sites, social networking sites, etc. 
•	 Directive	 98/48/EC	 of	 the	 European	
parliament and of the Council of 20 July 
1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying 
down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the field of technical standards 
and regulations. This Directive provides the 
definition of information society services 
(Art.1(2)) which applies to social networking 
and eCommerce sites. 
•	 Recommendation	 No.	 R	 (97)	 5	 on	 the	
Protection of Medical Data (Feb. 13, 
1997). This recommendation explicitly 
defines the expression “medical data” 
(“which refers to all personal data 
concerning the health of the individual. 
It refers also to data which have a clear 
and close link with health as well as 
to genetic data”), and the expression 
“genetic data” (“which refers to all 
data, of whatever type, concerning the 
hereditary characteristics of an individual 
or concerning the pattern of inheritance 
of such characteristics within a related 
group of individuals”). It is important 
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to bear in mind these definitions when 
analysing the citizens’ own perceptions 
regarding the concepts of health data and 
genetic data. 
•	 Directive	 on	 Patients’	 Rights	 in	 Cross-
Border Healthcare: Directive 2011/24/
EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-
border healthcare. The directive applies 
to individual patients who decide to seek 
healthcare in a Member State other than the 
Member State of affiliation. By following its 
provisions, Member States must ensure that 
the healthcare providers on their territory 
apply the same scale of fees for healthcare 
for patients from other Member States, 
as for domestic patients in a comparable 
medical situation (Art. 4, para.4). Taking 
into account that the majority of EU citizen 
wishes to benefit from the same protection 
over their personal information regardless 
of the EU country in which its is collected 
and processed, the results observed in 
this fact sheet seem to be in line with 
this very recently adopted directive, 
which contributes to the harmonization 
of the access to healthcare within the EU 
(Member States must adopt the necessary 
laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions to implement this directive by 
25 October 2013).
•	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	
the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: “A Digital 
Agenda for Europe.”
•	 The	overall	desire	 to	have	 the	 same	 level	of	
data protection across the EU, the general 
trend to qualify medical information as 
sensitive and the attitude towards its non-
disclosure render particularly important and 
necessary the key actions planned by the 
European Commission in the field of eHealth: 
•	 Key Action 13: Undertake pilot actions to 
equip Europeans with secure online access 
to their medical health data by 2015 and to 
achieve by 2020 widespread deployment of 
telemedicine services.
•	 Key Action 14: Propose a recommendation 
defining	a	minimum	common	set	of	patient	
data for interoperability of patient records 
to be accessed or exchanged electronically 
across Member States by 2012.
 The results verified in this fact sheet reinforce 
the understanding that EU citizens may 
only be able to enjoy the same degree of 
protection of their medical information, 
qualified as sensitive data, across different 
EU Member States if secure online 
access systems to one’s medical data are 
implemented and interoperability standards 
of electronic exchange of patients records 
are established.
Other legal sources concerning medical 
information from a data protection point of view 
are the following:
•	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	
Human Rights (ECHR).
•	 Articles	 7	 and	 8	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
•	 Convention	n.108	of	 the	Council	of	Europe	
for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
adopted on 28 January 1981.
•	 Convention	 n.164	 for	 the	 protection	 of	
Human Rights and dignity of the human 
being with regard to the application of 
biology and medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine and its 
Additional Protocols.
For details regarding the methodology used 
in the survey, please refer to the main report 
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[Special Eurobarometer 359: “Attitudes on Data 
Protection and Electronic Identity in the European 
Union”]. Some of the question in the survey we 
asked both of social networking site users and 
of people suing online sharing sites. In this fact 
sheet, we examine the responses – behaviours, 
attitudes - of social networking users.
5.3 Medical information as personal 
data
All respondents were asked what information 
they consider to be personal [Table 77]. Around 
three-quarters of Europeans think that the 
following are personal: financial information, 
such as salary, bank details and credit record 
(75%), medical information such as patient 
records, health information (74%), and their 
national identity number and/or card number 
or passport number (73%). Thus, alongside 
financial and identity data, medical information 
is considered very personal by a large majority of 
Europeans.
A second group of data, which appears to be 
closely tagged to the individual, and is considered 
personal by most Europeans, includes fingerprints 
(64%), home address (57%), mobile phone 
number (53%), photos of people (48%), and their 
name (46%). A third group, identified as social 
information follows: about a third of EU people, 
consider as personal their work history (30%) and 
who their friends are (30%); around a quarter of 
respondents also think that information about 
their tastes and opinions (27%), their nationality 
(26%), things they do, such as hobbies, sports, 
places they go (25%), and the websites they visit 
(25%) is personal.
To confirm the complementarities of types 
of personal data,68 factor analysis was used to 
68 We have excluded from the factor analysis “Your national 
identity number \ card number\ passport number” due 
to the different documents, if any, used in EU27 and the 
different regulations regarding the allocation and use of 
national identity numbers.
categorise items into various themes or factors.69 
This analysis yields three statistically significant 
and conceptually meaningful factors [Table 78]. 
the first factor groups information related with 
social activities as activities; preferences; friends; 
websites visited; work history and photos. In other 
words, people who consider one item as personal 
are also very likely to consider the next item in 
the factor as personal. The first factor includes 
mostly ‘social’ information, and was therefore 
labelled “social information”. The second factor 
includes name, address, nationality and mobile 
number. This information may be interpreted 
as “identifiers” – that is items of information 
generally used to identify people in identity 
management systems, online and offline. Finally, 
the third factor includes financial information, 
medical information and fingerprints. Thus, this 
factor is labelled as “sensitive information”, 
as most people consider it personal, as it was 
discussed above. 
To sum up, there are three main types 
of information people considered personal 
‘jointly’: social information, identifiers and 
sensitive information. Not surprisingly, medical 
information is grouped as sensitive information. 
We then looked in greater depth at medical 
information as personal information, to see 
whether there are differences based on socio-
demographic traits of respondents and across 
EU27 countries.
From a socio-demographic point of view 
[Table 79], females (75%) are slightly more 
likely than males (72%) to consider medical 
information as personal. Age also appears to 
play a role: middle age interviewees, especially 
those between 25-39 (75%) and 40-54 (76%), 
are slightly more likely to consider medical 
information to be personal than younger (71%) or 
69 An analysis of the correlation matrix (KMO and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity) was carried out to check that the 
correlation matrixes were factorable. Data reductions 
were undertaken by principal components analysis 
using	 the	Varimax	option	 to	 identify	possible	underlying	
dimensions.
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Financial information (e. g salary, bank details, credit record) 75%
Medical information (patient record, health information) 74%
Your national identity number \ card number\ passport number 73%
Your fingerprints 64%
Your home address 57%
Your mobile phone number 53%
Photos of you 48%
Your name 46%
Your work history 30%
Who your friends are 30%
Your tastes and opinions 27%
Your nationality 26%
Things you do (e.g. hobbies, sports, places you go) 25%
Websites you visit 25%
None (SPONTANEOUS) 1%
DK 1%
Base: EU27.
Source: QB2.
Table 78. Factor analysis of data and information considered as personal
Factor 1.
Social information
Factor 2.
Identifiers
Factor 3.
Sensitive information
Your tastes and opinions .82
Things you do (e.g. hobbies, sports, places 
you go)
.81
Who your friends are .78
Websites you visit .69
Your work history .64
Photos .50
Your name .85
Your home address .84
Your nationality .50 .57
Mobile number .47 .46
Medical information (patient record, health 
information)
.76
Financial information (e. g salary, bank 
details, credit record)
.76
Your fingerprints .58
Auto values 5.13 1.51 1.15
% Variance explained 39.5 11.6 8.9
Base: EU27.
Source: QB2.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0.896; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 5 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .04 are 
omitted.
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elderly (72%) interviewees. Younger individuals 
(15-24) are more likely to be healthy and may 
not worry as much about their health, however 
71% of them considered medical information as 
personal vs. 29% who did not consider this type 
of information as personal. It could be argued 
that even if younger individuals should not worry 
about their health status, they are significantly 
concerned about the medical information, and 
therefore they consider it as personal information. 
Elderly individuals (55+), who are more likely 
to be worried about their health and have a 
higher probability to suffer a health problem, are 
less likely to consider medical information as 
personal but not by much.
Several differences also appear in terms 
of education and occupation. Interviewees 
with lower levels of formal education (terminal 
education age lower than 16) or still studying are 
less likely to consider medical information to be 
personal (67% and 71% respectively), than those 
with higher levels of formal education (20+) 
(81%). On the contrary, managers (83%) and 
other white collar workers (78%) are more likely 
to consider medical information more personal 
than house people (68%), unemployed (69%), 
retired (71%) or students (71%). Furthermore, 
interviewees who have difficulties to pay bills 
most of the time (69%) are less likely to consider 
medical information to be personal, than those 
who have these difficulties from time to time 
(70%) and almost never or never (76%). Finally, 
individuals who have a personal mobile phone 
(75%) and use the Internet (78%) are more likely 
to consider medical information to be personal 
than those who do not have a personal mobile 
phone (63%) and do not use the Internet (65%). 
These characteristics reveal a small socio-
economic divide in the perception of the 
importance of personal medical data between 
Table 79. Medical information considered as personal information by socio-demographic traits
No Yes
Gender
Male 28% 72%
Female 25% 75%
Age [brackets]
15-24 29% 71%
25-39 25% 75%
40-54 24% 76%
55+ 28% 72%
Terminal education age
15- 33% 67%
16-19
20+ 19% 81%
Still Studying 29% 71%
Occupation
Self-employed
Managers 17% 83%
Other white collars 22% 78%
Manual workers
House person 32% 68%
Unemployed 31% 69%
Retired 29% 71%
Students 29% 71%
Difficulties to pay bills Most of the time 31% 69%
From time to time 30% 70%
Almost never/ never 24% 76%
Personal mobile phone
No 37% 63%
Yes 25% 75%
Internet use
No 35% 65%
Yes 22% 78%
Base: EU27.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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well educated, white collar, wealthy respondents, 
and those with lower education, outside the 
labour market and less wealthy. These results may 
be natural, and people in the former category 
have more health choice than people solely 
relying on national health systems, where lesser 
choice may be available. However, it also points 
to a significant disparity in the perception of one’s 
own health, as people from poorer backgrounds 
may be less protective of their medical data 
privacy than wealthier Europeans.
At country level, a large majority of 
European interviewees see medical information 
as personal. But respondents located in the 
north and west of the European Union are most 
likely to regard medical information as personal 
[Figure 28]. Medical information comes forward 
as personal before other types of information, 
namely financial and identity information, in the 
following Member States: Ireland (93%), Slovenia 
(90%), Sweden (89%), Belgium (84%), and 
France (82%). Large majorities of respondents 
who believe that medical information is personal 
are also found in the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark (each 87%), the Netherlands (86%), 
Slovakia (84%), the United Kingdom (83%), 
Estonia (81%) and Finland (80%). Countries 
where only around half of the respondents think 
so are Poland (46%), Portugal and Romania 
(each 50%) and Bulgaria (52%). In these 
Member States, identity credentials, such as 
identity cards and passports, are deemed to be 
personal by a vast majority of people (84%, 73%, 
81%, 92% respectively). If the latter indicates 
that where traditional identifiers dominate, 
sensitive information is seen as ‘less sensitive’, 
it nevertheless does not appear to reflect 
Figure 28. Medical information considered personal data by country
Base: EU27.
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influence from institutional or health care system 
characteristics nor welfare state models.70
5.4 Management of personal data by 
other parties, trust, concern and value
We then asked a range of questions 
concerning the management of personal 
information by other parties, on behalf of the 
individual. Different authorities (government 
departments, local authorities, agencies) and 
private companies routinely collect and store 
personal data. Questions were asked on approval, 
on trust in data handlers and on concern about 
use of personal data.
First, individuals were asked if specific 
approval should be required before any kind of 
personal information is collected and processed. 
A large majority say their approval should be 
required in all cases (74%). Only around one in 
ten says so in the case of personal information 
collected on the Internet (12%), or in the case of 
sensitive information (health, religion, political 
beliefs or sexual preferences - 8%). Individuals 
who stated that specific approval should be 
required are more likely to consider medical 
information as personal (55%) than those who 
do not consider medical information as personal 
information (45%). Furthermore, individuals who 
stated that specific approval should be required 
in all cases are more likely to consider medical 
information as personal (76%) than individuals 
who do not consider this type of information as 
personal (24%).
70 Klazinga N, Fischer C, Ten Asbroek A. (2011) Health 
services research related to performance indicators and 
benchmarking in Europe. Journal of Health Services 
Research & Policy;. 16(2):38-47. 
 Simonazzi A. (2009). Care regimes and national 
employment models- Cambridge Journal of Economics; 
33: 211-232.
Second, respondents were asked to what 
extent they trust institutions to protect their 
personal information [Table 80]. Individuals 
who considered medical information as personal 
are more likely to trust health and medical 
institutions (86%), national public authorities 
(73%), and banks and financial institutions 
(66%) than those who did not consider medical 
information as personal (74%, 68%, and 59% 
respectively). On the contrary, they are less likely 
to trust shops and department stores (62%); 
internet companies (73%), and phone companies 
(68%) than those who do not consider medical 
information as personal information (44%, 49% 
and 62% respectively). 
These results point out the difficulties that 
shops, Internet, phone and mobile companies 
and ISPs may have to launch and/or maintain 
any health business initiative which implies the 
disclosure of medical information, due to the 
importance of trust in the health field.71 On the 
other hand, national public authorities, banks 
and financial institutions and specially health and 
medical institutions could benefit from this level 
of trust to launch or support this kind of initiatives 
(as Personal Health Records).72 Furthermore, 
banking on health has been pointed out as a 
possible way to allow individuals to access 
upload and control their medical information.73 
This could be framed in Digital Agenda for Europe 
(Pillar ICT for Social Challenges) under Action 
75: Give Europeans secure online access to their 
medical health data and achieve widespread 
telemedicine deployment.
71 Recently Google has announced that its Personal Health 
Record Google Health will be retired on 1 January 2012 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-
google-health-and-google.html
72 Archer N, Fevrier-Thomas U, Lokker C, McKibbon KA, 
Straus SE (2011) Personal health records: a scoping review 
J Am Med Inform Assoc.18(4):515-22.
73 Ball MJ, Gold J. (2006). Banking on health: Personal 
records and information exchange. J Health Inf Manag. 
20(2):71-83 and Ball MJ, Costin MY, Lehmann C. (2008). 
The personal health record: consumers banking on their 
health. Stud Health Technol Inform.134:35-46.
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Medical information as personal
No Yes
National public authorities
Do not trust at all 10% 8%
Tend not to trust 22% 19%
Tend to trust 52% 53%
Totally trust 16% 20%
European institutions*
Do not trust at all 12%* 12%*
Tend not to trust 28%* 26%*
Tend to trust 48%* 49%*
Totally trust 12%* 12%*
Banks and financial 
institutions
Do not trust at all 12% 11%
Tend not to trust 29% 23%
Tend to trust 46% 49%
Totally trust 13% 17%
Health and medical 
institutions
Do not trust at all 8% 5%
Tend not to trust 18% 14%
Tend to trust 54% 55%
Totally trust 20% 26%
Shops and department 
stores
Do not trust at all 16% 21%
Tend not to trust 38% 41%
Tend to trust 40% 34%
Totally trust 6% 4%
Internet companies 
Do not trust at all 29% 33%
Tend not to trust 40% 43%
Tend to trust 27% 22%
Totally trust 4% 2%
Phone companies, mobile 
phone companies and 
Internet Services Providers
Do not trust at all 23% 28%
Tend not to trust 39% 40%
Tend to trust 33% 29%
Totally trust 5% 3%
Base: EU27.
Source: QB25.
Note:	*	No	significant	difference	was	found.
Companies holding personal information 
may sometimes use it for a purpose other than 
that for which it was collected (e.g. for direct 
marketing or targeted online advertising), 
without informing the individuals concerned. 
Respondents were asked how worried they 
were about this use of their information [Table 
81]. Individuals who considered medical 
information as personal are slightly more 
likely to be concerned (74%) than those who 
did not consider this type of information as 
personal (66%).
We then checked the relationship between 
trust and concern [Table 82], in relation to 
personal health information. Overall, individuals 
who consider medical information as personal 
are more likely to be concerned about stealth 
re-use of their personal data than individuals 
who did not consider it personal, regardless of 
whether they trust or not data controllers. On 
the one hand, individuals who consider medical 
information as personal and trust national public 
authorities, banks and financial institutions and 
health and medical institutions are more likely 
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to be concerned (approximately 70%) than 
individuals who did not consider this type of 
information as personal (approximately 65%). 
That is, trust makes very little difference to people 
who do not consider medical information as 
personal, but a large difference for those who 
consider their medical data to be personal. On 
the other hand, trust is extremely important, 
almost critical, for shops and department stores, 
Table 81. Concern about unannounced re-use of personal data for different purpose than original and  
medical information considered as personal data
Medical information as personal
No Yes
Not at all concerned 8% 5%
Not very concerned 26% 21%
Fairly concerned 46% 46%
Very concerned 20% 28%
Base: All individuals.
Source: QB26.
Table 82. Concern about unannounced re-use of personal data by trust in data controllers and medical 
information considered as personal data
Medical information as personal
No Yes
% concerned % concerned
National public authorities
Not trust 68% 82%
Trust 66% 71%
Banks and financial institutions
Not trust 69% 81%
Trust 65% 71%
Health and medical institutions
Not trust 67% 81%
Trust 66% 73%
European institutions
Not trust 70% 82%
Trust 64% 70%
Shops and department stores
Not trust 73% 80%
Trust 59% 66%
Internet companies (Search Engines, SNS, E-mail 
Services)
Not trust 72% 80%
Trust 58% 60%
Phone and mobile phone companies and Internet 
Services Providers
Not trust 73% 79%
Trust 58% 64%
Base: All individuals.
Source: QB25.
Internet companies, phone and mobile phone 
companies. In this case, trust matters a lot for all, 
in that trust is associated with significantly lower 
values of percentage of concerned across the 
sample, for both people who consider medical 
data as personal and otherwise.
Finally, people were asked about their 
willingness to pay for access to personal data 
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held by data controllers [Table 83].74 Respondents 
who considered medical information as personal 
are slightly more likely to be willing to pay for 
access to personal data in the case of only 
small amount of money (21%) and up to 20 
euros (8%) than those who did not consider 
this type of information as personal (15% and 
6% respectively). Nevertheless, two-thirds of 
respondents (about 66%) are not prepared to pay 
at all.75
5.5 Awareness and protection of 
personal data
We found that considering one’s medical 
data as personal is associated with increased 
levels of awareness and a higher desire for strong 
protection of one’s personal data.
Respondents were asked whether they heard 
of or experienced issues related to data loss and 
identity theft in the last 12 months.76 Respondents 
who considered medical information as personal 
are more likely to have heard about it through 
television, radio, newspapers, the Internet 
(45% media awareness) than those who did not 
74 QB27. According to EU data protection rules, you have the 
right to access your personal information stored by public 
or private entities, in order to change, block or delete it. EU 
rules do not specify whether access to personal information 
should be free of charge. In some EU Member States, you 
have to pay in order to be granted such access. Would you 
be prepared to pay to have access?
75 Financial information follows the same pattern as medical 
information
76 QB30. In the last 12 months, have you heard about or 
experienced issues in relation to data losses and identity theft?
consider it as personal (32%). Social awareness 
(word of mouth and/or acquaintance) and self-
family experience (you directly and/or a member 
of your family) were not found to be statistically 
significant. This emphasises the importance of 
media in health communication campaigns to 
raise awareness as to risks related to data loss 
or theft. Moreover, respondents who consider 
medical information as personal are more likely 
to have heard about a public authority in their 
countries responsible for protecting their rights 
regarding personal data77 (36%) than those who 
did not consider this type of information as 
personal (28%).
Furthermore, respondents who considered 
medical information as personal are more likely 
to state that they would want to be informed 
by a public authority or by a private company 
whenever information they hold about them is 
lost or stolen78 (91% vs. 78%) and to have the 
same rights and protections over their personal 
information regardless of the EU country in 
which it is collected and processed79 (79% 
vs. 57%). Also, those who consider medical 
information as personal are more likely to state 
that the enforcement of the rules on personal 
77 QB38. Have you heard about a public authority in 
(OUR COUNTRY) responsible for protecting your rights 
regarding your personal data?
78 QB31. Would you want to be informed by a public 
authority or by a private company whenever information 
they hold about you is lost or stolen?
79 QB32. How important or not is it for you to have 
the same rights and protections over your personal 
information regardless of the EU country in which it is 
collected and processed?
Table 83. Willingness to pay for access to personal data
Yes, but only a small 
amount (e.g. postage or 
communication costs)
Yes, up to 20 
Euro
Yes, more 
than 20 
Euro
No DK
Medical information 
considered as personal 
information
No 15% 6% 3% 66% 9%
Yes 21% 8% 2% 65% 4%
Base: EU27.
Source: QB27.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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data protection should be dealt with at European 
level80 (47%) than those who did not consider it 
as personal (38%).
5.6 Medical information and social 
computing
5.6.1 User characteristics of Social Networking 
Sites and their use of medical information
Social Computing is defined as “a set of 
open, web-based and user-friendly applications 
that enable users to network, share data, 
collaborate and co-produce content” and has 
become “an important social phenomenon, in 
terms of reach, time-use and activities carried 
out”.81 In the health arena, the concept of Health 
2.082 has emerged to examine the role of social 
computing within health, seen as creating several 
opportunities and challenges in relation with 
the disclosure of medical information. On the 
one hand, the participation, collaboration and 
interaction of social computing users83 around 
health issues within SNS and/or websites to share 
pictures, videos, experiences and intelligence 
could facilitate their empowerment and have 
a positive impact on their health. On the other 
hand, the context and quality of information 
shared, the health literacy of the individuals 
accessing it, privacy, confidentiality, control of 
information, could inhibit the positive impact or 
even have a negative impact on their health.
The current prevalence of social 
computing is reflected in the number of 
users. Slightly over half of all internet users 
(52%) use a social networking site and 
80 QB37. In your opinion, the enforcement of the rules on 
personal data protection should be dealt with at…?
81 Punie, Y., Lusoli, W., Centeno, C., Misuraca, G., & Broster, 
D. (2009) (Eds.). The impact of Social Computing on the 
EU Information Society and Economy (JRC Scientific and 
Technical Reports No. EUR 24063 EN). Brussels: JRC
82	 Van	De	Belt	TH,	Engelen	LJ,	Berben	SAA,	Schoonhoven	L	
Definition of Health 2.0 and Medicine 2.0: A Systematic 
Review J Med Internet Res 2010;12(2):e18.
83 Users could be patients, medical professionals, formal 
and informal carers and supportive relatives.
more than four in ten (44%) use websites to 
share pictures, videos, movies, etc. Socio-
demographic characteristics that influence 
social networking and sharing sites are age, 
education, occupation, financial situation, 
household composition and frequency 
of Internet use. Specifically, younger age 
cohorts (15-24 and 25-39) are more likely 
than the older age cohorts (40-55 and 55+) to 
undertake both activities. Also, Internet users 
with higher education, those who studied 
until the age 20 or later, are more likely to 
engage in these activities than users who 
left school at the age of fifteen or younger: 
using social networking sites (48% vs. 35%), 
and using sharing sites (40% vs. 30%). Then, 
interviewees who use the Internet every day 
undertake both activities more often than 
average: social networking sites (60%), and 
sharing sites for pictures and the like (51%).
In terms of geography, high rates of 
social networking use are found in smaller in 
population and newer in joining the European 
Union Member States. Social networking 
sites are used most often by internet users in 
Hungary (80%), Latvia (73%), Malta (71%), 
Ireland (68%), Cyprus, Slovakia (both 66%), 
Poland and Denmark (both 63%), and least in 
Germany (37%), Italy, Czech Republic (both 
at 48%), Austria (49%) and France (50%). 
Websites for sharing files are particularly 
popular in eastern and southern Member 
States. A majority of Internet users in mostly 
eastern and southern EU Member States use 
websites to share pictures, videos and movies: 
Bulgaria, Lithuania (both 59%), Cyprus, 
Slovakia and Ireland (all 58%), Romania, 
Latvia (both 56%), Greece, Hungary and Spain 
(all 53%), as compared to around one-third of 
those in Germany (32%), Finland (35%) and 
France (39%).
The respondents who use SNS and sharing 
sites (to identify this group of users, we name 
them social computing users) were then asked 
which types of personal information they 
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disclosed in these environments.84 We found that 
only 5% disclose medical information on SC 
sites. By means of comparison, we also found 
that only 3% of Internet users disclosed medical 
information in the context of eCommerce. 
Indeed, people mostly share social 
information on SC sites but also basic identity 
information: almost eight out of ten social 
computing users, revealed their name (79%) 
and around half disclosed photos of themselves 
(51%) or their nationality (47%). Almost four in 
ten disclosed the things they do (for example 
hobbies, sports, places they go), their home 
address, and who their friends are (all three 39%). 
One-third shared their tastes and opinions (33%) 
and a quarter gave their mobile phone number 
(23%). Fewer respondents disclosed their work 
history (18%), their national identity number, 
identity card number, or passport number (13%). 
Financial information such as salary, bank details 
and credit record (10%), and medical information 
such as patient record and health information 
(5%) are unlikely to be disclosed on SC sites.
Factor analysis was carried out to check the 
complementarities of the personal information 
disclosed in SNS and sharing sites.85 This 
analysis [Table 84] identified three conceptually 
meaningful factors. The first factor includes 
who friends are; photos; activities; preferences 
and websites visited. Therefore, it is labelled 
“social information”. The second factor groups 
fingerprints, medical information and financial 
information. These types of information disclosed 
are related with “sensitive information”. Finally, 
the third factor tackles national identity number; 
address; mobile number; name and nationality. 
Thus, this factor is labelled as “traditional 
84 QB4a Thinking of your usage of social networking 
sites and sharing sites, which of the following types 
of information have you already disclosed (when you 
registered, or simply when using these websites)? 
85 An analysis of the correlation matrix (KMO and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity) was carried out to check that the 
correlation matrixes were factorable. Data reductions were 
undertaken by principal components analysis using the 
Varimax	option	to	identify	possible	underlying	dimensions.
identifiers”. This may be a slight misnomer, as 
‘mobile phone’ is included in the group. However, 
all other items are personal information used as 
identifiers in many government and commercial 
transactions. To sum up, there are three main 
types of information Social Computing users 
disclose ‘jointly’: Social information; Sensitive 
information and Traditional identifiers.
We then took jointly into account Social 
Computing users’ behaviours (what data they 
actually disclose) and perceptions (what they 
thought are personal data.) This allowed us 
to profile four different types of individuals 
[Table 85]. The first two groups include ‘self-
revealing’ social computing users who disclose 
medical information (5%). Within this group 
we can identify those who consider this type of 
information as personal (4%) and those who do 
not consider it as personal (1%). Even though 
both groups are generating online medical 
information contents, different perceptions of this 
type of information as personal raises a different 
level of awareness and caution. But a majority 
of social computing users do not disclose 
medical information (95%). Within this group are 
individuals who consider medical information as 
personal (73%) and this group may be labelled as 
“Cautious” and individuals who do not consider 
it as personal (22%) and the second group may 
be labelled as “Indifferent”.
Due to the small number of social computing 
users who disclose medical information, we 
examine here three groups only: social computing 
users who disclosure medical information (self-
revealing - 5%); social computing users who do 
not disclosure medical information and consider 
it as personal (cautious - 73%) and social 
computing users who do not disclosure medical 
information and do not consider this type of 
information as personal (indifferent - 22%). 
We started by looking at the socio-
demographic differences, if any, among these 
groups [Table 86]. To put results in perspective, 
it should be kept in mind that we are talking of 
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internet users who also use social computing 
sites. Self- revealing users are more likely to be in 
the older age (40-54 and 55+ cohorts (25% and 
14% respectively); to end education at the age of 
16-19 (46%); to live in a house with three persons 
(28%); not to have difficulties to pay their bills; 
and to be heavy Internet users at home. Cautious 
users are slightly more likely to be female; to be 
15-24 (29%) or 55+ (12%); to be students (19%) 
or manual workers (23%); to end education at 
the age of 16-19 (41%) or 20+ (34%); to live in 
a house with 4+ (34%); not to have difficulties to 
pay their bills; and to be heavy Internet users at 
home and at work. Indifferent users are slightly 
more likely to be male (56%); to be 15-24 (38%); 
to be student (26%); to be still studying (25%) or 
end education at 20+; not to have difficulties to 
Table 84. Factor analysis of personal information disclosed in social computing
Factor 1.
Social information
Factor 2.
Sensitive information
Factor 3.
Traditional identifiers
Who friends are .76
Photos .75
Activities .75
Preferences .73
Websites visited .46
Work history
Fingerprints .76
Medical information .75
Financial information .69
National Identity number .61 .33
Address .81
Mobile number .67
Name .31 -.35 .58
Nationality .42 .51
Auto values 3.108 2.428 1.556
% Variance explained 22.199 17.346 11.111
Base: SC users. 
Source: QB4a. Thinking of your usage of social networking sites and sharing sites, which of the following types of information have 
you already disclosed (when you registered, or simply when using these websites)?.
Notes: Rotated components matrix; Sampling method: factor analysis by main components; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin 0. 786; Bartlett’s test of sphericity p=0.000; Convergence in 4 iterations; Minimum eigenvalue 1; Values below .03 are 
omitted.
Table 85. Social computing users and medical information
Medical information disclosure
Yes No
Medical information as personal
Yes 4% 73%
No 1% 22%
Base: SC users. 
Source: QB2.1 & QB4a1.
pay their bills; and to be heavy Internet users at 
home and at work. Finally, self-revealing Internet 
users are more likely to be using the Internet in 
more sophisticated ways (r. = .33 correlation 
with advanced software activities); cautious users 
carry out more eCommerce and eGovernment 
transactions (r = .20) – which may be the reason 
they are indeed cautious; while indifferent SC 
users are less likely to do either (that is, they 
largely carry out ordinary Internet activities, 
email and search).
More specific differences include:
•	 Cautious	 users	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	
female while indifferent individuals are 
more likely to be male. This characteristic 
137
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
, A
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
Po
lic
y 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
as
 re
ga
rd
s 
Pe
rs
on
al
 Id
en
tit
y 
D
at
a 
M
an
ag
em
en
tTable 86. Characterisation of social computing users and medical information perception and behaviours
Medical information
Disclosed
(self-revealing)
Not Disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Gender
Male 49% 56%
Female 51% 44%
Age
15-24 30% 29% 38%
25-39
40-54 25%
55+ 14% 12% 6%
Occupation
Self-employed 8% 9%
Managers 9% 14% 11%
Other white collars
Manual workers 23%
House person 5%
Unemployed 9%
Retired 8% 4%
Students 19% 26%
Terminal education age
15-
16-19 46% 41%
20+ 34% 25%
Still Studying 19% 25%
Household composition
1 16% 12%
2 18% 5%
3 28%
4+ 34% 42%
Difficulties to pay your 
bills
Most of the time 15%
From time to time 40% 29% 36%
Almost never/ never 45% 61% 55%
Internet use at home
Every day/Almost every day 67% 81% 74%
Two or three times a week 23% 12% 15%
About once a week 3% 5%
Internet use at work
Every day/Almost every day 35% 25%
Two or three times a week 9% 5% 7%
About once a week 3%
Two or three times a month 61% 33%
Base: Social computing users.
Source: QB2.1 & QB4a1.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance] * Adjusted residual >1.9.
points out the importance of women 
regarding health issues.
•	 If	we	consider	that	individuals	above	40	have	
more probability of having a health problem 
(especially those above 55+) or being 
responsible of caring for their families, it is 
not surprising that self-revealing individuals 
are more likely to be older than cautious 
and indifferent individuals (this profile is the 
youngest one).
•	 Due	 to	 the	 age	 characterization	 cautious	
and indifferent individuals are more 
educated than self-revealing individuals. 
Nevertheless, the education level of self-
revealing individuals remains high so the 
risk of health illiteracy could be decreased 
and the positive impact of disclosing 
medical information on their health 
outcomes or the health outcomes of their 
family would be higher. Furthermore, the 
role of health information to empower 
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individuals could be increased with a 
positive impact on health outcomes.
•	 The	 fact	 that	 household	 composition	 is	
statistically significant reveals the importance 
of social life of medical information and 
emphasises the role of the individuals as 
mediators of health information.
It is worth pointing out that predictors of 
Internet use and social computing use (young age, 
wealth, household composition, education) are 
also related with social determinants of health. 
Thus, while self-revealing individuals have a 
slightly lower socio-economic status than cautious 
and indifferent individuals (education and 
difficulties to pay bills), they are in a better socio-
economic status than people who do not use the 
Internet (67% self-revealing individuals use the 
Internet at home every day or almost every day 
and 23% use it two or three times a week).
Regarding national differences [Table 87], 
the highest percentage of social computing 
respondents who disclose medical information 
(self-revealing) are to be found in Estonia (13%), 
Austria (12%) and Romania (12%). In contrast, 
respondents in France (1%) and Luxemburg (1%) 
Table 87. National differences of social computing users and medical information perception and 
behaviours
% of Internet users who 
used Internet for health 
purposes*
Medical information**
Disclosed 
(self-
revealing)
Not Disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
France 46 1 82 17
Luxemburg 65 1 87 12
Sweden 45 3 88 9
United Kingdom 39 3 84 13
Germany 60 3 83 14
Denmark 59 3 89 8
Bulgaria 31 3 54 42
Cyprus 41 3 61 35
Finland 67 3 81 16
Poland 43 4 49 48
The Netherlands 56 4 83 12
Latvia 49 4 76 20
Greece 50 4 60 36
Lithuania 51 5 72 24
Slovenia 64 5 87 8
EU27 50 5 73 22
Malta 54 6 74 21
Slovakia 64 6 79 15
Belgium 47 7 81 12
Portugal 59 7 57 36
Czech Republic 31 8 82 11
Hungary 65 8 58 34
Italy 45 8 60 32
Ireland 41 9 82 9
Spain 53 9 61 30
Romania 53 12 48 40
Austria 50 12 65 23
Estonia 47 13 72 16
Base: 
* % of Internet users who used Internet for health purposes. EUROSTAT 2010 ICT Household survey.
**SC users.
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tFigure 29. Social computing users and Internet users who use the Internet for health purposes at 
country level
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Base: EU27.
are least likely to disclose medical information. 
The most ‘indifferent’ respondents tend to be in 
Poland (48%), Bulgaria (42%) and Romania (40%) 
while the least ‘indifferent’ respondents are to be 
found in Slovenia and Denmark (each with 8%) 
and in Sweden and Ireland (each with 9%). Finally, 
the most ‘cautious’ respondents are to be found in 
Denmark (89%), Sweden (88%) and Luxemburg 
(87%) while the least ‘cautious’ respondents are 
to be found in Romania (48%), Poland (49%) 
and Bulgaria (54%). While there is a marked 
absence of pattern that could give rise to a logical 
interpretation of the reasons why this is happening, 
the case of Austria86 with a relatively high number 
of self-revealing users (12%), with a relatively low 
number of ‘cautious’ users (65%) and a relatively 
high number of ‘indifferent’ users (23%) seems 
86 AT is a Member State with relatively high Internet use, where 
electronic Identity management exists, including in the 
health area, is functional and relatively diffused, the citizens 
of which are well aware of Data protection regulation.
to define a future trend to further explore. This 
indicates that there are benefits to sharing health-
related information on SC sites (see Table 88 for 
an analysis of the reason to disclose), and when 
managed appropriately it lowers concerns and 
empowers the users.
Looking at the wider picture, we examine 
whether there is a relation between Internet 
use for medical information in a country,87 and 
disclosure of medical information in the context 
of social networking (self-revealing, cautious, 
indifferent). In short, the correlation is weak for 
all three behaviours across EU27 [Figure 29]. 
The absence of patterns indicates the lack of 
network effect in the number of users generating 
medical information content and the number of 
users seeking health information on the Internet. 
Medical information on the Internet at large and 
87	 Source:	EUROSTAT	2010	ICT	HOUSEHOLD	SURVEY	%	
of Internet users who used Internet for health purposes.
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disclosure of online personal data appear to be 
unrelated at country level.
5.7 Reasons to disclose medical 
information in SNS
We examined the relation between disclosure 
of medical information in social computing 
and the general reasons why people disclose 
information on such sites [Table 88]. The two main 
reasons given by respondents for the disclosure are 
to access the service (61%) and to connect with 
others (52%). Around one-fifth of the respondents 
do so for fun (22%), to obtain a service adapted to 
their needs (18%), or to get a service for free (18%). 
People who self-reveal medical information appear 
to disclose (in general), for pragmatic reasons: 
they are more likely to disclose to get a service for 
free; to save time at the next visit; to benefit from 
personalised commercial offers and to receive 
money or price reduction. On the contrary, they 
are less likely to disclose information to connect 
with others or for fun.88
This trend could support a niche market 
of digital health services as health personal 
records or SNS to support groups of individuals 
with the same health problems, especially 
chronic conditions. However we have to 
emphasise the importance of trust in relation 
with health (see Table 82 with data on what 
institutions are more trusted). On the other 
hand, we also need to take into account that 
the group of indifferent users is sharing health 
related information that they think can hardly be 
Table 88. Reasons to disclose personal data in social computing and medical information disclosed in social 
computing sites
Total Social 
Computing 
users
 Medical information 
Disclosed
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
To access the service Yes 61%
To connect with others Yes 52% 27% 56% 43%
For fun Yes 22% 12% 23% 21%*
To obtain a service adapted 
to your needs
Yes 18%
To get a service for free Yes 18% 26% 17% 19%
To save time at the next visit Yes 12% 25%
To benefit from personalised 
commercial offers
Yes 8% 15% 7% 8%*
To receive money or price 
reduction
Yes 6% 18% 5% 7%*
Base: SC users.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance] * Adjusted residual >1.9.
88 Financial information follows the same trend as medical 
information does.
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considered a risk or raise concern (i.e. disease-
related information that is clearly curable and has 
no future consequences for the individual such 
as: fever, appendix problems, chickenpox, etc…).
It is also interesting to note that whether it 
is considered as personal or not, the information 
disclosed [e.g. cautious and indifferent types] 
makes little difference in terms of the reasons why 
people disclose. The only statistically important 
difference relates to the reason “connecting with 
others”, which is more significant as a reason for 
‘cautious’ users than for ‘indifferent’ users. Again, 
this underlines the importance of the nature of 
the information actually disclosed, rather than 
of the perceptions: people who are cautious in 
relation to their medical information (therefore 
aware) need not be cautious in relation to data 
of social nature disclosed [Figure 30]. In essence 
this means that while self-revealing individuals 
are behaving consistently for all types of data 
(including health-related information), cautious 
individuals who are concerned about revealing 
their health information are instead more likely 
to disclose other items on Social Computing sites 
than indifferent individuals, who share very few 
data overall.
5.8 Risks, informed consent and 
responsibility
Social Computing users were asked which 
three (out of ten) potential risks they associated 
with disclosure of personal information.89 Around 
four in ten respondents mention information being 
used without their knowledge (44%), being victim 
of fraud (41%) and information being shared with 
third parties without their knowledge (38%). 
Around one-third mention the risk of identity 
theft online (32%) and that the information 
will be used to enable sending them unwanted 
commercial offers (28%). About a quarter of 
respondents fear that the information will be used 
in different contexts from the ones where they 
disclosed it (25%). Just 3% of respondents stated 
spontaneously that they perceive no risks. Self-
revealing SC users are more likely to perceive 
reputation damage and misunderstanding of their 
views and behaviors connected with disclosure 
of personal information [Table 89].
89 QB7a I will read out a list of potential risks. According 
to you, what are the most important risks connected with 
disclosure of personal information on social networking 
sites and\ or sharing sites?
Figure 30. Number of items disclosed and medical information disclosed
Note:	ANOVA	p<.000.
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SC users were then asked whether service 
providers sufficiently inform their users about 
the possible consequences of disclosing personal 
information.90 Almost half of the respondents say 
they are sufficiently informed (52%). However, 
an almost equal proportion says that they are 
not (48%). This point is very important, as it is 
at the core of the informed consent principle of 
data protection regulation in Europe. Although 
informed consent relates largely to the uses that 
will be made of the data, and not to the possible 
consequences, the latter are most important 
for users. SC users who disclosed medical 
information (self-revealing) are more likely 
to consider that these sites sufficiently inform 
their users about the possible consequences of 
90 QB8a. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with 
the following statement: social networking sites and/ 
or sharing sites sufficiently inform their users about the 
possible consequences of disclosing personal information.
disclosing personal information (65%) than SC 
users who did not disclose this type of information 
(47% cautious and 61% indifferent) [Table 90]. 
Once again, considering one’s data as personal 
may be more accurate than actual disclosure to 
explain people’s perceptions of data protection in 
the SC environment.
Concerning responsibility, SC users were 
asked who should take care of the information 
they have disclosed.91 Firstly, half of the 
respondents point to themselves (50%), while 
one-third point to the social networking or 
sharing sites (33%). Even fewer respondents 
mention public authorities (17%). When the 
interviewees are given the opportunity to 
name a second responsible entity or person 
91 QB9a  Who do you think should make sure that your 
information is collected, stored and exchanged safely on social 
networking sites and/ or sharing sites? Firstly? And secondly?
Table 89. Risk perception and medical information disclosed in SC sites
Total 
SC 
users
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-
revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Your information being used without your knowledge 44% 36% 46% 40%
Yourself being victim of fraud 41%
Your information being shared with third parties without 
knowledge
38% 31% 41% 30%
Your identity being at risk of theft online 32% 31% 34% 29%
Your information being used to send you unwanted 
commercial offers
28% 18% 25%
Your information being used in different contexts 25% 20% 27% 19%
Your personal safety being at risk 20%
Your reputation being damaged 12% 19%
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 11% 17%
Yourself being discriminated against 7% 5%
None (SPONTANEOUS) 3% 2% 4%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB7a.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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(secondly), the total results mention social 
networking or sharing sites (43%), the public 
authorities (30%) and themselves (27%). 
While we found no specific patterns here, self-
revealing respondents are slightly more likely to 
give overall responsibility to public authorities 
firstly (20%) than respondents who do not 
disclose medical information (17%). Overall, 
therefore, attribution of responsibility appears 
stable regardless of disclosure and perception of 
medical information.
5.8.1 Attitudes towards the disclosure 
environment: trust, approval and concern 
regarding re-use of personal data 
National public authorities and European 
institutions are considered as the most trusted 
institutions by SC users who disclose medical 
information (self-revealing). These individuals are 
more likely to trust national public authorities 
(80%) than cautious (76%) and indifferent (71%) 
[Table 91]. Furthermore, even though the level 
Table 90. SNS sufficiently inform their users about the possible consequences of disclosing information by 
disclosure of medical information
Total 
SC users
Medical information
Disclosed (self-
revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Totally disagree 18% 13% 21% 11%
Tend to disagree 30% 22% 32% 28%
Tend to agree 39% 47% 35% 48%
Totally agree 13% 18% 12% 13%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB8a.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Table 91. Trust in data controllers and medical information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
National public authorities
Do not Trust 20% 24% 29%
Trust 80% 76% 71%
European institutions
Do not Trust 22%
Trust 78%
Banks and financial institutions
Do not Trust
Trust
Health and medical institutions
Do not Trust 16% 23%
Trust 84% 77%
Shops and department stores
Do not Trust 45% 60% 51%
Trust 55% 40% 49%
Internet companies 
Do not Trust 55% 67% 57%
Trust 45% 33% 43%
Phone companies, mobile phone 
companies and ISPs
Do not Trust 51% 62% 54%
Trust 49% 38% 46%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB25.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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of trust is lower, self-revealing individuals are 
more likely to trust shops and department stores 
(55%) and phone companies (49%) and Internet 
companies (45%) than cautious (40%, 38% and 
33% respectively) and indifferent (49%, 46% and 
43% respectively). These results are strikingly 
similar to those reported in Table 80.
In line with this finding, SC users who disclose 
medical information are also slightly less likely to 
consider that specific approval is required before 
personal information is collected and processed 
[Table 92]. However, in the context of personal 
information asked on the Internet these individuals 
are more likely to consider specific approval. Also, 
they are more likely to be concerned about the re-
use of personal data for different purposes (75% 
self-revealing – 70% cautious – 66% indifferent). 
Thus, again, context makes a difference to people’s 
attitudes, in this case concern grows as we move 
closer to actual experience of SC users. In this 
case, percentage of individuals who considered 
medical information as personal and stated that 
specific approval should be required in all cases 
(76%) is lower than the percentages of self-
revealing individuals (61%) while concern about 
re-use is strikingly similar 
5.8.2 Control: deletion of personal data and 
portability
Respondents who had disclosed personal 
information on SC sites were asked how much 
control they felt they had over the information 
they had disclosed, such as the ability to amend, 
delete or correct this information.92 Perception 
of control does not vary significantly whether 
SC user disclosed or not medical information. 
Nevertheless SC users who did not disclose 
medical information and did not consider it as 
personal (indifferent) are slightly more likely to 
feel they have control over the information than 
cautious users [Table 93].
92 QB6a How much control do you feel you have over the 
information you have disclosed on social networking sites 
and\ or sharing sites, e.g. the ability to change, delete or 
correct this information?
Table 92. Approval required for personal data handling, concern abut re-use of personal information and 
medical information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Approval
required
Yes, in all cases 61% 74% 68%
Yes, in the context of personal information 
asked on the Internet
29% 17%
Yes, in the case of sensitive information 
(health, religion, political beliefs, etc.)
No 3% 5%
Concern 
about re-use
Total ‘Concerned’ about re-use 75% 70% 66%
Total ‘Not concerned’ about re-use 25% 29% 34%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB24, QB26.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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SC users who do not disclose medical 
information are more likely to state that they 
would like their personal data to be completely 
deleted whenever they decide it (79% cautious; 
71% indifferent vs. 63% self-revealing). On 
the other hand, self-revealing individuals are 
more likely to want to have the possibility to 
delete personal data when they change Internet 
provider (23% self-revealing vs. 11% indifferent) 
[Table 94]. In accordance with these results, self-
revealing individuals are more likely to consider 
data portability important (84%) than cautious 
individuals (75%) and indifferent individuals (80%) 
5.9 Awareness, identity theft, 
regulation
SC users who disclose medical information 
(self-revealing individuals) are more likely to 
be aware of identity theft (see Table 95) firstly 
through word of mouth and/or acquaintances 
Table 93. Control and medical information disclosed in SC sites
Total SC users
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-
revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Complete control 27% 26% 30%
Partial control 53% 53% 54%
No control at all 20% 22% 17%
Base: SC users.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Source: QB6a.
Table 94. Possibility to delete personal data held by controllers, data portability and medical information 
disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Data deletion
Whenever you decide to delete it 63% 79% 71%
When you change your Internet provider 23% 11%
When you stop using the service\ website 21% 27% 20%
Never 6% 2% 6%
Data 
portability
Very important 28% 34% 31%
Fairly important 56% 41% 49%
Not very important 10% 17% 15%
Not at all important 7% 5%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB28, QB29.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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(33% social awareness) and secondly through a 
member of their family and/or themselves (14% 
Self-family awareness) while it is also likely 
that they are unaware of identity theft (28%). 
Conversely, cautious individuals are made 
aware primarily through the media (49%) and 
secondarily through social awareness while 
it is also very likely that they are unaware 
(37%) of such situations. Similarly, indifferent 
individuals are more likely to be unaware 
(44%) and secondarily made aware through the 
media (37%). 
Table 95. Awareness of identity theft and medical information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed
 (self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Media awareness 49% 37%
Social awareness 33% 23%
Self-family experience 14% 6% 5%
No 28% 37% 44%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB30.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Table 96. Desire to be informed by controller whenever personal data held is lost or stolen and medical 
information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Yes 90% 94% 90%
No 10% 6% 10%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB31. 
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Table 97. Importance of having same data protection right across Europe and medical information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Very important 52% 65% 49%
Fairly important 44% 31% 46%
Not very important 3% 4%
Not at all important
Base: SC users.
Source: QB32. 
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
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Most SC users (see Table 96) desire to be 
informed by a public authority or by a private 
company whenever information they hold about 
them is lost or stolen. Cautious individuals are 
slightly more likely to want to be informed (94%) 
than self-revealing and indifferent individuals 
(both 90%).
Similar consensus emerged among SC users 
about the importance of having the same data 
protection right across the EU (see Table 97): more 
than 95% of the individuals consider it important. 
Cautious individuals are more likely to consider 
it very important (56%) than self-revealing (52%) 
and indifferent (49%) individuals.93
93 The trends reported in Table 97 and Table 98 are similar 
for those individuals who considered medical information 
as personal [5.3].
On the other hand, self-revealing 
individuals (54%) are more likely to be aware of 
the national authority responsible for protecting 
their rights regarding personal data than cautious 
individuals (40%) and indifferent individuals 
(33%) [Table 98].
Moreover, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between SC users 
who disclose medical information and those 
who do not disclose this type of information 
in the case of deciding at which level the 
enforcement of the Data Protection rules 
should be dealt with (Table 99 European, 
National or Regional/local).
Finally, all respondents were asked about 
the need for special protection of genetic data 
Table 98. Public authority responsible for protecting your rights regarding your personal data and medical 
information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
Yes 54% 40% 33%
No 46% 60% 67%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB38.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	due	
to chance].
Table 99. Enforcement of the rules on personal data protection and medical information disclosed
Medical information
Disclosed
 (self-revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
European level 52% 48%
National level
Regional or local level 7% 10%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB37.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	
reported is not due to chance].
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as sensitive personal data.94 Seven out of ten 
Europeans stated that special protection is needed 
definitely (68%) and a quarter to some extent 
(25%). However, self-revealing individuals are 
less likely to consider that this special protection 
is needed definitely (55%) than cautious (75%) 
and indifferent (60%) individuals. In essence this 
is evidence that self-revealing individuals are not 
likely to be revealing genetic information while 
sharing information over Social networks.
5.10 Self-protection
The survey also asked various questions 
concerning self-protection of one’s data online. 
Specifically, it asked questions in relation to 
changing one’s profile privacy settings on SC 
sites95 and questions concerning a range of 
practical measure to minimise risks related to 
personal data disclosure (e.g. minimisation, 
withholding, adjusting, software, etc…).
94 QB33. EU data protection rules nowadays provide for 
special protection for the processing of sensitive personal 
data, such as data related to health, sex life, ethnic origin, 
religious beliefs, political opinions, etc. Do you think that 
genetic information such as DNA data should also have 
the same special protection?
95 QB10a Have you ever tried to change the privacy settings 
of your personal profile from the default settings on a 
social networking site and/ or sharing site?
Overall, more than half of SC users has tried 
to change privacy settings (51%), while almost 
half has not (46%). This implies a significant 
degree of trust of users in the default setting of 
such site for all SC users. Self-revealing SC 
users are slightly less likely to try to change 
privacy settings (48%) than users who do not 
disclose medical information. However, there is 
no statistically significant difference regarding 
whether they had encountered difficulties to 
change their privacy settings96 or when queried 
over other reasons why they did not try to change 
the privacy settings.97
Respondents were finally asked about 
the steps they were taking to protect their 
personal data and identity, both online and 
offline.98 Concerning Internet protection, a 
scale was created that ranged from 0 to 8 
possible protection behaviours [see fact sheet 
on Social Networking]. Self-revealing SC users 
are no more likely to stay protected online; 
conversely, cautious individuals are more likely 
to do so (r = .19) while indifferent SC users 
96 QB11a How easy or difficult did you find it to change the 
privacy settings of your personal profile?
97 QB12a Why did you not try to change these privacy 
settings?
98 QB15. In your daily life, what do you do to protect your 
identity? Please indicate all that apply in the following list.
 QB16. And, specifically on the Internet, what do you do 
to protect your identity? Please indicate all that apply in 
the following list.
Table 100. Need for special protection of genetic data as sensitive personal data and medical information 
disclosed
Total 
individuals
Total 
SC users
Medical information
Disclosed 
(self-
revealing)
Not disclosed
Personal
(cautious)
Not Personal
(indifferent)
No, definitely not 2%
No, not really 5% 4% 6%
Yes, to some extent 25% 38% 32%
Yes, definitely 68% 55% 75% 60%
Base: SC users.
Source: QB33.
Note:	Only	significant	difference	at	p	<	0.01	are	reported	[i.e.	when	there	is	a	99%	probability	that	the	relation	reported	is	not	
due to chance].
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were less likely to protect themselves online (r 
= -.19). Similar results were found concerning 
overall management of one’s personal data, 
with cautious users more likely not to disclose 
and to adjust the personal information they 
provided (r correlations in the order of .2), and 
indifferent users less likely to do so (similar r 
coefficients with negative sign). Overall, the 
difference in self-protection behaviour, similarly 
to the results found for perceptions of the SC 
environment reported above, is marked more by 
the consideration of one’s health information as 
personal or otherwise than by actually having 
disclosed medical information on SC sites.
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Electronic commerce
1 eCommerce is becoming mainstream in 
Europe as about 40% of all EU27 citizens 
engage in this activity (60% of all Internet 
users). But the bulk of eCommerce 
occurs within Member States (46% of 
all Internet users); there are very limited 
online purchases cross border and very 
little difference between percentages of 
people buying inside and outside the EU 
(18% and 13% respectively). Notable is 
the relation between different locations 
of eCommerce: virtually nobody shops in-
EU and out-EU without shopping in their 
own country. This finding is important 
per se and in relation to disclosure in 
eCommerce.
2 The uneven take-up of eCommerce in MS 
is striking; it ranges from Denmark and 
the Netherlands (81% of Internet user) 
to Bulgaria (21%) and Portugal (22%). At 
country level, there is a strong correlation 
between Internet use and proportion of 
people shopping online; this should not 
necessarily be the case. There appear to 
be two Europes: one at a lower level of 
eCommerce, and the other at a higher 
plateau. For both blocks there is an almost 
perfect correlation between Internet use 
and eCommerce. This we interpret to 
mean that there are national factors that 
influence eCommerce uptake – supply, 
structure of the digital market, regulation 
[not higher perception of risk, according 
to our data]; but also that Internet use and 
eCommerce have common roots, namely 
that the socio-economics underpinning 
Internet uptake [affluence, education, 
age], also strongly influence online 
shopping. 
3 eCommerce activities are most similar to other 
‘transactional’ activities, generally carried out 
within one’s own country – home banking and 
eGovernment. It may well be that eServices 
are a ‘single bundle’ in people’s eyes and 
experience, but they are MS-based. People 
shopping online in their own countries also 
tend to do home banking and eGovernment, 
while people who shop in the EU and outside 
the EU tend to do that only. Also, frequent 
Internet users shop slightly more across borders; 
the strongest predictor is the overall number of 
Internet activities carried out. This may mean 
that the three activities may grow together only 
if interoperable systems are provided that make 
it easier to transact outside one’s own country; 
the question remains open whether eCommerce 
could assist eGovernment, which is currently 
very low in EU27 [23% of Internet users].
4 In eCommerce, there is a common core 
of disclosure of name and address [about 
90%], and to lesser extent nationality and 
mobile number [about 40%]. There are 
four main types of information people 
disclose ‘jointly’: biographical information 
[often disclosed], social information [never 
disclosed], sensitive information [seldom 
disclosed] and security-related information 
[sometimes disclosed]. Financial information 
does not belong in the security group, but in 
the sensitive information group. This pattern 
of behaviour may be good news for those 
wishing to create a disclosure system based 
on third-party credentials, rather than on 
direct disclosure of bank or credit related 
information.
5	 Very	 few	 people	 share	 their	 social	
activities in the context of eCommerce; 
as this information is not normally asked 
by eCommerce sites, the low number 
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activities elsewhere, such as in Social 
Networking Sites; advertising seems to be 
an increasingly important selling point for 
SNS and an important source of revenue. 
This may also mean that traditional 
eCommerce vendors may have been less 
rapid than SNS companies to see the 
value of web2.0 for offering to customers 
products [generally digital, such as music, 
but not only] tailored to and anticipating 
their preferences. If this is the case, which 
need to be further probed by a market 
survey, then again European eCommerce 
companies and sites [which are where 
most people buy] may be at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis largely US-owned 
SNS sites.
6 The similarity between MS in relation 
to personal disclosure of ‘biographical 
data’ is truly remarkable; this may allow 
for significant harmonisation and, should 
problems exist (and they do exist, we 
argued in point 3), be addressed across 
EU27 by either technical (identity by 
design, credential cores) or legal means 
(harmonisation, standards). But there 
are differences across regional blocks 
for other personal data, such as mobile 
phone and nationality, in particular, and 
security-related information in general. 
Increasingly, eCommerce sites make use 
of authentication techniques based on 
identity number, mobile number (via SMS) 
and other ways of pegging ‘virtual identity’ 
to real identity. This type of disclosure 
(security-related) is highest in countries 
with established systems of electronic 
authentication (Austria, Belgium, Spain, 
Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden). 
Possibly, there is a case for extending this 
practice to other countries, and to other 
possible credentials (such as name and 
address), via burgeoning effort of identity 
credentials, which may well work cross-
borders.
7 Disclosure behaviour is related to other 
Internet behaviours, rather more strongly 
than it is related to attitudes towards 
disclosure. That is: the steering of certain 
desired behaviours in terms of disclosure 
depends more on ‘behavioural’ remedies 
and tools than with greater awareness 
and enhanced perceptions, especially of 
risks. Specifically, people who disclose 
biographical information also use credentials 
such as credit cards and customer cards 
in their daily lives, and they are also more 
likely to stay protected online using a 
range of strategies. But these credentials 
are also much less strongly associated 
with the disclosure of sensitive information 
and security information. People who 
disclose more biographical information also 
minimise what they disclose and adjust the 
information according to context as coping 
strategies in daily life, online and offline. 
Provision of security information is also to 
some extent adjusted to context. This may 
be good news for enforcing the principles of 
data minimisation or purpose-binding.
8 Overall, there is no apparent relation 
between considering one’s data personal 
and disclosing it on eCommerce sites. 
So even if people consider information 
personal, still they disclose it. Still more 
surprising, for many items [name, address, 
nationality, financial information], the 
more people consider this information 
personal, the more they disclose it on 
eCommerce sites [!]. It is true that in order 
to shop online, some information has to 
be disclosed, regardless of whether it is 
considered as personal. But this also may 
mean that information takes on personal 
connotation for people when it is disclosed, 
rather than having ‘a priori’ personal value. 
In this case, a system of credentials where 
no face-value information is disclosed may 
help people perceive that the information 
they have disclosed is ‘procedural’ rather 
than personal.
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9 eCommerce users mention fraud (55%), 
stealth use of and stealth sharing of one’s 
information with a third party (both at 43%), 
and identity theft (35%) as major risks of 
disclosure. Concern about unauthorised 
reuse of personal data is related to risks 
of identity theft and fraud, not with risks 
of unwanted commercial offers of stealth 
use of data [therefore security rather than 
profiling risks]. Risks to reputation and to 
personal safety are mentioned by far fewer 
respondents. A few correlations also stand 
out. Those who use government-issues 
credentials are less likely to fear risk of 
identity theft; but people using business-
related credentials are more likely to fear 
risk of identity theft. Also, people who fear 
risks of different nature are also more likely 
to take active steps to protect their personal 
identity, both online and offline.
10 People do not quite feel in control 
in eCommerce. Less than one in five 
eCommerce users think they have total 
control on their own information, about 
one in three thinks they have no control at 
all, while about half think they have some 
control. This may be normal, as except for 
large eCommerce portals, people do not 
have a profile page available to them, or a 
single point of entry or a purchase history 
(what they bought in past interaction, what 
they searched for, offers looked at). This 
may make it harder for people to feel in 
control of personal data they have disclosed 
one-off, several times on different sites. 
But control is central to user’s eCommerce 
activity. People who feel in control of their 
data trust companies and institutions to 
protect their data; they are less concerned 
about observation, about re-sue of their data 
and much more comfortable with online 
profiling; furthermore, they are far less likely 
to enjoy disclosing information. Therefore, 
if eCommerce is to be fostered, one may 
speculate on the relative merits of alternative 
solutions: strict data deletion policies, 
enforcement of the minimisation principle, 
on the one hand as traditional supply-side 
rules, and compulsory email notifications 
of data held, personal data consoles for 
users to use as demand side enabling tools 
enhancing control.
11 Individual and companies are seen as being 
responsible for keeping data safe, rather than 
policymakers. A minority of eCommerce 
users (20%) consider public authorities 
responsible. But about the same proportion 
(40%), argue that they or companies are 
responsible to keep their personal data safe. 
Overall, abut one in two respondents do 
not see public authorities as having either 
primary or secondary responsibility for 
protection of personal data safety. This result 
is remarkable, as there are small differences 
in attributing responsibility based on socio-
economic traits, as well as on country of 
residence. People who think they have 
control on their data tend to see only joint 
self-company responsibility. In all cases, 
companies are seen as responsible regardless 
of level of perceived control [e.g. their 
conferred responsibility remains relatively 
stable across perceived control]. 
12 Results on responsibility are also rather 
more sobering regarding self-protection. 
There is no relation between perceptions of 
self responsibility in eCommerce and most 
other regulatory perceptions: desire for the 
possibility to delete one’s data, to move 
one’s data and awareness of identity theft 
and data loss. What is more worrying is 
that there is no relation between perceived 
self-responsibility and Internet protection 
behaviours and very little relation with 
identity protection behaviours in general. 
As found in previous surveys, even people 
feeling responsible do [as little] as the next 
person to protect their personal data once 
they have been disclosed. As it was noted 
above, this may be due to the lack of tools 
allowing people to take care, effectively if at 
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notices, people do read them if they feel 
responsible. So, all in all, better tools may 
be required if people have to take care of 
themselves online.
13 Finally, the picture for responsibility is 
more complex that the baseline. On 
the one hand, people who are happy to 
disclose personal data [about one in four 
Europeans!] think it is authorities who 
are responsible, rather than companies. 
But trust in companies as personal data 
controllers appears to reduce the perceived 
need for authorities’ responsibility. People 
considering authorities responsible have 
heightened concerns about observation, 
reduced comfort about online profiling and 
more concern about re-use of their data. 
In all these cases, people are also slightly 
more likely to think companies, rather than 
oneself, are responsible for correct handling 
of personal data [understandably, as there is 
little they can do]. This suggests that fostering 
[genuine] trust in data controllers and their 
practices may remove part of the burden 
from regulator’s shoulders.
6.2 Social Networking Sites
14 More than a third of all Europeans use SNS 
(34% of EU27 population). SNS users are more 
likely to be younger and well educated. They 
are also heavier Internet users and are still 
studying or are unemployed. SNS users are as 
’green’ as generally believed, but they are also 
able to harness the Internet to a greater extent 
than previously known: more than half of SNS 
users also utilised websites to share pictures, 
videos, movies, etc (68%); instant messaging, 
chat websites (57%) and have purchased 
goods or services online (57%).
15 The more the Internet is widespread, the more 
Internet users also use Social networking 
sites (SNS); however, age plays a key role 
at national level. This means that younger 
people in most EU countries use the Internet 
very little outside SNS while older people 
who use SNS are practically the same as the 
percentage of Internet users. The generation 
split may be set at 40 years of age as the age 
group [40-54] tend to act more like the 55+ 
while the [25-39] more like the [15-24].
16 In general SNS are used the most in Hungary 
(80%), Latvia (73%), Malta (71%), Ireland 
(68%), Cyprus, Slovakia (both 66%), Poland 
and Denmark (both 63%), and least in 
Germany (37%). When considering usage 
risks, SNS users living in the north of Europe, 
specifically Germany, Sweden, France, 
Ireland and Denmark appear to have more 
concerns about using SNS; conversely, 
residents of Italy, Romania, Poland and 
Portugal, that is mainly the south but also the 
east of Europe, are likely to perceive lesser 
risks in SNS activity.
17 Age appears to play the most important role 
in the type of information that is disclosed 
by SNS users: social (photos; activities; 
preferences), sensitive (work history; 
fingerprints; medical/financial information), 
or traditional identifiers (address; mobile 
number; name and nationality). There are 
no discernible regional patterns concerning 
overall disclosure which may signal that 
SNS use is still very national, as people do 
disclose different types of information on 
language based-sites or due to country-
culture differences or even regulatory 
framework.
18 People understand they need to disclose 
social information if they want to socialise 
online. Overall, there is no apparent relation 
between considering one’s data personal 
and disclosing it on SNS. The most important 
reasons for disclosing personal information 
when using SNS are to access a service 
(61%) followed by connecting with others 
(54%). However, more people provide 
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commercially valuable information on SNS 
than people provide social information 
on eCommerce sites; this may point 
to an advantage of SNS operators over 
eCommerce providers regarding viability of 
business plans based on Web2.0 dynamics 
– extracting monetary value from people’s 
personal information.
19 SNS users are less cautious about sharing 
their social information [friends, activities, 
etc.] since they think that disclosure is 
unavoidable in today’s’ life, although they 
consider it personal. SNS users are less 
concerned to being ‘observed’ online – more 
comfortable with online profiling – but more 
cautious in sharing their sensitive [medical, 
financial, etc.] information. 
20 In some countries, SNS users are slightly 
more likely to disclose happily [Italy, 
Estonia], and to think that disclosure is 
unavoidable. Conversely, in other countries 
[Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia], people are less 
likely to be happy to disclose their personal 
data; they also think that disclosure could be 
avoided. Unavoidability of disclosure is also 
related to the benefit of the service related to 
the data disclosure.
21 The issue of informed consent in SNS is 
more complicated than may be thought. 
There are four groups of SNS users in 
relation to it: 19% of all SNS users claim 
to have not been informed of either 
conditions or consequences; 29% report 
having been informed about conditions 
of data collection, but are unhappy with 
the degree of information about possible 
consequences; 40% have been informed 
about both collection conditions and 
consequences; and 11% are happy 
about SNS sites informing them of 
consequences, but have hardly been given 
information on how the data collected 
will be used. In policy terms, significant 
work is required to enforce informed 
consent and enhanced information about 
what may happen with people’s personal 
data once it is disclosed in SNS.
22 Managers and other white collar workers 
are mainly using SNS sites that relate to their 
work history and to relate to friends (peers 
or even competitors); while still not very 
diffused this practice seems to be gaining 
ground with many institutions opening up 
Facebook–like sites to promote internal 
communication and cross-fertilisation of 
ideas.
23 SNS users are less likely than Internet 
users to use private or government-related 
credentials, are more likely than Internet 
users to report to have been informed about 
data collection conditions when disclosing 
personal data to access an online service 
and use a slightly wider range of strategies 
to protect their personal data online than 
the average Internet user. This may be due to 
younger age.
6.3 Identity and authentication in 
Europe
24 Frequent Internet-users are more likely to use 
leisure-related credentials: driving license, 
customer cards, passports and Internet 
accounts, but less likely to use national 
identity cards. This points to the increasing 
embedding of credentials, rather private 
than public, in the fabric of the Internet. This 
may only be natural, as government-issued 
credentials can today be used to carry out 
online commercial transactions in a limited 
number of countries only, including Belgium, 
Austria, Spain and Estonia. 
25 A significant proportion of respondents 
– including SNS and eCommerce users – 
claim they are not using an Internet account, 
while they carry out activities that clearly 
require one; this is not the case of the Digital 
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awareness of Internet users regarding the 
identity-related personal data they routinely 
provide to online service providers via their 
accounts, without being aware.
26 The system of credentials is highly 
fragmented in Europe: by country, by socio-
economic status and by Internet use. Overall, 
differences in the use of credentials are not 
necessarily regional or related to economic 
growth and macro-economic indicators, but 
they mirror the structure of credentials in 
place in single countries. The use of identity 
cards varies greatly: respondents from the 
east and south of the European Union are 
more likely to use them than those living 
in the north and west. There are no such 
differences in the use of passports. Trust 
alone makes only a little difference in the 
likelihood of having a bank / credit card. 
Conversely, controlling for trust, country 
of residence makes a large difference [e.g. 
+21% for people living in Sweden, and -44% 
for residents of Greece]. Social position and 
younger age make a difference. For Internet 
users, use of business-related credentials is 
strongly associated with online transactions 
such as home banking, eGovernment and 
ecommerce; but it is inversely related with 
online social activities. Internet behaviour is 
unrelated to the use of government-related 
credentials. This fragmentation may not 
bode well for the adoption of cross-border 
eGovernment and cross-border eCommerce, 
even where Internet access should become 
more widespread and faster.
27 People who use business-related credentials 
are more likely to report slightly higher 
perception of risk of identity theft and fraud 
due to eCommerce disclosure; conversely, 
people using government related credentials 
are likely to report reduced perception 
of risk of identity theft in eCommerce. 
This may be natural: people are likely to 
associate higher risks to the loss of financial 
rather than governed-related information 
as it constitutes to them a greater and more 
visible asset. Those who use credentials of 
both types are more likely to trust institutions 
as data controllers, especially business-
related credentials; those who do not trust 
companies as data controllers are likely to 
make greater use of government-related 
credentials. Therefore, use of credentials 
may be enhanced by portability of trust from 
public institutions to commercial institutions, 
via the greater use of government-supported, 
if not issued outright, credentials, or by 
establishing circles of trust through Public-
Private-Partnerships (PPP).
28 There are significant national differences 
in the relation between disclosure in 
eCommerce and use of credentials; in other 
words, what credentials people use as they 
transact online. Overall, the structure of 
disclosure in eCommerce is dominated by 
privately-released credentials: credit cards 
and customer cards; government cards and 
identity cards only have a marginal role in 
the structure of disclosure. However, in some 
countries where the structure of electronic 
authentication is most advanced [Austria, 
Belgium, Germany] people use government-
related and business-related credential 
in relation to eCommerce disclosure. 
Again, the former credentials are usually 
associated with lower level of disclosure 
of sensitive information. In some countries, 
government related credentials are dominant 
[Spain, Sweden and Poland], while in some 
countries business credentials underpin most 
of people’s disclosure in eCommerce [UK, 
Ireland, Italy and Estonia]. These findings 
largely resound with industry-level analysis 
on the structure of the electronic identity 
market in Europe. 
29 Concerning regulation, users of business-
related credential are strongly in favour of 
homogeneous data protection right across 
EU, to be informed when their personal data 
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is lost or stolen, and to be able to edit/delete 
their data whenever they wish so. On the 
one hand, this hints that ‘if you build it they 
will come’: engaging people in safer online 
authentication may get them to value their 
personal data more, and be more willing to 
protect them [see par. 32]. But it also appears 
that remedies requiring more of people’s 
initiative are less popular than institution-
centred remedies.
30 Personal experience of identity theft and 
data loss is very low in Europe, affecting 
only 2% of EU27 population. For the sake of 
comparison, identity theft only [but not data 
loss], affected about 3.5 % of US residents 
in 2010. Largely, identity theft and data loss 
affect managers and other office workers and 
their families; people with customer cards 
are more likely to have reported incidence 
of identity theft and data loss [6%]; the 
reverse is true for holders of national identity 
cards [8% of non-holders]. Internet users 
are more likely to report overall awareness, 
media awareness and experience with the 
phenomenon [incidence is three times 
higher for heavy internet users]. 
31 Sensitivity to identity theft and data loss 
is relatively high, as more than half are 
aware of the issue via different or multiple 
sources, which increases to two in three 
in most northern countries, where Internet 
access is higher. Thus, general Internet 
skills alone do not provide an answer to 
identity theft and data loss, and other more 
specific skills may be needed [see par. 
34]. Also, concerning remedies, media 
awareness appears intertwined with calls 
for enhanced regulation, including greater 
harmonisation of data protection rights 
across EU27, request for information if/
when data lost or stolen and the possibility 
to delete personal data. The media may 
thus be playing a role in generating support 
for a more vigorous and more articulated 
response to the challenge.
32 While a majority of Europeans take one or 
more actions to protect their personal identity 
data [average is 2.3 actions], a significant 
minority do not minimise disclosure, do 
not withhold bank details, they provide 
information to controllers they do not trust 
and disclose usernames and passwords. All 
in all, this is in line with the widespread 
perception that disclosure is unavoidable. 
However, lack of protection is not caused 
by resignation: if you think disclosure is 
unavoidable you are slightly more likely to 
protect yourself. Rather it is strongly linked 
to propensity to disclose personal data, 
which one in three Europeans happily does. 
Specifically, those who are happy disclosing 
personal data, those who trust companies [!!] 
and those comfortable with online profiling 
are much less likely to minimise data, as 
may be obvious, but are also less likely to 
withhold sensitive information and to use 
software measures to protect their data.
33 Personal data protection is particularly low 
in southern European countries, eastern 
and central European countries, and 
relatively high in Scandinavian countries 
and the Netherlands. In fact, people use 
very different strategies across Member 
States. Offline, traditional strategies are 
linked to high concern about observation, 
while minimisation is linked to Internet use, 
especially eCommerce. So while people in 
Nordic countries are generally less concerned 
about their behaviour being recorded, and 
are more likely to use eCommerce [and 
thus minimise], the situation is inverse for 
other countries mentioned. Thus use of 
the Internet for transactions may have a 
beneficial awareness-raising effect. Also, 
media awareness of identity theft and data 
loss is particularly important to make people 
minimise personal data disclosure.
34 Internet users use a different mix of strategies 
to protect themselves, possibly as they 
have to face a different challenge, largely 
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theft. Rather than minimisation and low-
tech strategies, a majority of Internet users 
engage in security-enhancing, information 
withholding behaviours. Particularly, those 
who use business-related credentials, 
often in eCommerce, are much more likely 
to try to minimise the information they 
disclose. Also, Internet users engaging in 
online transactions are much more likely 
than ordinary internet users to take a range 
of measure to protect their data online, 
including data minimisation and reactive 
software use. This confirms the intuitive idea 
that being on the Internet hones specific 
strategies of self protection than carrying 
oneself in offline, everyday life.
35 But what was reported in par. 33 does not 
mean that Internet users actually protect 
themselves to a sufficient degree. On the 
Internet, protection behaviour rests on passive 
use of existing tools [e.g. tools and strategies 
to limit unwanted emails – 40%] rather than 
on active strategies of information control [e.g. 
changing the security settings of your browser 
– 22%]. There is a strong correlation between 
the overall number of internet activities 
carried out [a proxy for internet skills], 
and online protection behaviour. But also, 
people in some countries tend to stand more 
protected online regardless of the number 
of activities they carry out on the Internet. 
These deviations from the trend hint at the 
importance of variables others than internet 
use to explain protection; these may have to 
do with national technical culture and with 
maturity of the market for online protection 
tools. This all implies that where simple tools 
are not available, or are cumbersome to use 
for the average user, people are unlikely to 
take proper care of their personal identity 
data online.
36 Data minimisation is strongly correlated with 
regulatory preferences and data protection 
principles. In short, people who minimise 
the information they disclose also tend to 
have particularly strong feelings regarding 
the needs for stronger protection of their 
rights in EU27 and on enhanced control 
of their personal data, such as deletion 
on demand and data breach notification. 
Also, existing rules and principles of data 
protection engender greater self-protection 
by Internet users. Namely, those who think 
they had to disclose more that they wished 
actually did so compensated by using 
reactive, proactive and deception strategies. 
Information about data collection conditions 
is associated positively with reactive and 
proactive behaviour and with minimisation. 
Finally, concern about re-use of one’s data is 
associated with significant minimisation of 
the data disclosed.
6.4 Medical information as personal 
data
37 Around three-quarters of Europeans think 
that medical information such as patient 
records and health information (74%) is 
personal. Thus, Health information, financial 
information and national identity information 
are equally perceived to be personal.
38 There are only small socio-economic 
differences in the perception of medical data 
as personal between well educated, white 
collar, wealthy respondents [more likely 
to say it is personal], and those with lower 
education, outside the labour market and 
less wealthy. 
39 There are significant country differences 
in the perception of medical information 
as personal; respondents located in the 
north and west of the European Union are 
most likely to regard medical information 
as personal. In the south east the situation 
is different, especially in Poland (46%), 
Portugal and Romania (each 50%) and 
Bulgaria (52%). In these countries, 
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identity credentials, such as identity cards 
and passports, are deemed to be personal 
over and above sensitive information 
(financial, medical).
40 Considering medical data as personal makes 
a large difference to a range of regulatory 
preferences. Those who consider medical 
information as personal are more likely to 
want to be informed whenever information 
held about them is lost or stolen (91% vs. 
78%) and to desire the same protection 
over their personal information regardless of 
the EU country in which it is collected and 
processed (79% vs. 57%).
41 People who consider medical information 
as personal are more likely to be concerned 
about stealth re-use of their personal data 
than individuals who did not consider it 
personal, regardless of whether they trust 
or not data controllers. But trust in data 
controllers is a powerful mediating factor. 
Trust in public institutions significantly 
reduces the worry of those who care about 
their medical data. And trust in shops, 
Internet and phone companies is extremely 
important, almost critical, as it is associated 
with significantly lower concerns across 
the sample, for both people who consider 
medical data as personal and otherwise.
42 Although a majority of people consider 
that medical information is personal, still a 
small percentage do disclose it – medical 
information is disclosed in the context of 
eCommerce (3%) and Social networking 
(5%). They are aware of the risks involved 
and still they do it; it can only mean that 
they are getting a benefit from the disclosure 
or are obliged to do it.
43 There are three groups of Europeans 
concerning medical information disclosure 
in the context of Social Computing. “Self-
revealing” social computing users disclose 
medical information (5%). “Cautious” users 
consider medical information as personal 
and do not disclose (73%). “Indifferent” 
neither consider it as personal nor do they 
disclose it (22%). These three groups consist 
of Internet users who are also users of social 
computing sites – thus largely users who 
are better educated and in a better socio-
economic status than non-Internet users 
– who however, are statistically different in 
many other respects.
44 Cautious users are slightly more likely to 
be female (51% vs. 49%) while indifferent 
individuals are more likely to be male (56% 
vs. 44%); this characteristic points out the 
importance of women in relation to health 
issues.
45 Self-revealing individuals are more likely 
to be older than cautious and indifferent 
individuals (this profile is the youngest 
one), probably because older individuals 
are more likely to either face a health 
problems themselves or care for someone 
else in the family. Although due to age, 
self-revealing users are also less educated 
than cautious or indifferent individuals, 
their overall high education makes the 
risk of health illiteracy minimal, especially 
if we compare these individuals with 
non internet users. Due to the active 
participation of this typology of Internet 
users as regards their health, health 
information on the internet has a higher 
potential to empower individuals, with a 
positive impact on health outcomes.
46 Self-revealing individuals who also are 
Internet users are more likely to be using the 
Internet in more sophisticated ways; cautious 
users carry out more eCommerce and 
eGovernment transactions – which may be 
the reason they are indeed cautious; while 
indifferent Social Computing site users are 
less likely to do either (that is, they largely 
carry out ordinary Internet activities, email 
and search).
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C
on
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ns 47 Self-revealing individuals share 
information for very specific reasons, 
namely: (a) to connect with others – one 
would think similar individuals; (b) so as 
to get a service for free – in relation to 
their condition; and (c) to save time at the 
next visit – presumably when receiving a 
service over time.
161
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
, A
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
Po
lic
y 
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 
as
 re
ga
rd
s 
Pe
rs
on
al
 Id
en
tit
y 
D
at
a 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Annex: Survey Questionnaire
Legend
DK = don’t know/no answer – always spontaneous
(OUR COUNTRY) will be replaced by the name of the country in each country
(NATIONALITY) will be replaced by the nationality of the country in each country
Socio-demographic variables
Q1 is the initial question about nationality
D1 – Left/right political scale
D7 – Marital status of the respondent
D8 – Age of end of education of the respondent
D10 – Gender of the respondent
D11 – Age of the respondent
D25 – Subjective urbanisation
D40 – Household composition
D43a – Landline phone in the household
D43b – Personal mobile phone
D46 – Equipments in the household
D60 – Difficulties in paying bills
D61 – Self-positioning on the social scale
ASK D15b IF “NOT DOING ANY PAID WORK CURRENTLY”, CODES 1 to 4 in D15a
D15a What is your current occupation?
D15b Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last occupation?
 
D15a D15b
CURRENT 
OCCUPATION
LAST 
OCCUPATION
NON-ACTIVE
Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, or without any current 
occupation, not working
1  
Student 2  
Unemployed or temporarily not working 3  
Retired or unable to work through illness 4  
SELF EMPLOYED
Farmer 5 5
Fisherman 6 6
Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.) 7 7
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person 8 8
Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company 9 9
EMPLOYED
Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect) 10 10
General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, 
other director)
11 11
Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, 
technician) 
12 12
Employed position, working mainly at a desk 13 13
Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.) 14 14
Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.) 15 15
Supervisor 16 16
Skilled manual worker 17 17
Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant 18 18
Never did any paid work  19
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 (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT)
Everyday\ 
Almost 
everyday
Two or 
three 
times a 
week
About 
once a 
week
Two or 
three 
times a 
month
Less 
often
Never
No Internet 
access 
(SPONTANEOUS)
1
You use the Internet at 
home, in your home
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2
You use the Internet on 
your place of work
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3
You use the Internet 
somewhere else (school, 
university, cyber-café, 
etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ASK QB1a AND QB1b IF “USE THE INTERNET”, CODE 1 TO 5 IN D62.1 OR D62.2 OR D62.3 – OTHERS 
GO TO QB2
QB1a For each of the following activities, please tell me if it is an activity that you do, or not, on the 
Internet.
(ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT) Yes No DK
1 Use websites to share pictures, videos, movies, etc. 1 2 3
2 Use a social networking site 1 2 3
3
Purchase goods or services online\ online shopping (e.g. travel & 
holiday, clothes, books, tickets, films, music, software, food)
1 2 3
QB1b Which of the following activities do you also do on the Internet?
 (SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ROTATE – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Keep a blog (also known as web-log) 1,
Instant messaging, chat websites 2,
Use peer-to-peer software and\ or sites to exchange movies, music, etc. 3,
Make or receive phone calls or video calls over the Internet 4,
Install plug-ins in your browser to extend its capability 5,
Design or maintain a website (not just a blog) 6,
Do home banking 7,
(ONLY IF “YES” IN QB1a.3) Purchase goods or services from a seller located in (OUR 
COUNTRY)
8,
(ONLY IF “YES” IN QB1a.3) Purchase goods or services from a seller located in another EU 
country
9,
(ONLY IF “YES” IN QB1a.3) Purchase goods or services from a seller located outside the EU 10,
Submit tax declaration or use other online government services 11,
Use online softwares 12,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 13,
DK 14,
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QB2 Which of the following types of information and data that are related to you do you consider as 
personal?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Medical information (patient record, health information) 1,
Your fingerprints 2,
Financial information (e. g salary, bank details, credit record) 3,
Your work history 4,
Your national identity number (USE APPROPRIATE TERM IN EACH COUNTRY)\ card number\ 
passport number
5,
Your name 6,
Your home address 7,
Your nationality 8,
Things you do (e.g. hobbies, sports, places you go) 9,
Your tastes and opinions 10,
Photos of you 11,
Who your friends are 12,
Websites you visit 13,
Your mobile phone number 14,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 15,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 16,
DK 17,
QB3 For each of the following statements, could you please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to 
agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree?
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT – ROTATE)
Totally 
agree
Tend to 
agree
Tend to 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
Not applicable 
(SPONTANEOUS)
DK
1
Nowadays you need to log into 
several systems using several 
usernames and passwords
1 2 3 4 5 6
2
The (NATIONALITY) Government 
asks you for more and more 
personal information 
1 2 3 4 5 6
3
You feel obliged to disclose 
personal information on the 
Internet
1 2 3 4 5 6
4
There is no alternative than to 
disclose personal information 
if one wants to obtain products 
or services
1 2 3 4 5 6
5
Disclosing personal information 
is not a big issue for you
1 2 3 4 5 6
6
Disclosing personal information 
is an increasing part of modern 
life
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
You don’t mind disclosing 
personal information in return 
for free services online (e.g. 
free email adress)
1 2 3 4 5 6
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ASK QB4a TO QB12a IF “USE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND\ OR SHARING SITES”, CODE 1 IN 
QB1a.1 OR QB1a.2 – OTHERS GO TO QB4b
Social networking sites and sharing sites are becoming more and more popular. On these sites, people 
keep in touch with their friends and families, conduct business, meet new friends or play games.
QB4a Thinking of your usage of social networking sites and sharing sites, which of the following types 
of information have you already disclosed (when you registered, or simply when using these 
websites)?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Medical information (patient record, health information) 1,
Your fingerprints 2,
Financial information (e. g salary, bank details, credit record) 3,
Your work history 4,
Your national identity number (USE APPROPRIATE TERM IN EACH COUNTRY)\ card number\ passport 
number
5,
Your name 6,
Your home address 7,
Your nationality 8,
Things you do (e.g. hobbies, sports, places you go) 9,
Your tastes and opinions 10,
Photos of you 11,
Who your friends are 12,
Websites you visit 13,
Your mobile phone number 14,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 15,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 16,
DK 17,
ASK	QB5a	AND	QB6a	IF	“HAVE	DISCLOSED	PERSONAL	INFORMATION	ON	SOCIAL	NETWORKING	
SITES AND\ OR SHARING SITES”, CODE 1 TO 15 IN QB4a – OTHERS GO TO QB7a
QB5a What are the most important reasons why you disclose such information on social networking 
 sites and\ or sharing sites?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MAX. 3 ANSWERS)
To access the service 1,
To save time at the next visit 2,
To receive money or price reductions 3,
To benefit from personalised commercial offers 4,
To get a service for free 5,
To obtain a service adapted to your needs 6,
For fun 7,
To connect with others 8,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 9,
DK 10,
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 sites and\ or sharing sites, e.g. the ability to change, delete or correct this information?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Complete control 1
Partial control 2
No control at all 3
DK 4
ASK QB7a TO QB12a IF “USE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND\ OR SHARING SITES”, CODE 1 IN 
QB1a.1 OR QB1a.2 – OTHERS GO TO QB4b
QB7a I will read out a list of potential risks. According to you, what are the most important risks 
 connected with disclosure of personal information on social networking sites and\ or sharing sites?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ROTATE – MAX. 3 ANSWERS)
Your information being used without your knowledge 1,
Your information being shared with third parties without your agreement 2,
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial offers 3,
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 4,
Your identity being at risk of theft online 5,
Your personal safety being at risk 6,
Yourself being victim of fraud 7,
Yourself being discriminated against (e.g. in job selection, receiving price increases, getting 
no access to a service)
8,
Your reputation being damaged 9,
Your information being used in different contexts from the ones where you disclosed it 10,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 11,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 12,
DK 13,
QB8a Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Social networking 
sites and\ or sharing sites sufficiently inform their users about the possible consequences of 
disclosing personal information.
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Totally agree 1
Tend to agree 2
Tend to disagree 3
Totally disagree 4
DK 5
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safely on social networking sites and\ or sharing sites? Firstly?
QB9a2 And secondly?
(SHOW CARD – ONE ANSWER PER COLUMN)
(READ OUT)
QB9a1 QB9a2
FIRSTLY SECONDLY
You – as you need to take care of your information 1 1
The social networking sites and\ or sharing sites you are dealing with – as they need to 
ensure they process your information fairly
2 2
Public authorities – as they need to ensure that citizens are protected 3 3
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 4 4
DK 5 5
A personal profile on a social networking site or sharing site is made of information such as your age, 
location, interests, an uploaded photo and an “about me” section. Profile visibility – who can see your 
information and interact with you - can in some cases be personalised by managing the privacy settings 
offered by the site.
QB10a Have you ever tried to change the privacy settings of your personal profile from the default 
settings on a social networking site and\ or sharing site?
Yes 1
No 2
DK 3
ASK QB11a IF “YES”, CODE 1 IN QB10a – OTHERS GO TO QB12a
QB11a How easy or difficult did you find it to change the privacy settings of your personal profile?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Very easy 1
Fairly easy 2
Fairly difficult 3
Very difficult 4
DK 5
ASK QB12a IF “NO”, CODE 2 IN QB10a – OTHERS GO TO QB4b
QB12a Why did you not try to change these privacy settings?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
You did not know that you could change the settings 1,
You do not know how to proceed to change these settings 2,
You trust the site to set appropriate privacy settings 3,
You are not worried by having personal data on social networking and\ or sharing sites 4,
You did not find the time to look at the available options 5,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 6,
DK 7,
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ASK	QB4b	TO	QB8b	IF	“PURCHASE	GOODS	OR	SERVICES	ONLINE”,	CODE	1	IN	QB1a.3	–	OTHERS	
GO TO QB13
It is increasingly common to purchase goods and services via the Internet (online shopping). People buy 
clothes, sports goods, books, travel tickets and holidays online; they purchase films, music and games; 
they compare prices of goods and services; they buy shares and financial and insurance products.
QB4b Thinking of the occasions when you have purchased goods or services via the Internet, which of 
the following types of information have you already disclosed?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Medical information (patient record, health information) 1,
Your fingerprints 2,
Financial information (e. g salary, bank details, credit record) 3,
Your work history 4,
Your national identity number (USE APPROPRIATE TERM IN EACH COUNTRY)\ card 
number\ passport number
5,
Your name 6,
Your home address 7,
Your nationality 8,
Things you do (e.g. hobbies, sports, places you go) 9,
Your tastes and opinions 10,
Photos of you 11,
Who your friends are 12,
Websites you visit 13,
Your mobile phone number 14,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 15,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 16,
DK 17,
ASK	QB5b	AND	QB6b	IF	“HAVE	DISCLOSED	PERSONAL	INFORMATION	WHEN	SHOPPING	ONLINE”,	
CODE 1 TO 15 IN QB4b – OTHERS GO TO QB8b
QB5b What are the most important reasons why you disclose such information in online shopping?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MAX. 3 ANSWERS)
To access the service 1,
To save time at the next visit 2,
To receive money or price reductions 3,
To benefit from personalised commercial offers 4,
To get a service for free 5,
To obtain a service adapted to your needs 6,
For fun 7,
To connect with others 8,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 9,
DK 10,
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online, e.g. the ability to change, delete or correct this information?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Complete control 1
Partial control 2
No control at all 3
DK 4
ASK	QB7b	TO	QB8b	IF	“PURCHASE	GOODS	OR	SERVICES	ONLINE”,	CODE	1	IN	QB1a.3	–	OTHERS	
GO TO QB13
QB7b I will read out a list of potential risks. According to you, what are the most important risks 
connected with disclosure of your personal information to buy goods or services via the Internet? 
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ROTATE – MAX. 3 ANSWERS)
Your information being used without your knowledge 1,
Your information being shared with third parties without your agreement 2,
Your information being used to send you unwanted commercial offers 3,
Your views and behaviours being misunderstood 4,
Your identity being at risk of theft online 5,
Your personal safety being at risk 6,
Yourself being victim of fraud 7,
Yourself being discriminated against (e.g. in a job selection, receiving price increases, 
getting no access to a service)
8,
Your reputation being damaged 9,
Your information being used in different contexts from the ones where you disclosed it 10,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 11,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 12,
DK 13,
QB8b1 Who do you think should make sure that your information is collected, stored and exchanged 
safely when you buy goods or services via the Internet? Firstly?
QB8b2 And secondly?
(SHOW CARD – ONE ANSWER PER COLUMN)
(READ OUT)
QB8b1 QB8b2
FIRSTLY SECONDLY
You – as you need to take care of your information 1 1
The online shopping sites – as they need to ensure they process your information fairly 2 2
Public authorities – as they need to ensure that citizens are protected 3 3
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 4 4
DK 5 5
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ASK ALL
QB13 Nowadays, cameras, cards and websites record your behaviour, for a range of reasons. Are 
you very concerned, fairly concerned, not very concerned or not at all concerned about your 
behaviour being recorded…?
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT)
Very 
concerned
Fairly 
concerned
Not very 
concerned
Not at all 
concerned
Not applicable 
(SPONTANEOUS)
DK
1
On the Internet (browsing, 
downloading files, accessing 
content online)
1 2 3 4 5 6
2
In a public space (street, 
subway, airport, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
3
In a private space (restaurant, 
bar, club, office, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6
4
Via mobile phone\ mobile 
Internet (call content, geo-
location)
1 2 3 4 5 6
5
Via payment cards (location and 
spending)
1 2 3 4 5 6
6
Via store or loyalty cards 
(preferences and consumption, 
patterns, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6
QB14 Which of the following do you currently use?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Credit cards and bank cards 1,
Customer cards (loyalty cards, frequent flyer cards) 2,
National identity cards\ residence permit 3,
Passport 4,
Government entitlement cards (USE APPROPRIATE NAME IN EACH COUNTRY – e. g. BE : 
carte SIS, FR : carte VITAL)
5,
Driving licence 6,
(ONLY IF STUDENT) Student card 7,
(ONLY IF USE THE INTERNET) An account you use on the Internet (email, social networking, 
commercial services)
8,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 9,
DK 10,
QB15 In your daily life, what do you do to protect your identity? Please indicate all that apply in the 
following list.
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Use cash instead of recorded transactions (bank cards, transfers) 1,
Give the minimum required information 2,
Adjust the information you disclose to different contexts (e.g., depending on whether you are dealing with a company, a 
bank or a website)
3,
Provide wrong information 4,
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Shred old bills, bank statements, credit card receipts, etc. 6,
Do not disclose payment card details online 7,
Do not disclose your user names and passwords 8,
Do not disclose your bank details or PIN numbers 9,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 10,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 11,
DK 12,
ASK QB16 TO QB23 IF “USE THE INTERNET”, CODE 1 TO 5 IN D62.1 OR D62.2 OR D62.3 – OTHERS 
GO TO QB24
QB16 And, specifically on the Internet, what do you do to protect your identity? Please indicate all 
that apply in the following list.
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Use a dummy email account 1,
Use anti-spy software 2,
Delete cookies 3,
Use tools and strategies to limit unwanted emails (spams) 4,
Check that the transaction is protected or the site has a safety logo\ label 5,
Avoid providing the same information to different sites 6,
Change the security settings of your browser to increase privacy 7,
Use a search engine to maintain awareness of what information circulates about you on the Internet 8,
Ask websites to access the information they hold about you in order to update it or delete it 9,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 10,
None (SPONTANEOUS) 11,
DK 12,
I am going to ask you a series of questions about how personal information or data is collected, treated, 
stored and protected by public and private organisations.
QB17 When you intend to become a member of a social networking site or register for a service 
online, you are usually asked to disclose personal information. In these circumstances, have you 
been informed about the conditions for the data collection and the further uses of your data?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Always 1
Sometimes 2
Rarely 3
Never 4
Not applicable (SPONTANEOUS) 5
DK 6
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and who will have access to it.
QB18 Thinking about privacy statements on the Internet, which of the following sentences best 
describes your situation?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
You usually read and understand them 1
You usually read them but do not fully understand them 2
You usually do not read them 3
You do not know where to find them 4
You ignore them 5
DK 6
ASK QB19 IF “READ THEM”, CODE 1 OR 2 IN QB18 – OTHERS GO TO QB20
QB19 Have you adapted your behaviour on the Internet after reading privacy statements? Please 
choose the sentence that comes closest to your experience.
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Yes, and you have already decided at least once not to use an online service 1
Yes, and you have been more cautious about the personal information you disclose on the Internet 2
No 3
DK 4
ASK QB20 IF “DON’T READ THEM USUALLY” OR “IGNORE THEM”, CODE 3 OR 5 IN QB18 – OTHERS 
GO TO QB21
QB20 What are the reasons why you usually do not read them or you usually ignore them?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
You think the websites will not honour them anyway 1,
You believe that the law will protect you in any case 2,
It is sufficient for you to see that websites have a privacy policy 3,
DK 4,
ASK QB21 TO QB23 IF “USE THE INTERNET”, CODE 1 TO 5 IN D62.1 OR D62.2 OR D62.3 – OTHERS 
GO TO QB24
QB21 As you may know, some Internet companies are able to provide free search engines or free 
e-mail accounts thanks to the income they receive from advertisers trying to reach users on their 
websites. How comfortable are you with the fact that those websites use information about your 
online activity to tailor advertisements or content to your hobbies and interests?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Very comfortable 1
Fairly comfortable 2
Fairly uncomfortable 3
Very uncomfortable 4
DK 5
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to or to use an online service (e.g. when registering for an online game or an online information 
service, purchasing a good online, opening an account with a social networking site)?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Always 1
Sometimes 2
Rarely 3
Never 4
DK 5
ASK QB23 IF “ALWAYS” OR “SOMETIMES”, CODE 1 OR 2 IN QB22 – OTHERS GO TO QB24
QB23How concerned are you about such cases?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Very concerned 1
Fairly concerned 2
Not very concerned 3
Not at all concerned 4
DK 5
ASK ALL
QB24 Should your specific approval be required before any kind of personal information is collected 
and processed?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Yes, in all cases 1,
Yes, in the context of personal information asked on the Internet 2,
Yes, in the case of sensitive information (health, religion, political beliefs, sexual preferences, etc.) 3,
No 4,
DK 5,
QB25 Different authorities (government departments, local authorities, agencies) and private 
companies collect and store personal information. To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions to protect your personal information?
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT)
Totally 
trust 
Tend to 
trust
Tend not 
to trust
Do not 
trust at all
DK
1
National public authorities (e.g. tax authorities, social security 
authorities)
1 2 3 4 5
2
European institutions (European Commission, European 
Parliament, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
3 Banks and financial institutions 1 2 3 4 5
4 Health and medical institutions 1 2 3 4 5
5 Shops and department stores 1 2 3 4 5
6
Internet companies (Search Engines, Social Networking 
Sites, E-mail Services)
1 2 3 4 5
7
Phone companies, mobile phone companies and Internet 
Services Providers
1 2 3 4 5
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the one it was collected for, without informing you (e.g. for direct marketing, targeted online 
advertising). How concerned are you about this use of your information?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Very concerned 1
Fairly concerned 2
Not very concerned 3
Not at all concerned 4
DK 5
QB27 According to EU data protection rules, you have the right to access your personal information 
stored by public or private entities, in order to change, block or delete it. EU rules do not specify 
whether access to personal information should be free of charge. In some EU Member States, you 
have to pay in order to be granted such access. Would you be prepared to pay to have access?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Yes, but only a small amount (e.g. postage or communication costs), less than 2€ 1
Yes, up to 20 € 2
Yes, more than 20 € 3
No 4
DK 5
ASK QB28 AND QB29 IF “USE THE INTERNET”, CODES 1 TO 5 IN D62.1 OR D62.2 OR D62.3 – 
OTHERS GO TO QB30
QB28 In what circumstances, if any, would you like personal information stored and collected through 
a website to be completely deleted?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Whenever you decide to delete it 1,
When you change your Internet provider 2,
When you stop using the service\ website 3,
Never 4,
DK 5,
QB29 When you decide to change providers or stop using a service, how important or not is it for you 
to be able to transfer personal information that was stored and collected through the website?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY) 
Very important 1
Fairly important 2
Not very important 3
Not at all important 4
DK 5
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QB30 In the last 12 months, have you heard about or experienced issues in relation to data losses and 
identity theft?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE)
Yes, through television, radio, newspapers, the Internet 1,
Yes, through word of mouth 2,
Yes, it affected one of your acquaintances 3,
Yes, it affected a member of your family 4,
Yes, it affected you directly 5,
Yes, others (SPONTANEOUS) 6,
No 7,
DK 8,
QB31 Would you want to be informed by a public authority or by a private company whenever 
information they hold about you is lost or stolen?
Yes 1
No 2
DK 3
QB32 How important or not is it for you to have the same rights and protections over your personal 
information regardless of the EU country in which it is collected and processed?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Very important 1
Fairly important 2
Not very important 3
Not at all important 4
DK 5
QB33 EU data protection rules nowadays provide for special protection for the processing of sensitive 
personal data, such as data related to health, sex life, ethnic origin, religious beliefs, political 
opinions, etc. Do you think that genetic information such as DNA data should also have the 
same special protection?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Yes, definitely 1
Yes, to some extent 2
No, not really 3
No, definitely not 4
DK 5
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tQB34 Please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with 
the following statements regarding the protection of personal data of minors.
(SHOW CARD WITH SCALE – ONE ANSWER PER LINE)
 (READ OUT)
Totally 
agree
Tend to 
agree
Tend to 
disagree
Totally 
disagree
DK
1
Minors should be specially protected from the 
collection and disclosure of personal data
1 2 3 4 5
2
Minors should be warned of the consequences of 
collecting and disclosing personal data
1 2 3 4 5
QB35 The police sometimes access and analyse individuals’ personal data to carry out their activities. 
In what circumstances should the police be able to access individuals’ personal data?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
For all general crime prevention activities 1
Only specific data within the framework of a specific investigation 2
Only with the authorisation of a judge 3
Never (SPONTANEOUS) 4
DK 5
QB36 Do you think that your data would be better protected in large companies if they were obliged to 
have a specific contact person in charge of ensuring that your personal data is handled properly?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
Yes, definitely 1
Yes, to some extent 2
No, not really 3
No, definitely not 4
DK 5
QB37 In your opinion, the enforcement of the rules on personal data protection should be dealt with at…?
(READ OUT – ONE ANSWER ONLY)
European level 1
National level 2
Regional or local level 3
DK 4
QB38 Have you heard about a public authority in (OUR COUNTRY) responsible for protecting your 
rights regarding your personal data?
Yes 1
No 2
DK 3
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re QB39 Some companies use people’s personal data without them being aware, creating inconvenience 
ranging from spam to financial loss. What should be the public authorities’ main priorities to 
fight these practises?
(SHOW CARD – READ OUT – ROTATE – MAX. 4 ANSWERS)
Impose a fine to these companies 1,
Provide legal support for those willing to take the case in court 2,
Provide an out of court procedure to sort out the problem 3,
Ban them from using such data in the future 4,
Compel them to compensate the victims 5,
Put people in similar situation in touch to start joint legal action 6,
Give people more direct control on their own personal data 7,
Allocate more resources to monitoring and enforcing existing regulations 8,
Find better technical solution that preserve users’ privacy and safety 9,
Provide formal education and guidelines on safe disclosure 10,
Raise awareness of the implications of unsafe disclosure 11,
Make greater use of warnings and signs to signal possible unsafe disclosure 12,
Other (SPONTANEOUS) 13,
DK 14,
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